(c) no proposal for the appropriation of any such revenues or other moneys for any purpose shall be made except on the recommendation of the governor, communicated to the council.

(3) Nothing in the foregoing sub-section shall require proposals to be submitted to the council relating to the following heads of expenditure :(i) Contributions payable by the local government to the Governor-General in Council; and (ii) Interest and sinking fund charges on loans; and

(iii) Expenditure of which the amount is prescribed by or under any law; and

(iv) Salaries and pensions of persons appoint. ed by or with the approval of His Majesty or by the Secretary of State in Council; and

(v) Salaries of judges of the high court of the province and of the advocate-general.

If any question arises whether any proposed appropriation of moneys does or does not relate to the above heads of expenditure, the decision of the governor shall be final.

"

Executive and Legislature. In the light of these facts it is now possible to explain more exactly the relationship between the provincial executive and the provincial legislature. The dual character of the former has already been mentioned, and the corresponding bifurcation of provincial subjects into "reserved and transferred" categories. The rules under the act prescribe a list of 20 subjects which are trans. ferred to the administration of the Governor acting with Ministers, the more important of which are Local Self-Government, Medical Ad ministration, Public Health, Education (with certain reservations), Public Works, Agriculture, Excise, and Development of Industries. The "reserved" subjects comprise all those in the list of "provincial" (as distinct from "central") subjects which are not transferred.

Machinery. No change has been made by the Act of 1919 in the machinery and methods of administration by the Governor in Council; decisions are taken at the Council Board, as before, by a majority vote, and the Governor is entitled, as before, to overrule such a vote in certain specified circumstances if he disagrees with it. For such decisions the Governor in Council remains as before, responsible to the Secretary of State and Parliament, and on questions of legislation and supply he has the power of enforcing them despite opposition by a majority of the Legislative Council. But, the whole spirit of the Act and the existence of a large non-official elected majority in every Provincial Legislative Council is an important factor in determining the policy to be pursued by the official half of the Government in its administration of reserved subjects. A further and not less important factor is the existence in the Government, side by side with the Executive Council, of two or more Ministers appointed from the elected members of the legislature, who, though they are not charged by law with, and in fact are legally absolved from, any responsibility for decisions on matters outside the transferred sphere, will necessarily be able, and in fact are expected, to make their opinions felt by their colleagues in the Executive Council. But

these factors, while they will doubtless lead to constant endeavour on the part of the official half of the Government to accommodate ite policy to the wishes of its ministerial colleagues and of the majority of the legislature, and to avoid situations which involve resort to the enforcement of its decisions in the face of popular opposition, are not intended to obscure the responsibility to Parliament in the last resort of the Governor in Council for the administration of reserved subjects and the right of His Majesty's Government, and of the Secretary of State as a member thereof, to lay down and require the observance of any principles which they regard as having the support of Parliament and, in the last resort of the British electorate.

Transfer of Control. With regard to transferred subjects the position is very different. Here there has been an actual transfer of control from the British elector and the British Parliament to the elector and the Legislative Council

in the Indian province. The provincial subjects of administration are grouped into portfolios, and just as each member of the Executive Council has charge of a portfolio consisting of a specified list of "reserved" subjects or "departments," so each Minister is directly responsible for the administration of those particular transferred "departments" which are included in his portfolio. But his responsibility lies, not, as in the case of a member of the Executive Council, to the Government of India, the Secretary of State and Parliament, but to the Provincial Legislative Council of which he is an elected member and from which he is selected by the Governor as commanding or likely to command the support of the majority of that body. He holds office during the Governor's pleasure, but his retention of office is contingent on his ability to retain the confidence not only of the Governor, but also of the Legislative Council, upon whose vote he is directly dependent for his salary. Further, the control of the Legislative Council over transferred subjects, both as regards supplies and legislation, is almost entirely free from the restrictions just noticed which necessarily qualify its control over the "reserved" subjects. It is thus within the power of the Provincial Council to insist on the pursuit of a policy of its own choice in the administration of transferred subjects by withdrawing its confidence from a Minister who departs from that policy and bestowing it only on a successor who will follow its mandate; and this power is dependent on the provincial elector in virtue of his freedom to control the composition of the Legislative Council by the use which he makes of his vote. No doubt this statement requires some qualification before it can be accepted as literally accurate, for, technically, the authority charged with the administration of transferred subjects is "the Governor acting with Ministers appointed under this Act," not the Ministers acting on their own initiative, and, further, the Governor, who is not, of course, subject to removal from office by the Legislative Council, is charged personally with responsibility for the peace and tranquillity of his province, and would be entitled, and indeed bound, to recommend the removal of a department from the transferred list if he found the legislature bent on pursuing a policy in its administration

