again, the impostors who call themselves Vaidic pundits are mutually destructive, as the authority of the jnána-káṇḍa is overthrown by those who maintain that of the karma-káṇḍa, while those who maintain the authority of the jnána-kánda reject that of the karma-káṇḍa; and lastly the three Vedas themselves are only the incoherent rhapsodies of knaves, and to this effect runs the popular saying,*

The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, and smearing oneself with ashes,—

Brihaspati says, these are but means of livelihood for those who have no manliness nor sense.

Hence it follows that there is no other hell than mundane pain produced by purely mundane causes, as thorns, &c. ; the only Supreme is the earthly monarch whose existence is proved by actual perception; and the only Liberation is the dissolution of the body. By holding the doctrine that the soul is identical with the body, such phrases as ‘I am thin,' ‘I am black,' &c. are at once intelligible, as the attributes of thinness, &c. and intelligence will reside in the same subject (the body); and the use of the phrase 'my body' is elliptical, like the head of Ráhu' (Ráhu being really all head).

All this has been thus summed up,

In this school there are four elements, earth, water, fire and air;
And from these four elements alone is intelligence produced,―
Just like the intoxicating power from kinwa, &c. mixed together;
Since in 'I am fat,' 'I am lean,' these attributes abide in the same subject,
And since fatness, &c. reside only in the body,t it alone is the soul and
no other,

And such phrases as 'my body' are only significant by ellipsis.

"Be it so," says the opponent, "your wish would be gained, if inference, &c. had no force of proof; but then they have this force; else, if they had not, then how on perceiving smoke, should the thoughts of the intelligent immediately proceed to fire; or why, on hearing another say 'there are fruits on the bank of the river,' do those who desire fruit proceed at once to the shore ?" All this, however, is only the inflation of the world of fancy. Those who maintain the authority of inference accept the sign, or middle term, as the causer of knowledge, which middle term must * The word ábhánaka, which occurs several times in the S. D. S. (e. g. p. 107), is not found in any lexicon. The Pandits explain it by kimvadantí.

+ I read देद्दे for देहः.

be found in the minor and be itself invariably connected with the major. Now this invariable connection must be a relation destitute of any condition, accepted or disputed ;† and this connection does not possess its power of causing inference by virtue of its existence, as the eye, &c. are the cause of perception, but by virtue of its being known. What then is the means of this connection's being known?

We will first shew that it is not perception. Now perception is held to be of two kinds, external and internal, i. e. as produced by the external senses, or by the inner sense, mind. The former is not the required means; for although it is possible that the actual contact of the senses and the object will produce the knowledge of the particular object thus brought in contact, yet as there can never be such contact in the case of the past or the future, the universal proposition‡ which was to embrace the invariable connection of the middle and major terms in every case, becomes impossible to be known. Nor may you maintain that this knowledge of the universal proposition has the general class as its object, because, if so, there might arise a doubt as to the existence of the invariable connection in this particular case,§ (as, for instance, in this particular smoke as implying fire).

Nor is internal perception the means, since you cannot establish that the mind has any power to act independently towards an external object, since all allow that it is dependent on the external senses, as has been said by one of the logicians, "The eye, &c., have their objects as described; but mind externally is dependent on the others."

Nor can inference be the means of the knowledge of the universal proposition, since in the case of this inference, we should also require another inference to establish it, and so on, and hence would arise the fallacy of an ad infinitum retrogression.

Nor can testimony be the means thereof, since we may either allege in reply, in accordance with the Vais'eshika doctrine of Kanáda, that this is included in the topic of inference; or else we may hold that this fresh proof of testimony is unable to leap over the old barrier

*Literally "must be an attribute of the subject and have invariable attendedness (vyapti.)”

For the sandigdha and nis'chita upádhi see Siddhánta Muktávali, p. 125. The former is accepted only by one party.

‡ Literally, the knowledge of the invariable attendedness (as of smoke by fire). § The attributes of the class are not always found in every member,-thus idiots are men, though man is a rational animal; and again, this particular smoke might be a sign of a fire in some other place.

that stopped the progress of inference, since it depends itself on the recognition of a sign, in the form of the language used in the child's presence by the old man ;* and moreover there is no more reason for our believing on another's word, that smoke and fire are invariably connected, than for our receiving the ipse dixit of Manu, &c., (which of course we Chárvákas reject).

And again, if testimony were to be accepted as the only means of the knowledge of the universal proposition, then in the case of a man to whom the fact of the invariable connection between the middle and major terms had not been pointed out by another person, there could be no inference of one thing (as fire) on seeing another thing (as smoke); hence, on your own shewing, the whole topic of inference for oneself would have to end in mere idle words.

Then again comparison,‡ &c., must be utterly rejected as the means. of the knowledge of the universal proposition, since it is impossible that they can produce the knowledge of the unconditioned connection (i. e. the universal proposition), because their end is to produce the knowledge of quite another connection, viz., the relation of a name to something so named.

Again, this same absence of a condition,§ which has been given as the definition of an invariable connection (i. e. a universal proposition ;) can itself never be known; since it is impossible to establish that all conditions must be objections of perception, and therefore although the absence of perceptible things may be itself perceptible, the absence of non-perceptible things must be itself non-perceptible, and thus, since we must here too have recourse to inference, &c., we cannot leap over the obstacle which has already been planted to bar them. Again, we must accept as the definition of the condition, "it is that which is reciprocal or equipollent in extension|| with the major term,

*See Sahitya Darpana (Dr. Ballantyne's trans. p. 16) and Siddhánta M. p. 80. The properly logical, as distinguished from the rhetorical, argument. "Upamána or the knowledge of a similarity is the instrument in the production of an inference from similarity. This particular inference consists in the knowledge of the relation of a name to something so named," Dr. Ballantyne's Tarka Sangraha.

