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causeth poverty and inconvenience in a state, for it is a surcharge of expence; and besides, it being of necessity that many of the nobility fall in time to be weak in fortune, it maketh a kind of disproportion between honour and means.
As for nobility in particular persons; it is a reverend thing to see an ancient castle or building not in decay; or to see a fair timber tree sound and perfect; how much more to behold an ancient noble family, which hath stood against the waves and weathers of time? for new nobility is but the act of power, but ancient nobility is the act of time. Those that are first raised to nobility, are commonly more virtuous, but less innocent, than their descendants; for there is rarely any rising, but by a commixture of good and evil arts: but it is reason the memory of their virtues remain to their posterity, and their faults die with themselves. Nobility of birth commonly abateth industry; and he that is not industrious envieth him that is. Besides, noble persons cannot go much higher; and he that standeth at a stay, when others rise, can hardly avoid motions of envy. On the other side, nobility extinguisheth the passive envy from others towards them, because they are in possession of honour. Certainly kings that have able men of their nobility, shall find ease in employing them, and a better sUde into their business: for people naturally bend to them, as born in some sort to command.
XV. Of Seditions And Troubles.
Shepherds of people had need know the kalendars of tempests in state; which are commonly greatest when things grow to equality; as natural tempests are greatest about the cequinoctia. And as there are certain hollow blasts of wind, and secret swellings of seas, before a tempest, so are there in states: Ille etiam cacos instare tumultus
Sc&pe monet, fraudesque et operta tumescere bella.
Libels and licentious discourses against the state, when they are frequent and open, and in like sort
false news often running up and down to the disadvantage of the state, and hastily embraced, are amongst the signs of troubles. Virgil giving the pedigree of Fame, saith, she was sister to the giants. I Ham Terra parens, ira irritata Deorum, Extremam, ut perhibent,Ceeo Enceladoque sororem Progenuit. As if fames were the relicks of seditions past: but they are no less indeed the preludes of seditions to come. Howsoever he noteth it right, that seditious tumults, and seditious fames, differ no more, but as brother and sister, masculine and feminine; especially if it come to that, that the best actions of a state, and the most plausible, and which ought to give greatest contentment, are taken in ill sense and traduced: for that shews the envy great, as Tacitus saith; conflata magna invidia, seu bene, seu male, gesta premunt. Neither doth it follow, that because these fames are a sign of troubles, that the suppressing of them with too much severity should be a remedy of troubles. For the despising of them many times checks them best: and the going about to stop them, doth but make a wonder long-lived. Also that kind of obedience which Tacitus speaketh of, is to be held suspected; Erant in officio, sed tamen qui mallent mandata imperantium intcrpretari quam exequi; disputing, excusing, cavilling upon mandates and directions, is a kind of shaking off the yoke, and assay of disobedience: especially if in those disputings, they which are for the direction, speak fearfully and tenderly; and those that are against it, audaciously.
Also, as Machiavel noteth well, when princes, that ought to be common parents, make themselves as a party, and lean to a side, it is as a boat that is overthrown by uneven weight on the one side: as was well seen in the time of Henry the third of France; for first, himself entered league for the extirpation of the protestants; and presently after the same league was turned upon himself. For when the authority of princes is made but an accessary to a cause, and that there be other bands, that tie faster than the band of
sovereignty, kings begin to be put almost out of possession.
Also, when discords, and quarrels, and factions, are carried openly and audaciously, it is a sign the reverence of government is lost. For the motions of the greatest persons in a government ought to be as the motions of the planets under primum mobile, according to the old opinion; which is, that every of them is carried swiftly by the highest motion, and softly in their own motion. And therefore when great ones in their own particular motion move violently, and, as Tacitus expresseth it well, liberius, quam ut imperantium meminissent; it is a sign the orbs are out of frame. For reverence is that wherewith princes are girt from God, who threateneth the dissolving thereof; solvam cingula regum.
So when any of the four pillars of government are mainly shaken or weakened, which are religion, justice, counsel, and treasure, men had need to pray- for fair weather. But let us pass from this part of predictions, concerning which, nevertheless, more light may be taken from that which followeth, and let us speak first of the materials of seditions; then of the motives of them; and thirdly, of the remedies.
