their intention."-Lloyd v. Lloyd (1837), 2 My. & Cr. 192, at p. 202, Lord Cottenham, L. C.

"It is quite true, I am not to conjecture or guess at what might have been the intention of the parties; but I am to consider the whole instrument, and if there appear a plain intention to give interest, then though there should be no express words to that effect, and this is the case of a deed, yet I am bound to give it that construction."-Clayton v. Glengall (1841), 1 Dr. & W. 1, at p. 14, Sir Edward B. Sugden, L. C.

"As the different parts of the deed are inconsistent with each other, the question is, to which part effect ought to be given. There is no doubt that, applying the approved rules of construction to this instrument, effect ought to be given to that part which is calculated to carry into effect the real intention, and that part which would defeat it should be rejected."-Walker v. Giles (1848), 6 C. B. 662, at p. 702; 18 L. J. C. P. 323, at p. 330, Wilde, C. J.

"One suggestion is, to reject the proviso altogether, as wholly inconsistent with the previous trusts, according to the well-known rule, that in deeds containing two clauses absolutely inconsistent with each other, the latter is to be rejected, being, in that respect, the converse of the rule which obtains in construing wills. This is an expedient to which the Court will very reluctantly, in any case, have recourse, and never, unless absolutely compelled to do so, having exhausted every other means in its power to reconcile apparent inconsistencies.”—Bush v. Watkins (1851), 14 Beav. 425, at p. 432, Sir John Romilly, M. R.

"I adopt the observations of C. B. Alexander in Colmore v. Tyndall (1828), 2 Y. & J. 605, at p. 622, that this Court deals with a deed according to the clear intention of the parties appearing in the four corners of the deed itself. If the Court sees an intention clearly and distinctly established by it, it has no difficulty in carrying that into effect; subject, of course, to any rules of law that may be applicable to it, but only qualified to that extent.”— Beaumont v. The Marquis of Salisbury (1854), 19 Beav. 198, at p. 206; 24 L. J. Ch. 94, at p. 97, Sir J. Romilly, M. R.

"Undoubtedly, as Sheppard says (Touchstone, p. 87), in the construction of all parts of all kinds of deeds, amongst the rules to be universally observed is one, that the construction be made upon the entire deed, and that one part of it doth help to expound another, and that every word (if it may be) may take effect, and none be rejected.' Where words are ambiguous, or the intention

is not manifest and plain, it is useful and sometimes necessary to recur to other parts of the deed for interpretation."-Monypenny v. Monypenny (1859), 3 De G. & J. 572, at p. 587; 28 L. J. Ch. 303, at p. 306, Lord Chelmsford, L. C.

"The question is not what the parties to a deed may have intended to do by entering into that deed (a marriage settlement), but what is the meaning of the words used in the deed: a most important distinction in all cases of construction, and the disregard of which often leads to erroneous conclusions."-Monypenny v. Monypenny (1861), 9 H. L. Cas. 114, at p. 146; 31 L. J. Ch. 269, at p. 275, Lord Wensleydale.

"The result of all the authorities is, that when a Court of law can clearly collect from the language within the four corners of a deed, or instrument in writing, the real intentions of the parties, they are bound to give effect to it by supplying anything necessarily to be inferred from the terms used, and by rejecting as superfluous whatever is repugnant to the intention so discerned.". Gwyn v. Neath Canal Co. (1868), L. R. 3 Ex. 209, at p. 215; 37 L. J. Ex. 122, at p. 126, Kelly, C. B.

"The settlement is one which I cannot help thinking was never intended by the framer of it to have the effect I am going to attribute to it; but, of course, as I very often say, one must consider the meaning of the words used, not what one may guess to be the intention of the parties."-Smith v. Lucas (1881), 18 Ch. D. 531, at p. 542, Jessel, M. R.

"I conceive that all deeds are to be construed, not only strictly according to their words, but so far as is possible without infringing any rule of law, in such a way as to effectuate the intention of the parties."-Hilbers v. Parkinson (1883), 25 Ch. D. 200, at pp. 203, 204, Pearson, J.

"The principle on which an instrument of this description [a deed] should be construed is not doubtful. It is (to quote the words of Lord Watson in an unreported case [Chamber Colliery Co., Ltd. v. Twyerould, H. L., July 20, 1893]) that the deed must be read as a whole in order to ascertain the true meaning of its several clauses, and that the words of each clause should be so interpreted as to bring them into harmony with the other provisions of the deed if that interpretation does no violence to the meaning of which they are naturally susceptible, or (as was said by Lord Selborne) you may disregard the literal meaning of the words and give them another meaning if the words are sufficiently flexible to bear that interpretation: Caledonian Rail. Co. v. North British

Rail. Co. (1881), 6 App. Cas. 114, at p. 122."-North Eastern Railway v. Lord Hastings, [1900] A. C. 260, at pp. 267, 268; 69 L. J. Ch. 516, at p. 520, Lord Davey.

"Now, I agree that in a conveyance of leaseholds, however inartistic, untechnical, or uncertain the words used may be, if you see an apparent intention that the legal estate shall pass, then it may be held to pass. Looking, then, at the deed before us, and endeavouring to ascertain the intention, I should not myself come to the conclusion that it was the obvious intention of the partiesor, indeed, their intention at all—that the legal estate should pass. I adopt the principle stated by my brother Vaughan Williams in the course of the argument, that on granting or assigning a term of years, there must, in order that the legal estate may pass, be some words which imply the intention to part with the possession." -In re Beachey, Heaton v. Beachey, [1904] 1 Ch. 67, at pp. 74, 75; 73 L. J. Ch. 68, at p. 70, Lord Alverstone, C. J.