§ The upádhi is the condition which must be supplied to restrict a too general middle term, as in the inference the mountain has smoke because it has fire,' if we add wet fuel as the condition of the fire, the middle term will be no longer too general. In the case of a true vyápti there is of course no upádhi.

|| Αντιστρέφει. We have here our own A with distributed predicate.

though not constantly accompanying the middle." These three distinguished clauses, "not constantly accompanying the middle term,” "constantly accompanying the major term," and "being constantly accompanied by it" (i. e. reciprocal), are needed in the full definition to stop respectively three such fallacious conditions, in the argument to prove the non-eternity of sound, as 'being produced,' 'the nature of a jar,' and 'the not causing audition ;"* wherefore the definition holds,—and again it is established by the s'loka of the great Doctor beginning samasama.†

But since the knowledge of the condition must here precede the knowledge of the condition's absence, it is only when there is the knowledge of the condition, that the knowledge of the universality of the proposition is possibie, i. e. a knowledge in the form of such a connection between the middle term and major term as is distinguished by the absence of any such condition; and on the other hand the knowledge of the condition depends upon the knowledge of the in

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6

*If we omitted the first clause and only made the upádhi "that which constantly accompanies the major term and is constantly accompanied by it," then in the Naiyayik argument sound is non-eternal, because it has the class of sound,' being produced' would serve as a Mímánsik upádhi, to establish the vyabhichára fallacy, as it is reciprocal with non-eternal;' but the omitted clause excludes it, as an Upádhi must be consistent with either party's opinions, and of course the Naiyayik maintains that being produced' always accompanies the class of sound. Similarly if we defined the upadhi as not constantly accompanying the middle term and constantly accompanied by the major,' we might have as an upadhithe nature of a jar,' as this is never found with the middle term (the class or nature of sound only residing in sound, and that of a jar only in a jar,) while at the same time wherever the class of jar is found there is also found non-eternity. Lastly if we defined the upádhi as "not constantly accompanying the middle term, and constantly accompanying the major," we might have as a Mímánsik upádhi'the not causing audition' i. e. the not being apprehended by the organs of hearing; but this is excluded, as non-eternity is not always found where this is, ether being inaudible and yet eternal.

This refers to an obscure s'loka of Udayanáchárya, "where a reciprocal and a non-reciprocal universal-connection (i. e. universal propositions which severally do and do not distribute their predicates) relate to the same argument (as e. g. to prove the existence of smoke,) there that non-reciprocating term of the second will be a fallacious middle, which is not invariably accompanied by the other reprocal of the first." Thus the mountain has smoke because it has fire' (here fire and smoke are non-reciprocating, as fire is not found invariably accompanied by smoke though smoke is by fire,) or 'because it has fire from wet fuel' (smoke and fire from wet fuel being reciprocal and always accompanying each other); the nonreciprocating term of the former (fire) will give a fallacious inference, because it is also, of course, not invariably accompanied by the special kind of fire, that produced from wet fuel. But this will not be the case, where the non-reciprocating term is thus invariably accompanied by the other reciprocal, as the mountain has fire because it has smoke;' here though fire and smoke do not reciprocate, yet smoke will be a true middle, because it is invariably accompanied by heat which is the reciprocal of fire.

variable connection. Thus we fasten on our opponents as with adamantine glue the thunderbolt-like fallacy of reasoning in a circle. Hence by the impossibility of knowing the universality of a proposition it becomes impossible to establish inference, &c.*

The step which the mind takes from the knowledge of smoke, &c., to the knowledge of fire, &c., can be accounted for by its being based on a former perception or by its being an error; and that in some cases this step is justified by the result, is accidental just like the coincidence of effects observed in the employment of gems, charms, drugs, &c.

From this it follows that fate, &c.† do not exist, since these can only be proved by inference. But an opponent will say, if you thus do not allow adrishta, the various phenomena of the world become destitute of any cause. But we cannot accept this objection as valid, since these phenomena can all be produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things. Thus it has been said,

The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing cool the breeze of morn,
By whom came this variety? from their own nature was it born.

And all this has been also said by Brihaspati.

There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in another world,
Nor do the actions of the four castes, orders, &c., produce any real effect.
The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, and smearing
one's self with ashes,

Were made by Nature as the livelihood of those destitute of knowledge
and manliness.

If a beast slain in the Jyotishṭoma rite will itself go to heaven,
Why then does not the sacrificer forthwith offer his own father?

If the S'ráddha produces gratification to beings who are dead,

Then here too in the case of travellers when they start, it is needless to give provisions for the journey.

If beings in heaven are gratified by our offering the S'ráddha here,

Then why not give the food down below to those who are standing on the housetop?

*Cf. Sextus Empiricus, P. Hyp. ii.-In S. D. S. pp. 7, 8, we have an attempt to establish the authority of the universal proposition from the relation of cause and effect or genus and species.

Adrishta, i. e. the merit and demerit in our actions which produce their effects in future births.

‡ I take Dhátṛi as = God, or nature, speaking by common parlance. Dr. Hall (Catalogue, p. 162) would seem to take Dhátri as the name of an author,-Dhátri may sometimes stand for Brihaspati,