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ally expected, that the doctrines in question would have been attributed to S'ukra, the preceptor of the demons, rather than to Brihaspati, the preceptor of the gods; and plausible grounds for such an adjudication might have been found in the singular passage at the end of the Chhándogya Upanishad. There we read, that Indra among the gods and Virochana among the Asuras or demons, went to Prajapati to learn the knowledge of the Soul, and that Virochana acquiesced without further inquiry in the exoteric doctrine of the Self. "He, Virochana, with a feeling of satisfaction, repaired to the Asuras, and unto them imparted this instruction, 'Self alone is adorable; in this world Self alone should be served; by adoring and serving one's self, both this and the other world may be attained.' Therefore thenceforward the Asuras give no alms, have no faith in good works, and officiate at no sacrifice; hence are they called Asuras. This is their Upanishad. Their dead are besmeared with aromatics and adorned with ornaments and costly raiment, and they think that thereby they will overcome this region and that." Tradition, however, gives a different origin; and just as Vishnu is said to have assumed his ninth avatár as Buddha to destroy the daityas, so Brihaspati is described as promulgating his system to overthrow the preeminence of the sons of Raji.

The legend is given with more or less detail in the Vishnu and Matsya Puránas.* I subjoin the following abridgement of it from the Harivansa (chapter 28).

A'yus, the son of Purúravas of the lunar dynasty, had five sons, Nahusha, Vriddhas'arman, Rambha, Raji and Anenas, of whom Raji had five hundred sons. A great war was going on between the devas and asuras, and Brahmá had foretold victory to that side which was espoused by Raji. The two parties claim his aid,† but on his demanding to be made an Indra as his reward, the demons refused saying, "Our Indra is Prahráda." The gods on the other hand accept the proposed condition, and Raji accordingly conquers their enemies and becomes during his lifetime their Indra. On Raji's death, his 500 sons seize the inheritance, and Indra is unable to prevail against them. In the extremity of his distress he is repre

*The latter makes Brihaspati teach the Jaina doctrine.

Raji was descended by his father from Soma, but by his mother from Swar blánu, a dánava.

sented as going to Brihaspati and begging for a piece of the sacred Purodás a though it were only the size of a jujube fruit, to support his fainting strength, just as Aristophanes represents the gods coming to Peisthetærus when the walls of Nephelococcygia interrupted the smoke of the sacrifices. Brihaspati in compassion promises to aid him in recovering his lost dominion, and for this purpose he invented a new system of atheistical doctrines, "A practical S'ástra of atheism, utterly hostile to religion, most subtile of logical systems, and beguiling the hearts of the wicked, though such as could never please the mind of the truly virtuous." This new S'ástra of Brihaspati easily deluded the minds of the young princes, and they soon lost all their merit and fell from their 'pride of place,' and Indra regained his throne.

The earliest mention which I have found of the word Nústika (nihilist,) or its derivatives is in the Maitráyaní Upanishad (3rd book, § 5) where Nástikya is enumerated as one of the effects of the quality of darkness.* Nástika and Nástikya occur several times in Manu. In the Rámáyana we have an allusion to nástikas in ch. 109 (Schlegel'sed), of the Ayodhya Kánda, where Ráma censures Jábáli for advising him to break his father's vow and return to his capital.

“I blame that deed of my father that he chose as his priest one so unstable-minded as thee,-wandering to ruin with such opinions, a very atheist (Nástika) astray from the path of religion.

"As is the thief, so too is the Bauddha; and know that the Nástika is equal to them. Therefore the sage whom men most hold in awe, will not speak face to face with the Nástika.†”

We find Nástika as well as ástika in the Purohitagana attached to Pánini's grammar. I have already mentioned that Chárváka ap

* Buddhist, or materialist, opinions seem alluded to in such passages as Chhándogya Upanishad, VI. 2, 1, &c.

+ There a variation in Schlegel's text and that of the late Calcutta edition. The former has तस्माद्धि यः शंक्यतमः प्रजानां ; the latter has शक्यतमः, and the Schol. explains the S'loka thus ;

बुद्धो बुद्धमतानुसारौ तथा चोरवद् दश्य इति प्रसिद्धं नास्तिकं चार्वाकं तथा`गतं तत्सदृशं चोरवद् दण्ड्यं विद्वि । नास्तिक बिशेषस्तथागतः तमपि चोरवद दण्यमिति शेष इत्यन्ये । वेदप्रामाण्यापहर्टत्वेन तेषामपि चोरत्वात् । हि निश्चयेन तस्मात् प्रजानामनुग्रहाय राज्ञा चोरवदेव दण्डयितुं शक्यतमो यः स चोरवदेव दण्यः दण्डयेोग्ये तु बुधो ब्राह्मणो नास्तिकेऽभिमुखो न स्यात् तत्सम्भाषणादि न कुर्वीतेत्यर्थः । तुल्यन्यायात् दण्डासमर्थे। ब्राह्मणोऽपि तद्विमुखः स्यादिति सूचितं ।

pears as a demon in the Mahábhárata, and he is there described as killed by the curses of some Bráhmans of Yudhishthira's party.

Some authorities say that Brihaspati taught his doctrines to his disciple Chárváka, but if we may judge by the occasional quotations, the so-called Brihaspati-s'ástra must have been from ancient times the text-book of the sect. No copy is now known to exist,* but we have quite enough extant in the form of quotations to enable us to judge of the character of the work. Its author, like Lucretius among the Romans or Omar Khayyám among the Persians, was strong to overthrow, he could ridicule the absurdities of superstition, but he was blind to the religious instincts which underlie them,-and hence they are, all alike, men

-when faith had fall'n asleep,

Who heard a voice 'believe no more,'
And heard an ever-breaking shore
That tumbled in the godless deep.

