CHAPTER IV,

Situation of the Squadron. - The Frigate Philadelphia burned. General Operations. - Tunis evinces hostile Dispositions. - Preparations to attack Tripoli. Preble borrows Gunboats and Bomb-vessels of the King of Naples. - Squadron ready to proceed against Tripoli, and assembles in Force off the City.

IN January, 1804, leaving the Constitution and some other vessels of the squadron at Syracuse, Preble went to Malta in the Vixen, for the purpose of procuring a translation of the documents found on board of the prize Mastico, to obtain some boats for light cruisers, and to forward letters and a supply of stores to Bainbridge and his fellow-prisoners at Tripoli.

Previous to his departure, orders were given which would keep every man in port active during his absence. Stewart was directed to prepare the Siren for a cruise of six weeks; a course of guard duty was marked out, to be rigidly observed, by which each ship was to perform that service in rotation; and the Constitution and Enterprise were to be placed in perfect order. Both of these vessels required attention, and the latter, indeed, upon a careful examination, was pronounced to be too weak and rotten to be trusted at sea during the inclement season.

The Argus had returned to Gibraltar for the objects already stated, and was to be absent for several months on the station assigned to her, until she should be relieved by a ship from the United States; although, after the loss of the Philadelphia, she was much needed elsewhere. She was a beautiful vessel, of a fine model, and, in Preble's opinion, would not only sail a third faster than either the Siren or the Vixen, but was, in every respect, the best vessel then in the navy for cruising in the Mediterranean seas. As the Enterprise would be compelled to remain in port until April, the effective force against Tripoli, to maintain the blockade, and for the various other duties, was reduced for the winter to the Constitution, Siren, Vixen, and Nautilus. The Siren was in good condition, as, in addition to some repairs, her rigging had been refitted, and her mainmast placed further aft, to improve her sailing. Towards the close of the month, it was known that not a Tripolitan vessel had dared to put to sea, and that none was out; but still, that nothing might be omitted, even in midwinter, and that Tunis, Tripoli, and Morocco, might all be strictly watched, Stewart and Smith were ordered to hold the Siren and Vixen in readiness to brave anew the perils of the coast, at "a moment's warning." The former, however, was soon wanted to aid in the memorable exploit of burning the Philadelphia.

This far-famed enterprise was executed soon after Preble's return from Malta. There has been some discussion and difference of opinion, as to the origin of the plan for destroying that ship; and the honor has been claimed for Bainbridge and Decatur, but more generally for the former. That both of these gentlemen conceived the design, is readily admitted; but that Preble was indebted to either of them for the original idea of depriving the Bashaw of the benefits arising from the capture, is denied; for there appears to be ample proof, that the merit of devising the project, without communication from or with any person, belongs to the Commodore himself, quite as certainly as does that of maturing the plan, that of fixing upon the principal details, and that of assuming the high responsibility of despatching a force for its execution. The limits of this memoir forbid an argument founded upon facts, dates, and circumstances; and the case is submitted to the reader upon Preble's own positive and repeated declarations.

In announcing the loss of the frigate, and in communicating to the department Bainbridge's official account, on the 10th of December, he said, "I do not believe the Philadelphia will ever be of service to Tripoli. I shall hazard much to destroy her. It will undoubtedly cost us many lives, but it must be done." Again, he wrote to the Secretary, “І was well informed, that her situation was such as to render it impossible to bring her out; and, her destruction being absolutely necessary to avor my intended operations against that city, I determined the attempt should be made."

In a letter to Mr. Cathcart, at Leghorn, he used these decisive words; "I determined, from the moment I heard of her capture, to destroy her, to prevent the consequences of her remaining in their possession; " and subsequently, in a communication to Mr. Livingston, our minister at Paris, he repeated this emphatic language, and still more clearly stated the designs which he had in view, in getting her out of the way. Thus he said, "I determined, from the moment I heard she was in possession of the enemy, to destroy her; and it has been done. This will seriously affect the Bashaw, who is poor, as it has deprived him of the resources which the sale of her to Algiers or Tunis would have afforded; and at

the same time, those powers are deprived of an important addition of strength to their navy."

These statements make no allusion to the suggestions of others, and should be regarded as conclusive, made, as they were, at different times and to different officers of the government, and covering, as they do, the exact point in controversy. But, while this question is thus disposed of, the claims of Bainbridge are entitled to the most respectful attention. He and the Commodore had managed to keep up an active correspondence, both open and secret; and, though the transmission of letters was attended with difficulty and delay, the captive officer was untiring in his exertions to advise his chief of every event, and to make every suggestion calculated to aid his operations. In regard to this particular affair, he gave his views on three several occasions. His earliest communication was not received until the 4th of January, 1804, and his latest had not been sent from prison when the ship was burned.* His information was, beyond all doubt, highly