But the verbal in -Téos is also used as a mere infinitive, without inflexion, and governing the case of the noun, which in the direct predication would have been the subject. Here the dative is taken in immediate connexion with the substantive verb, and ẻσtí μoi, ἐστί σοι, "there is to me," "there is to thee," &c., mean, "I have," "thou hast" (to do so and so), i. e. "it is right or necessary for me and thee to do so.” Thus for ἀσκητέα ἐστί-σοι ἡ ἀρετή, "virtue is-for-thee to cultivate," we may write doxηтéov éσrí-σOL τηv åpeτýv, “it-is-for-thee to cultivate virtue," i. e. “thou must cultivate virtue;" and so, if the verb implied governs another case; as ἐπιθυμητέον ἐστί-σοι τῆς ἀρετῆς. The person is sometimes but more rarely expressed in the accusative, as in Plat. Crit. p. 49 A: οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ φαμὲν ἑκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι. Both constructions may appear in the same sentence, as Herod. IX. 58: èkelvolσi ταῦτα ποιεῦσι οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέα ἐστί, ἀλλὰ διωκτέοι εἰσί, “ it-is-not(for us) to give permission to them doing these things, but they are-for-us to pursue (we must pursue them)." Obs. 1 Just in the same way we have δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἐμὲ ταῦτα ποιεῖν by the side of δίκαιός εἰμι ταῦτα ποιεῖν ; whence we have the negatives εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ ye, or adikoinν μévr' av ei μý, i. e. “I ought to do so." Similarly ἀδικοίην μέντ ̓ μή, we have αξιόν ἐστι, δῆλόν ἐστιν ἐμέ, κ. τ. λ., by the side of ἄξιός είμι, δῆλός εἰμι. And as δεῖ = δέον ἐστί is equivalent to δίκαιόν ἐστι, we may have both πολλοῦ δέω τοῦτο ποιεῖν and πολλοῦ δεῖ ἐμὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν. Obs. 2 As the verbals in -rós and -Téos are of a qualitative or adverbial nature, like the adjectives mentioned above (419, (b)), we often find them predicated in the neuter plural; as συγγνώστ ̓ ἂν ἦν σοι τοῦδ ̓ ἐρασθῆναι λέχους (Eurip. Med. 491). Obs. 3 For this reason, and because the stress in the combination ἐστί μοι, èorí σo, as expressing the subject, falls upon the dative of the pronoun, the substantive verb is often omitted, and sometimes when the subject is clear, the pronoun also is wanting; thus we may have yuvaiko's ovdaμws noonréa (Soph. Antig. 678) for οὐδαμῶς δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἡσσᾶσθαι γυναικός. Obs. 4 We observe this in other combinations of corí with the dative; thus in Homer, l. xvI. 159, πᾶσιν δὲ παρήϊον αἵματι φοινόν, Tâσw includes the subject and copula-"all had their mouths gory with blood." Obs. 5 There cannot be an omission of the copula when the participle is predicated in a conditional sentence. Apparent instances to the contrary are corrupt. SIV. Primary Predicates. (c) Tenses of the Finite Verb. 422 As every verb has reference to action, and all action must take place in time, whatever is predicated by a verb is a predication of tense. A predication of tense has reference either to the time of speaking, or to some other point of time which must be defined. In the former case the tense is called (a) definite or determinate; in the latter (B) indefinite or indeterminate1. (a) In Greek the following are the definite tenses which relate to the time of speaking: The present, which expresses simultaneity, i. e. quod significat rem geri eo ipso tempore, quo loquimur. The future, which expresses posteriority, i.e. quod significat fore ut res geratur post id tempus, quo loquimur. The perfect, which expresses anteriority, i.e. quod significat rem gestam fuisse ante id tempus, quo loquimur. Thus: γράφω, "I write or am