which, in his judgment, was incompatible with the maintenance of peace and tranquillity; et the powers of control vested in the Legis ative Council over the transferred sphere are ndoubtedly great, and it was the opinion at All events of the Joint Select Committee that egislature and Ministers should be allowed to exercise them with the greatest possible freedom. "If after hearing all the arguments," observed the Committee, "Ministers should **decide not to adopt his advice, then in the ** opinion of the Committee the Governor should **ordinarily allow Ministers to have their way, ** fixing the responsibility upon them, even if **it may subsequently be necessary for him to wote any particular piece of legislation. It **is not possible but that in India, as in all other countries, mistakes will be made by Ministers ** acting with the approval of a majority of the **Legislative Council, but there is no way of learning except through experience and

** the realisation of responsibility.'"

Provision of Funds. The terms of the Act leave the apportionment of the provincial revenues between the two halves of the execu

tive for the financing of reserved and transferred subjects respectively to be settled by rules, merely providing that rules may be made "for the allocation of revenues or moneys for the "purpose of such 'administration' i.e., the administration of transferred subjects by the **Governor acting with Ministers". Probably the best description available of the method adopted by the rules for the settlement of this matter is the recommendation of the Joint Select Committee whose proposals have been followed with one modification only to enable the Governor to revoke at any time, at the desire of his Council and Ministers an "order

of allocation" or to modify it in accordance with their joint wishes. The passage is as follows:

"The Committee have given much attention to the difficult question of the principle on which the provincial revenues and balances should be distributed between the two sides of the provincial governments. They are confident that the problem can readily be solved by the simple process of common sense and reasonable give-and-take, but they are aware that this question might, in certair circums tances, become the cause of much fric

tion in the provincial government, and they are of opinion that the rules governing the allocation of these revenues and balances should be framed so as to make the existence of such friction impossible. They advise that, if the Governor, in the course of preparing either his first or any subsequent budget, find that there is likely to be a serious or protracted difference of opinion between the Executive Council and his Ministers on this sub. Ject he should be empowered at once to make an allocation of revenue and balances between the reserved and transferred subjects which should continue for at least the whole life of the existing Legislative Council. The Committee do not endorse the suggestion that certain sources of revenue should be allocated to reserved and certain sources to transferred subjects, but they recommend that the Governor should allocate a definite proportion of the revenue, say, by way of illustration, two-thirds to reserved and one-third to transferred subjects, and similarly a proportion, though not necessarily the same fraction of the balances. If the Governor desires assistance in making the allocat on, he should be allowed at his discretion to refer the question to be decided to such authority as the Governor-General shall appoint. Further, Committee are of opinion that it should be laid down from the first that, until an agreement which both sides of the Government will equally support has been reached, or until an allocation

the

has been made by the Governor, the total provisions of the different expenditure heads in the budget of the province for the preceding financial year shall hold good.

The Committee desire that the relation of the two sides of the Government in this matter as in all others, should be of such mutual sympathy that each will be able to assist and in

fluence for the common good the work of the other, but not to exercise control over it. The budget should not be capable of being used as a means for enabling Ministers or a majority of the Legislative Council to direct the policy of reserved subjects; but on the other hand the Executive Council should be helpful to Ministers in their desire to develop the departments entrusted to their care. On the Governor personally will devolve the task of holding the balance between the legitimate needs of both sets of his advisers."

The structural changes made by the Act of 1919 in the system of government outside the nine "Governors provinces" are of comparatively minor scope, though the spirit of the Act requires, as has al eady been shown, considerable modification of the relationship hitherto subsisting between the Provincial Governments on the one hand and the Government of India and the Secretary of State in Council on the other. The only concrete changes made in the constitution of the Central Govern ment are the removal of the statutory bar to the appointment of more than six members of the Governor-General's Executive Council (which, however, has had the far-reaching consequence that three of the eight members of the Council are now Indians), and the reconsti

tution in a much more enlarged representative and independent form of the central legislature. It has already been observed that this body was, in origin, like all other legislative bodies in India, the Governor-General's Executive Council with the addition of certain "additional members" appointed to assist the Executive Council in the formulation of legislation, Despite its steady growth in size and influence, and despite the introduction of the elective system, the existence of "additional members," who of course under Lord Morley's Act greatly preponderated in numbers over the members proper, i.e., the Executive Councillors, still persisted up to the passing of the Act of 1919. That Act, however, has entirely remodelled the "Indian Legislature,"