Concerning the materials of seditions. It is a thing well to be considered; for the surest way to prevent seditions, if the times do bear it, is to take away the matter of them. For if there be fuel prepared, it is hard to tell whence the spark shall come that shall set it on fire. The matter of seditions is of two kinds: much poverty, and much discontentment. It is certain, so many overthrown estates, so many votes for troubles. Lucan noteth well the state of Rome before the civil war:'
Hinc usura vorax, rapidumqiie in tempore Jcenus,
Hinc concussa fides, et multis utile betium. This same multis utile beltiim is an assured and infallible sign of a state disposed to seditions and troubles.' And if this poverty and broken estate in the better sort be joined with a want and necessity in the mean people, the danger is imminent and great. For the
rebellions of the belly are the worst. As for discontentments, they are in the politic body like to humours in the natural, which are apt to gather a preternatural heat, and to inflame. And let no prince measure the danger of them by this; whether they be just, or unjust; for that were to imagine people to be too reasonable; who do often spurn at their own good: nor yet by this; whether the griefs whereupon they rise be in fact great or small. For they are the most dangerous discontentments, where the fear is greater than the feeling. Dolendi modus, timendi non item. Besides, in great oppressions, the same things that provoke the patience, do withal mate the courage ; but in fears it is not so. Neither let any prince or state be secure concerning discontentments, because they have been often, or have been long, and yet no peril hath ensued; for as it is true that every vapour, or fume, doth not turn into a storm; so it is nevertheless true, that storms, though they blow over divers times, yet may fall at last; and as the Spanish proverb noteth well, the cord breaketh at the last by the weakest pull. ;. . ....
The causes and motives of seditions are, innovation in religion, taxes, alteration of laws and customs, breaking of privileges, general oppression, advancement of unworthy persons, strangers, dearths, disbanded soldiers, factions grown desperate; and whatsoever in offending people, joineth and knitteth them in a common cause.
For the remedies, there may be some general preservatives, whereof we will speak; as for the just cure, it must answer to the particular disease: and so be left to counsel, rather than rule.
The first remedy or prevention, is to remove by all means possible that material cause of sedition, whereof we spake; which is want and poverty in the estate. To which purpose serveth the opening and well ba. lancing of trade; the cherishing of manufactures; the banishing of idleness; the repressing of waste and excess by sumptuary laws; the improvement and husbanding of the sou; the regulating of prices of things
vendible; the moderating of taxes and tributes, and the like. Generally it is to be foreseen, that the population of a kingdom, especially if it. be not mown down by wars, do not exceed the stock of the kingdom which should maintain them. Neither is the population to be reckoned only by number: for a smaller number, that spend more, and earn less, do wear out an estate sooner than a greater number that live lower and gather more. Therefore the multiplying of nobility, and other degrees of quality, in an overproportion to the common people, doth speedily bring a state to necessity: and so doth likewise an overgrown clergy; for they bring nothing to the stock: and in like manner, when more are bred scholars, than preferments can take off.
It is likewise to be remembered, that forasmuch as the increase of any estate must be upon the foreigner, for whatsoever is somewhere gotten is somewhere lost, there be but three things which one nation selleth unto another; the commodity as nature yieldeth it; the manufacture; and the vecture or carriage. So that if these three wheels go, wealth will flow as in a spring tide. And it cometh many times to pass, that materiam superabit opus, that the work and carriage is more worth than the material, and enricheth a state more; as is notably seen in the Low-Countrymen, who have the best mines above ground in the world.
Above all things good policy is to be used, that the treasure and moneys in a state be not gathered into few hands. For otherwise a state may have a great stock, and yet starve. And money is like muck, not good except it be spread. This is done chiefly by suppressing, or at the least keeping a strait hand upon the devouring trades of usury, ingrossing, great pasturages, and the like.
For removing discontentments, or at least the danger of them: there is in every state, as we know, two portions of subjects, the noblesse, and the commonalty. When one of these is discontent, the danger is not great; for common people are of slow .motion, if they