Antitrust Law, Second EditionThe definitive textbook of antitrust law Antitrust Law was fundamental to redefining the field of antitrust law and it remains the definitive textbook for those teaching or learning the subject, Richard Posner's book has played a major role in transforming the field of antitrust law into a body of economically rational principles largely in accord with the ideas set forth in the first edition. Today's antitrust professionals may disagree on specific practices and rules, but most litigators, prosecutors, judges, and scholars agree that the primary goal of antitrust laws should be to promote economic welfare, and that economic theory should be used to determine how well business practices conform to that goal. In this thoroughly revised edition, Posner explains the economic approach to new generations of lawyers and students. "The antitrust laws are here to stay," Posner writes, "and the practical question is how to administer them better-more rationally, more accurately, more expeditiously, more efficiently." This fully revised classic will continue to be the standard work in the field. |
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agreement analysis anticompetitive antitrust enforcement antitrust laws antitrust policy brand cartel cartel price chapter charge Clayton Act Clorox collusive pricing competitive level competitive price concentration consumer contract costs of monopoly customers dealers decision deconcentration defendant demand curve discussed distribution divestiture economies of scale effect efficient elasticity of demand entrant entry evidence example exclusionary practices exclusive dealing Falstaff Federal firm’s higher price industry Journal of Law Law and Economics Law Review litigation lower price manufacturer marginal cost market power market price market share monopolist monopoly power monopoly price monopoly profits nopoly oligopolistic oligopoly output patent percent plaintiff potential competitor predatory pricing price discrimination price fixing price increase problem punishment purchasers reason reduce remedy resale price maintenance restrictions result retail sell sellers Sherman Act social costs Standard substitutes Supreme Court tacit collusion theory tie-in tied product tion total cost tying U.S. Steel United violation