Arms and Influence
Yale University Press, 1966 - Technology & Engineering - 293 pages
The author concentrates in this book n the way in which military capabilities real or imagined are used, skillfully of clumsily, as bargaining power. He sees the steps taken by the U.S. during the Berlin and Cuban crises as not merely preparations for engagement, but as signals to and enemy, with reports from the adversary's own military intelligence as our most important diplomatic communications.
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