(See also post, Repugnancy in Deeds.)

Ambiguities.

"It holdeth generally that all ambiguity of words by matter within the deed, and not out of the deed, shall be holpen by construction, or in some case by election, but never by averment, but rather shall make the deed void for uncertainty. But if it be ambiguitas latens, then otherwise it is."-Bac. Max. of the Law, Reg. 23.

"It is also a settled canon of construction that where a clause is ambiguous a construction which will make it valid is to be preferred to one which will make it void. This is analogous to the rule laid down in Grey v. Pearson (1857), 6 H. L. Cas. 61; 26 L. J. Ch. 473, referred to in Abbott v. Middleton (1858), 7 H. L. Cas. 68; 28 L. J. Ch. 110."-Mills v. Dunham, [1891] 1 Ch. 576, at p. 590; 60 L. J. Ch. 362, at p. 367, Kay, L. J.

(See also ante, pp. 83, 133—137.)

Deed operating Two Ways.

If a deed can operate two ways, that consistent with the intent should have effect given to it.

The plaintiff should be put in the least profitable position and the

defendant in the least burthensome.

The construction that renders the deed valid should be adopted. "If a deed can, therefore, operate two ways, one consistent with the intent and the other repugnant to it, Courts will be ever astute

so to construe it as to give effect to the intent; and the construction, I need not add, must be made on the entire deed."-Solly v. Forbes (1820), 2 B. & B. 38, at pp. 48, 49, Dallas, C. J. (This rule was referred to and applied by Wilde, C. J., in the case of Ford v. Beech (1848), 11 Q. B. 852, at p. 870; 17 L. J. Q. B. 114, at p. 117.)

"Generally speaking, where there are several ways in which the contract might be performed, that mode is adopted which is the least profitable to the plaintiff and the least burthensome to the defendant."-Cockburn v. Alexander (1848), 6 C. B. 791, at p. 814; 18 L. J. C. P. 74, at p. 83, Maule, J.

"But suppose we import into this case the rule that where a doubt exists and one mode of construction renders a contract valid and the other invalid, the former should be adopted."-Steele v. Hoe (1849), 19 L. J. Q. B. 89, at p. 93, Erle, J.

"We think that the words in their ordinary acceptation are capable of expressing a past or a concurrent consideration; and as upon one construction the instrument is void, the other is to be adopted which makes it valid.”—Ibid., Patteson, J., delivering the judgment of the Court.

"If a deed can, therefore, operate two ways, one consistent with the intent and the other repugnant to it, Courts will be ever astute so to construe it as to give effect to the intent; and the construction, I need not add, must be made on the entire deed." -Squire v. Ford (1851), 9 Hare, 47, at p. 57; 20 L. J. Ch. 308, at p. 312, Turner, V.-C.

"As it seems to me, the words of the agreement have not a double intendment; but even if they had, then, according to the ninth rule for the construction of deeds, given in Sheppard's Touchstone, p. 88, 'If words have a double intendment, and the one standeth with law and the other is against law, they are to be taken in that sense which is agreeable to law."-Fussell v. Daniel (1854), 10 Ex. 581, at p. 597; 24 L. J. Ex. 130, at p. 133, Martin, B.

"It is undoubted law, that a deed that is intended and made to one purpose, may enure to another; for if it will not take effect that way it is intended, it may take effect another way." [Sheppard's Touchstone, 82.] "There is an admirable judgment of Lord Chief Justice Willes on this subject, in Roe d. Wilkinson v. Tranmarr (1758), 1 Willes, 682, which has a considerable bearing on the point in question."-Monypenny v. Monypenny (1859), 3 De

G. & J. 572, at p. 589; 28 L. J. Ch. 303, at p. 307, Lord Chelmsford, L. C.

"It seems to me that there would be monstrous injustice if the husband, having suggested one construction of the deed in the old suit and succeeded on that footing, were allowed to turn round and win the new suit upon a diametrically opposite construction of the same deed. It would be playing fast and loose with justice if the Court allowed that."-Gandy v. Gandy (1885), 30 Ch. D. 57, at p. 82; 54 L. J. Ch. 1154, at p. 1163, Bowen, L. J.

Words how Interpreted.

The words of a deed are to be interpreted like the words of any other writing.

The words of a deed should be read in their ordinary primary and grammatical sense unless such an interpretation would lead to some absurdity or inconvenience or would be plainly repugnant to the intention of the parties to be collected from other parts of the deed.

"The same sense is to be put upon the words of a contract in an instrument under seal as would be put upon the same words in any instrument not under seal; for the same intention must be collected from the same words of a contract in writing, whether with or without a seal."-Seddon v. Senate (1810), 13 East, 63, at p. 74, Lord Ellenborough, C. J.

"It is equally a settled rule of law, where ambiguous expressions. are used, though you are not at liberty to prove by their declarations what the parties meant, you are not only at liberty, but you are driven to supply yourself with evidence to know what is the meaning of such expressions. If I have to decide on the meaning of a deed, in which some technical word, some word of art, of which I may be ignorant, is used, I must have recourse to dictionaries and lexicons, in order that they may instruct me.' The Att.-Gen. v. Drummond (Jan. 1842), 1 Dru. & Warr. 353, at p. 368, Sugden, L. C.

"The words of a deed are to be construed like those of any other writing, according to the ordinary use and application of them."-Bain v. Cooper (Ap. 1842), 9 M. & W. 701, at p. 708; 11 L. J. Ex. 325, at p. 327, Lord Abinger, C. B.