writing," i.e. "now, at the moment of speaking." ypaw, "I shall write," i.e. "at some time after the moment of speaking." γέγραφα, "I have written," i.e. "at some time before the moment of speaking." (B) The following are the indefinite tenses, which relate to some time specially defined. The imperfect, which expresses simultaneity, i.e. quod significat rem geri aliquo tempore, de quo loquimur. The aorist, which expresses posteriority, i.e. quod significat fore ut res geratur post aliquod tempus, de quo loquimur. The pluperfect, which expresses anteriority, i.e. quod significat rem gestam fuisse ante aliquod tempus, de quo loquimur. 1 This classification is due to J. L. Burnouf, to whom it was suggested by the tenses of the French verb; see New Cratylus, § 372. Thus: eypadov, “I was writing," i.e. "at some specified time." eypaya, "I wrote," i.e. "after some specified time." eyeypápew, “I had written," i.e. "before some specified time." (a) Definite Tenses. 423 A, 1. The Present. (aa) It is unnecessary to give any examples of the ordinary use of the present indicative. But there are three applications of this tense which deserve special notice. (1) In lively narratives the present is used for the imperfect or aorist, to signify that an action was going on, or that a deed was done, at some time specified by the context; thus Thucyd. VII. 83: καὶ ἀναλαμβάνουσί τε τὰ ὅπλα καὶ οἱ Συρακούσιοι αἰσθάνονται καὶ ἐπαιώνισαν γνόντες δὲ οἱ ̓Αθηναῖοι ὅτι οὐ λανθάνουσι κατέθεντο [τὰ ὅπλα] πάλιν: here the present is mixed up with the aorist, to show that the actions denoted by the former continued up to the point of time indicated by the latter. Again, we may have the present in a relative sentence, with an emphatical reference to past time; as in Eurip. Bacch. 2: Διόνυσος ὃν τίκτει ποθ ̓ ἡ Κάδμου κόρη Σεμέλη λοχευθεῖσ ̓ ἀστραπηφόρῳ πυρί, where the aorist λοXevoeîσa, as well as the particle TоTé, indicates the past time, to which TikTe points as the moment of the event described; cf. Eurip. Suppl. 640; Xen. Ages. II. 17-20, Anab. 1. 1; Thucyd. I. 48. (2) The present is used for the future in order to express the certainty of the coming event; thus we have the prophecy of Apollo, Pind. Οl. VIII. 42: Πέργαμος ἀμφὶ τεαῖς χερὸς ἐργασίαις áλiokeTaι, "Troy is taken, i.e. is not impregnable, but is doomed to capture, where thy hands have wrought," though afterwards, when a definite time is referred to, we have the future apžerai. See also Pind. Pyth. IV. 49; and Herod. vII. 140, where we have μévei, λείπεται, πέλει and ερείπει in a Delphic oracle. Xen. Cyr. VII. 1, 19: νῦν ὁρᾶς ἔργον τῆς σῆς ταχυεργίας· νῦν γὰρ εἰ φθάσομεν κ.τ.λ. οὐδεὶς ἀποθανεῖται. (3) The present is used for the perfect in verbs which express the permanence of a state, or an impression and its results. Such are ἀκούω, κλύω, αἰσθάνομαι, μανθάνω, γιγνώσκω, expressing the continuance of a perception or cognizance: adikéw, "I am a wrongdoer;" avxéw, "I boast or am confident;' θνήσκω, “I am dying" (Soph. Ed. T. 118); viráw, "I am victor or have conquered;" peúyw, "I am an exile." Thus Hom. Od. xv. 403: νῆσος τις Συρίη κικλήσκεται εἴ που ακούεις, “ if you have heard," i. e. possess knowledge by hearsay on that point; similarly Soph. Phil. 261: ôv xxveis lows, "whom perhaps you have heard of, know by hearsay." Esch. Agam. 305: viкậ 8 & πρŵτos KaÌ TeλEUTAîos Spaμov, "both the first and the last (in the series) have conquered in the race." (bb) Besides these usages there may be cases, in which, although the main verb is present both in form and signification, the reference is emphatically to the past and no longer existing state of things. Thus we have the two remarkable passages in Thucydides, 1.6 and 1. 