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But the verbal in -Téos is also used as a mere infinitive, without inflexion, and governing the case of the noun, which in the direct predication would have been the subject. Here the dative is taken in immediate connexion with the substantive verb, and εστί μοι, εστί σοι, « there is to me,” “ there is to thee,” &c., mean, “I have," “thou hast" (to do so and so), i.e. “it is right or necessary for me and thee to do so.' Thus for άσκητέα εστί-σοι η αρετή, 4 virtue is-for-thee to cultivate,” we may write ασκητέον εστί-σοι την αρετήν, «it-is-for-thee to cultivate virtue,” i. e. «thou must cultivate virtue;" and so, if the verb implied governs another case; as επιθυμητέον εστί-σοι της αρετής. The person is sometimes but more rarely expressed in the accusative, as in Plat. Crit. p. 49 A: ουδενί τρόπω φαμεν εκόντας αδικητέον είναι. Both constructions may appear in the same sentence, as Herod. IX. 58: εκείνοισι ταύτα ποιείσι ουκ επιτρεπτέα εστί, αλλά διωκτέοι εισί, «it-is-not(for us) to give permission to them doing these things, but they are-for-us to pursue (we must pursue them)."
Obs. 1 Just in the same way we have δίκαιόν έστιν έμε ταύτα ποιείν by the side of δίκαιός είμι ταύτα ποιείν ; whence we have the negatives εί μη αδικώ γε, or άδικοίην μέντ' αν ει μή, i. e. “I ought to do so.” Similarly we have άξιόν έστι, δηλόν έστιν εμέ, κ.τ.λ., by the side of άξιός είμι, δηλός είμε. And as δεί = δέον εστί is equivalent to δίκαιόν έστι, we may have both πολλού δέω τούτο ποιείν and πολλού δεί εμέ τούτο ποιείν.
Obs. 2 As the verbals in -rós and créos are of a qualitative or adverbial nature, like the adjectives mentioned above (419, (6)), we often find them predicated in the neuter plural; as
συγγνώστ' αν ήν σοι τούδ' ερασθήναι λέχους (Εurip. Med. 491).
συνεκποτέ εστί σοι και την τρύγα (Aristoph. Ρlut. 1085). Obs. 3 For this reason, and because the stress in the combination εστί μοι, εστί σοι, as expressing the subject, falls upon the dative of the
, pronoun, the substantive verb is often omitted, and sometimes when the subject is clear, the pronoun also is wanting; thus we may have
γυναικός ουδαμώς ήσσητέα (Soph. Αntig. 678)
for ουδαμώς δει ημάς ήσσάσθαι γυναικός. Obs. 4 We observe this in other combinations of cotí with the dative; thus in Homer, Il. xvi. 159,
πάσιν δε παρήίον αίματι φαινόν, πάσιν includes the subject and copula-« all had their months gory with blood."
Obs. 5 There cannot be an omission of the copula when the participle is predicated in a conditional sentence. Apparent instances to the contrary are corrupt.
Primary Predicates. (c) Tenses of the Finite Verb. 422 As every verb has reference to action, and all action must take place in time, whatever is predicated by a verb is a predication of tense.
A predication of tense has reference either to the time of speaking, or to some other point of time which must be defined. In the former case the tense is called (a) definite or determinate; in the latter (B) indefinite or indeterminate'.
(a) In Greek the following are the definite tenses which relate to the time of speaking: The present, which expresses simultaneity, i.e.
quod significat rem geri eo ipso tempore, quo loquimur. The future, which expresses posteriority, i.e. quod significat fore ut res geratur post id tempus, quo lo
quimur. The perfect, which expresses anteriority, i.e. quod significat rem gestam fuisse ante id tempus, quo loquimur.
Thus: γράφω, “I write or am writing,” i.e. "now, at the moment of speaking."
ypayw, “I shall write,” i.e. “at some time after the moment of speaking."
yéypada, “I have written," i.e. " at some time before the moment of speaking."
(B) The following are the indefinite tenses, which relate to some time specially defined. The imperfect, which expresses simultaneity, i.e.
quod significat rem geri aliquo tempore, de quo loquimur. The aorist, which expresses posteriority, i.e. quod significat fore ut res geratur post aliquod tempus, de
quo loquimur. The pluperfect, which expresses anteriority, i.e. quod significat rem gestam fuisse ante aliquod tempus, de
quo loquimur. · This classification is due to J. L. Burnouf, to whom it was suggested by the tenses of the French verb; see New Cratylus, $ 372.
Thus: šypapov, “I was writing," i.e. “at some specified time.” έγραψα šypaya, “I wrote,” i.e. “after some specified time.” éyeypápelv, "I had written," i.e.“ before some specified time.'
(a) Definite Tenses.
423 A, 1. The Present. (aa) It is unnecessary to give any examples of the ordinary use of the present indicative. But there are three applications of this tense which deserve special notice.
(1) In lively narratives the present is used for the imperfect or aorist, to signify that an action was going on, or that a deed was done, at some time specified by the context; thus Thucyd. vii. 83: και αναλαμβάνουσί τε τα όπλα και οι Συρακούσιοι αισθάνονται και έπαιώνισαν γνόντες δε οι Αθηναίοι ότι ου λανθάνουσι κατέθεντο [rà la] máliv: here the present is mixed up with the aorist, to show that the actions denoted by the former continued up to the point of time indicated by the latter. Again, we may have the present in a relative sentence, with an emphatical reference to past time; as in Eurip. Bacch. 2: Alóvuoos öv TikTEL TOD'Ý Kádpov κόρη Σεμέλη λοχευθεϊσ' άστραπηφόρα πυρί, where the aorist λοXevdeioa, as well as the particle proté, indicates the past time, to which tíktel points as the moment of the event described; cf. Eurip. Suppl. 640; Xen. Ages. II. 17—20, Anab. 1. 1; Thucyd.