Of course if we look at these blind gropings of bewildered humanity simply in themselves, they can have nothing to teach or even interest us; but it is not so, if we consider them in relation to the history of the human mind. The Chárváka doctrines, and in fact, all such purely negative systems, may be regarded from three separate points of view, and it is as seen under these several aspects that they present such widely varying characters. If we only look at them so far as they deny the deepest instincts of our nature, we can but turn from them in disgust and horror,-the belief in God and in the soul's immortality are not the results of logical inference, but the very postulates of human thought, and we deny our own humanity if we choose to question them. Again, so far as these sceptical systems only uttered a protest against the superstitions of their age, we may regard them not only with pity but with mournful interest. But so far as they express the negative side of philosophy, they may even claim our most serious attention, for they help us to remember those natural limitations and defects of the human mind, which we are so apt to forget in the excitement of new discoveries. Are they not in fact

Since writing this paper we have received the third part of Vol. XIX. of the Royal Asiatic Society's Journal, which contains a paper by Mr. Muir on the fragments of Brihaspati as compared with similar passages in the Rámáyana and Vishnu Purána. He there states that Dr. Hall had in vain searched for any copy of these Bárhaspatya S'lokas. We may well despair of their being ever found, if even the discoverer of the Bharatiya S'ástra has failed to find any trace.

the necessary shadow that the human mind flings as it advances,the slave set to warn the conqueror in the triumphal procession?

We now proceed to give a literal translation of Mádhava's account of the system from the Sarva-dars'ana Sangraha.

The Chárváka doctrine.

We have said in our preliminary invocation "salutation to S'iva, the abode of eternal knowledge, the storehouse of supreme felicity," but how can we attribute to the Divine Being the giving of supreme felicity, when such a notion has been utterly abolished by Chárváka, the crest-gem of the atheistical school, the follower of the doctrine of Brihaspati? The efforts of Chárváka are indeed hard to be eradicated, for the majority of living beings hold by the current refrain,

While life is yours, live joyously,

None can escape Death's searching eye;

When once this frame of ours they burn,

How shall we e'er again return?

The mass of men, in accordance with the S'ástras of policy and enjoyment* considering wealth and desire the only ends of man, and denying the existence of any thing belonging to a future world, are found to follow only the doctrine of Chárváka. Hence another name for that school is Lokáyata,-a name well accordant with the thing signified.†

In this school the four elements, earth, &c., are the original principles, -from these alone when transformed into the body, intelligence is produced, just as the inebriating power is developed from the mixing of certain ingredients, and when these are destroyed, intelligence at once perishes also. They quote the S'ruti for this (Brihad Arany. Up. II. 4. 12.), "springing forth from these elements, itself solid knowledge, it is destroyed when they are destroyed,—after death no

* See Dr. Hall's preface to the Vásavadattá, p. 11.

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+ S'ankara, Bhaskara, and other commentators name the Lokáyatikas, and these appear to be a branch of the Sect of Chárváka" (Colebrooke). Lokáyata may be etymologically analysed as 'prevalent in the world' (loka, and áyata). Laukayatika occurs in Pánini's ukthagana.

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Kinwa is explained as a drug or seed used to produce fermentation in the manufacture of spirits from sugar, bassia, &c." Colebrooke quotes from S'ankara: "The faculty of thought results from a modification of the aggregate elements in like manner as sugar with a ferment and other ingredients becomes an inebriating liquor; and as betel, areca, lime and extract of catechu chewed together, have an exhilarating property not found in those substances severally."

intelligence remains."* Therefore the soul is only the body distinguished by the attribute of intelligence, since there is no evidence for any soul distinct from the body, as such cannot be proved, since this school holds that perception is the only source of knowledge and does not allow inference, &c.

The only end of man is enjoyment produced by sensual pleasures. Nor may you say that such cannot be called the end of man as they are always mixed with some kind of pain,-because it is our wisdom to enjoy the pure pleasure as far as we can, and to avoid the pain which inevitably accompanies it; just as the man who desires fish, takes the fish with their scales and bones, and having taken as many as he wants, desists; or just as the man who desires rice, takes the rice, straw and all, and having taken as much as he wants, desists. It is not therefore for us, through a fear of pain, to reject the pleasure which our nature instinctively recognises as congenial. Men do not refrain from sowing rice, because forsooth there are wild animals to devour it ; nor do they refuse to set the cooking-pots on the fire, because forsooth there are beggars to pester us for a share of the contents. If any one were so timid as to forsake a visible pleasure, he would indeed be foolish like a beast, as has been said by the poet, The pleasure which arises to men from contact with sensible objects

Is to be relinquished as accompanied by pain,-such is the reasoning of fools;

The berries of paddy, rich with the finest white grains,

What man, seeking his true interest, would fling away, because covered with husk and dust ?+

If you object, that, if there be no such thing as happiness in a future world, then how will men of experienced wisdom engage in the agnihotra and other sacrifices, which can only be performed with great expenditure of money and bodily fatigue ?-your objection cannot be accepted as any proof to the contrary, since the agnihotra, &c., are only useful as means of livelihood, for the Veda is tainted by the three faults of untruth, self-contradiction and tautology ;‡ then

* Of course S'ankara, in his commentary, gives a very different interpretation, applying it to the cessation of individual existence when the knowledge of the Supreme is once attained. Cf. S'abara's Comm. Jaimini Sút. i. i. 5.

† I take कण as here equal to दूँড়. - Cf. Atharva V. xi. 3, 5. অवाः कणा गावस्तण्डुला मशकास्तुषाः.

See Nyáya Sútras, II. 57.

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