32. In the former we read: oi πρeσßútepoi αὐτοῖς τῶν εὐδαιμόνων διὰ τὸ ἁβροδίαιτον οὐ πολὺς χρόνος ἐπειδὴ χιτῶνάς τε λινοῦς ἐπαύσαντο φοροῦντες καὶ κρώβυλον ἀναδούμενοι, where the words dià rò áßpodíacтov bear an involved past sense, which qualifies the whole passage: "such was their luxurious attire, that it is only a short time since they saw the old men of the wealthy class among them leave off wearing linen tunics and binding up a knot of their hair with the fastening of golden mannah-flies." In the other passage we read: Evyyvóóμn, ei μn μετὰ κακίας, γνώμης δὲ μᾶλλον ἁμαρτίᾳ, τῇ πρότερον ἀπραγμοσύνῃ evavría тоλμôμev, where, as in the former example, the past reference on which the emphasis depends, in opposition to the present τολμώμεν, is involved in the clause μὴ μετὰ κακίας κ.τ.λ.: “ allowance should be made for us if, when there was previously no malevolence, but only an error of judgment, we now venture on a measure at variance with our former isolation:" for certainly the orator does not imply that the present wish of his countrymen to form an alliance with Athens is an error of judgment: he concedes that only with reference to their former anpayμоoven or unwillingness to encumber themselves with foreign politics. 424 B, 1. The Future. (aa) As distinguished from the periphrastic future with μéλλw, the simple form is used to denote a future event without any specification of the time after which it will happen, whereas the periphrastic future requires or implies a definition of the time. Thus Plat. Gorg. 523 Α: ὡς ἀληθῆ ὄντα λέξω σοι ἃ μέλλω λέγειν, "I shall speak the truth in what I am now going to say." (bb) The simple future often conveys the meaning of obligation rather than mere futurity. Thus Xen. Mem. II. 1, 17: oi eis τὴν βασιλικὴν τέχνην παιδευόμενοι τί διαφέρουσι τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης κακοπαθούντων, εἴ γε πεινήσουσι καὶ διψήσουσι καὶ ῥιγώσουσι, “ if they must (are obliged to) suffer hunger and thirst and cold." Eurip. Med. 1320: λέγ ̓ εἴ τι βούλει, χειρὶ δ ̓ οὐ ψαύσεις ποτέ, "speak if you like, but you shall not touch me with your hand." Hence, as we shall see, the future used interrogatively becomes equivalent to an imperative, as in Arist. Aves, 1571: eğeis ȧтρépas, "keep quiet." (cc) The future seems to be used for the present in cases when we imply a habit so usual or confirmed, that it may be expected and relied on; thus, ἀνὴρ σοφὸς τὰς ἐν τῷ βίῳ συμφορὰς ῥᾷον οἴσει τῶν ἄλλων, diσel Tŵv äλλwv, "a wise man will be found to bear, may be expected to bear, usually bears, misfortunes more easily than others." (dd) In relative sentences the future implies the object or end proposed; thus, ἔλεγον, ὅτι ἥκοιεν ἡγεμόνας ἔχοντες, οἳ αὐτοὺς ἄξουσιν ἔνθεν ἕξουσι τὰ ἐπιτήδεια, " they said they would bring with them guides who would lead them (to lead them) to a place from which they would (in order that they might from thence) get provisions.' (ee) The verb Bouλopal is sometimes used in the future, although the wish itself is present, because the mind passes on to the desired object, which is regarded as still absent and to come, and because a sort of conditional possibility is implied; thus Eurip. Med. 259: τοσοῦτον οὖν σου τυγχάνειν βουλήσομαι, ἤν μοι πόρος τις μηχανή τ' ἐξευρεθῇ, "I shall desire to obtain so much from you," if circumstances admit of my obtaining what I wish. Soph. Ed. Col. 1291: καὶ ταῦτ ̓ ἀφ ̓ ὑμῶν, ὦ ξένοι, βουλήσομαι καὶ ταῖνδ ̓ ἀδελφαῖν καὶ πατρὸς κυρεῖν ἐμοί, “ I shall desire to obtain these things from you," if you will oblige me. Ed. Τ. 1076: τοὐ μὴν δ ̓ ἐγώ, κεί σμικρόν ἐστι, σπέρμ' ἰδεῖν βουλήσομαι, "I shall wish to see it," i.e. "I shall be glad to see it." .¢ |