Individualism in Social Science: Forms and Limits of a Methodology

The literature on methodological individualism is characterized by two widely held assumptions: first that most formulations of the doctrine have been inadequate and enigmatic; and secondly that if the doctrine were to be stated with sufficient care it would be seen to be trivially true. Dr Bhargava challenges the second of these assumptions. He begins by disentangling the different forms of methodological individualism, and then shows that even in its most plausible version it is neither trivial, nor obviously true. He argues that assertions of its trivially true character are merely rhetorical devices, concealing deeper ontological and methodological issues that divide the individualist from the non-individualist. Both agree that actions are partly constituted by beliefs, but for the individualist beliefs are mental attitudes individuated wholly in terms of what lies within the individual mind, whereas for the non-individualist beliefs also lie embedded in social practice, and must be partly individuated in relation to social contexts. The author argues that, once the key individualist assumption is challenged, the way is clear for a rehabilitation of a non-individualist methodology which permits an independent study of social contexts, and a contextual study of the beliefs and actions of individuals.