Equality and PartialityDerived from Thomas Nagel's Locke Lectures, Equality and Partiality proposes a nonutopian account of political legitimacy, based on the need to accommodate both personal and impersonal motives in any credible moral theory, and therefore in any political theory with a moral foundation. Within each individual, Nagel believes, there is a division between two standpoints, the personal and the impersonal. Without the impersonal standpoint, there would be no morality, only the clash, compromise, and occasional convergence of individual perspectives. It is because a human being does not occupy only his own point of view that each of us is susceptible to the claims of others through private and public morality. Political systems, to be legitimate, must achieve an integration of these two standpoints within the individual. These ideas are applied to specific problems such as social and economic inequality, toleration, international justice, and the public support of culture. Nagel points to the problem of balancing equality and partiality as the most important issue with which political theorists are now faced. |
Contents
| 3 | |
2 Two Standpoints | 10 |
3 The Problem of Utopianism | 21 |
4 Legitimacy and Unanimity | 33 |
5 Kants Test | 41 |
6 The Moral Division of Labor | 53 |
7 Egalitarianism | 63 |
8 Problems of Convergence | 75 |
10 Equality and Motivation | 96 |
11 Options | 120 |
12 Inequality | 130 |
13 Rights | 139 |
14 Toleration | 154 |
The World | 169 |
| 181 | |
| 185 | |
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Common terms and phrases
accept advantages agent-neutral agent-relative alternative argument arrangement attitude basic believe benefit better categorical imperative choice claims competitive conception conflict decent demands democratic depends Derek Parfit desire discrimination division economic economic inequality effects egalitarian impartiality egalitarian system ethical everyone's favor framework freedom G. A. Cohen guaranteed minimum human ical impartial concern impersonal stand impersonal standpoint impersonal values important impose interests John Rawls Justice as Fairness Kantian legitimate liberal limited lives ment moral natural nepotism nomic numbers object one's personal aims personal and impersonal personal motives point of view policies political institutions political legitimacy political theory position possible present priority problem psychological pursuit question Rawls reasonably reject regard require responsible result role Ronald Dworkin sacrifice sense sexual social minimum society solution sonal standard strongly egalitarian talent Theory of Justice things tion toleration unanimity universal universalizability unreasonable utilitarian utopian vidual worse