The Arrow Impossibility Theorem

Front Cover
Columbia University Press, Jul 22, 2014 - Business & Economics - 160 pages

Kenneth J. Arrow's pathbreaking "impossibility theorem" was a watershed innovation in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, nondictatorship, and independence.

In this book Eric Maskin and Amartya Sen explore the implications of Arrow's theorem. Sen considers its ongoing utility, exploring the theorem's value and limitations in relation to recent research on social reasoning, and Maskin discusses how to design a voting rule that gets us closer to the ideal—given the impossibility of achieving the ideal. The volume also contains a contextual introduction by social choice scholar Prasanta K. Pattanaik and commentaries from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow himself, as well as essays by Maskin, Dasgupta, and Sen outlining the mathematical proof and framework behind their assertions.

 

Selected pages

Contents

Introduction by Prasanta K Pattanaik
1
The Lectures
23
Opening Remarks by Joseph E Stiglitz
25
Arrow and the Impossibility Theorem by Amartya Sen
29
Where Do We Go From Here? by Eric Maskin
43
Commentary by Kenneth J Arrow
57
Supplemental Materials
65
The Informational Basis of Social Choice by Amartya Sen
67
On The Robustness of Majority Rule by Partha Dasgupta and Eric Maskin
101
The Origins of the Impossibility Theorem by Kenneth J Arrow
143
Notes on Contributors
149
Copyright

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The Arrow Impossibility Theorem
Eric Maskin,Amartya Sen
Limited preview - 2014

Common terms and phrases

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About the author (2014)

Eric Maskin is the Adams University Professor at Harvard University. He received the 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics (with L. Hurwicz and R. Myerson) for laying the foundations of mechanism design theory. He has also contributed to game theory, contract theory, social choice theory, political economy, and other areas of economics.



Amartya Sen is the Thomas W. Lamont University Professor and Professor of Economics and Philosophy at Harvard University. In 1998 he was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, and in 1999 he was awarded the Bharat Ratna, India's highest civilian award. He is also a senior fellow at the Harvard Society of Fellows; distinguished fellow of All Souls College, Oxford; and a Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. His books have been translated into more than thirty languages.

Bibliographic information

TitleThe Arrow Impossibility Theorem
Kenneth J. Arrow Lecture Series
AuthorsEric Maskin, Amartya Sen
ContributorsKenneth J. Arrow, Partha Dasgupta, Prasanta K. Pattanaik, Joseph E. Stiglitz
Editionreprint
PublisherColumbia University Press, 2014
ISBN0231526865, 9780231526869
Length160 pages
Subjects ›  › 

Business & Economics / Economics / Theory
Business & Economics / General
Mathematics / Game Theory
Mathematics / Logic
Political Science / Political Process / Campaigns & Elections
  
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