as it is now called, which has become, like the Legislative Council in a Governor's province a legislature with all the inherent powers ordinarily attributed to such a body save such as are specifically withheld by the terms of the Act. It consists of two Chambers. The "Council of State" contains 60 members, of whom 34 are elected (including one member to represent Berar, who, though technically nominated, is nominated as the result of elections held in Berar) and 26 nominated, of whom not more than 20 may be officials. The "Legislative Assembly" consists of 144 members, of whom 104 are elected (including in the case of the Council of State, one Berar member, who, though actually elected, is technically a nominee). Of the 40 nominated members, 26 are required to be officials. The members of the Governor-General's Executive Council are not ex-officio members of either Chamber, but each of them has to be appointed a member of one or other Chamber, and can vote only in the Chamber of which he is a member. Any member of the Executive Council may, however, speak in either Chamber. The President of the Upper Chamber is a nominee of the Governor-General, as also, for the first four years after the constitution of the Chamber, is the President of the Legislative Assembly. But after that period the Lower Chamber is to elect its own Presiden., and It elects its own Deputy-President from the outset. The normal lifetime of each Council of State is

five years, and of each Legislative Assembly three years; but either Chamber, or both simultaneously, may be dissolved at any time by the Governor-General.

Election. The method of election for both Chambers is direct, and although the number of electors is considerably smaller than for the Provincial Councils, it is a great advance on the very restricted and for the most part indirect franchise established under the Act of 1909 for the unicameral central legislature which no longer exists. Generally speakIng, the electoral scheme for the Lower Chamber is on the same model as that for the Provincial Councils already described, except that, firstly, the property qualification for voters (and consequently for candidates) is higher in order to obtain manageable constituencies, and past service with the colours is not per se a qualification for the franchise, and secondly, that the constituencies necessarily cover a considerably larger area than constituencies for the Provincial Council. The distribution

of seats in both Chambers, and the arrangement

of constituencies, are on a provincial basis; that is a fixed number of the elective seats in each Chamber is assigned to representatives of each province, and these representatives are elected by constituencies covering an assigned area of the province.

The following table shows the allotment of the elective seats :

Since the area which returns perhaps members to a Provincial Council is the sam as the area which returns perhaps 12 memben to the Legislative Assembly-namely, the entire province in each case it follows that on the direct election system this area must be split into constituencies which are much larger than the constituencies for the local Councils, and just as it is generally correct to say that the normal area unit for those rural constituencies for the latter which are arranged on a territorial basis is the district, it may be said that the normal area unit in the case of the Legislative Assembly is the Division (the technical term for the administrative group of districts controlled by a Divisional Commissioner).

The Franchise : -The general result of the first franchise arrangements under the Act is thus that there is in each province a body of electors qualified to vote for, and stand for eleetion to, the Provincial Council, and that a selected number of these voters are qualified to vote for and stand for election to those seats in the

Legislative Assembly which are assigned to the province. The qualifications for candidature for the Legislative Assembly are the same in each province, mutatis mutandis, as for candi dature for the Provincial Council, except that in all provinces, so long as the candidate can show that he resides somewhere within the province, no closer connection with his particular constituency is insisted upon.

The franchise for the Council of State differs in character from that for the Provincial Council and the Legislative Assembly. The concern of the framers of the Act and rules was to secure for the membership of this body a character as closely as possible approximating to a "Senate of Elder Statesmen" and thus to constitute a

body capable of performing the function of a true revising Chamber. With this object, in addition and as an alternative to a high property qualification-adopted as a rough and ready method of enfranchising only persons with a stake in the country-the rules admit as qualifications certain personal attributes which are likely to connote the possession of some past administrative experience or a high standard of intellectual attainment. Examples of these qualifications are past membership of either Chamber of the Legislature as now constituted, or of its predecessor, or of the Provincial Council, the holding of high office in local bodies (district boards, municipalities and corporations), mem. bership of the governing bodies of Universities, and the holding of titles conferred in recognition of Indian classical learning and literature.

Powers:-The powers and duties of the Indian legislature differ but little in character within the "central" sphere from those of the provincial Councils within their provincial sphere, and it has acquired the same right of voting supplies for the Central Government.