(2) The present is used for the future in order to express the certainty of the coming event; thus we have the prophecy of Apollo, Pind. Oι. VΙΙΙ. 42: Πέργαμος αμφί τεαϊς χερός εργασίαις áríoketai, " Troy is taken, i.e. is not impregnable, but is doomed to capture, where thy hands have wrought,” though afterwards, when a definite time is referred to, we have the future åpetal. See also Pind. Pyth. IV. 49; and Herod. vii. 140, where we have uével, λείπεται, πέλει and έρείπει in a Delphic oracle. Χen. Cyr. VΙΙ. 1, 19: νυν δράς έργον της σής ταχυεργίας: νυν γαρ ει φθάσομεν κ.τ.λ. ουδείς αποθανείται.
(3) The present is used for the perfect in verbs which express the permanence of a state, or an impression and its results. Such are ακούω, κλύω, αισθάνομαι, μανθάνω, γιγνώσκω, expressing the
continuance of a perception or cognizance: ádıkéw, “I am a wrongdoer;" égavyéw, “I boast or am confident;" Ovouw, “I am dying” (Soph. Ed. T. 118); vików, “I am victor or have conquered;" Deúryw, “I am an exile.” Thus Hom. Od. xv. 403:
. νησός τις Συρίη κικλήσκεται εί που ακούεις, “if you have heard,”
, i.e. possess knowledge by hearsay on that point; similarly Soph. Phil. 261: Ôv Klúels iows, “whom perhaps you have heard of, know by hearsay." Æsch. Agam. 305: vixộ 8 ó mp@tos kai Televtalos Spauov, “ both the first and the last in the series) have conquered in the race."
(66) Besides these usages there may be cases, in which, although the main verb is present both in form and signification, the reference is emphatically to the past and no longer existing state of things. Thus we have the two remarkable passages in Thucydides, 1. 6 and 1. 32. In the former we read: oi Trpeoßútepos
: πρεσβύτεροι αυτούς των ευδαιμόνων διά το αβροδίαιτον ου πολύς χρόνος επειδή χιτώνάς τε λινούς επαύσαντο φορούντες και κρύβυλον αναδούμενοι, where the words dià tò áßpodiaitov bear an involved past sense, which qualifies the whole passage: “such was their luxurious attire, that it is only a short time since they saw the old men of the wealthy class among them leave off, wearing linen tunics and binding up a knot of their hair with the fastening of golden mannah-flies.” In the other passage we read: Eyvóun, ei uni μετά κακίας, γνώμης δε μάλλον αμαρτία, τη πρότερον απραγμοσύνη évavtla touwuev, where, as in the former example, the past reference on which the emphasis depends, in opposition to the present τολμώμεν, is involved in the clause μη μετά κακίας κ.τ.λ.: “ allowance should be made for us if, when there was previously no malevolence, but only an error of judgment, we now venture on a measure at variance with our former isolation:" for certainly the orator does not imply that the present wish of his countrymen to form an alliance with Athens is an error of judgment: he concedes that only with reference to their former atpaypocúm or unwillingness to encumber themselves with foreign politics.
424 B, 1. The Future. (aa) As distinguished from the periphrastic future with yêuw, the simple form is used to denote a future event without any specification of the time after which it will happen, whereas the
periphrastic future requires or implies a definition of the time. Thus Plat. Gorg. 523 Α: ως αληθή όντα λέξω σοι ο μέλλω λέγειν, “I shall speak the truth in what I am now going to say."
(66) The simple future often conveys the meaning of obligation rather than mere futurity. Thus Xen. Mem. 11. 1, 17: oi eis την βασιλικής τέχνης παιδευόμενοι τι διαφέρουσι των εξ ανάγκης κακοπαθούντων, εί γε πεινήσουσι και διψήσουσι και ριγώσουσι, “if they must are obliged to) suffer hunger and thirst and cold." Eurip. Med. 1320 : λέγ' εί τι βούλει, χειρί δ' ου ψαύσεις ποτέ, "speak if you like, but you shall not touch me with your hand." “ ,
. Hence, as we shall see, the future used interrogatively becomes equivalent to an imperative, as in Arist. Aves, 1571: έξεις άτρέμας, « keep quiet.”
(cc) The future seems to be used for the present in cases when we imply a habit so usual or confirmed, that it may be expected
a , and relied on; thus, ανήρ σοφός τας εν τω βίω συμφοράς ράον οίσει των άλλων, “a wise man will be found to bear, may be expected to bear, usually bears, misfortunes more easily than others."
(dd) In relative sentences the future implies the object or end proposed; thus, έλεγον, ότι ήκομεν ηγεμόνας έχοντες, οι αυτούς άξουσιν ένθεν έξουσι τα επιτήδεια, « they said they would bring with them guides who would lead them (to lead them) to a place from which they would (in order that they might from thence) get provisions.
(ee) The verb βούλομαι is sometimes used in the future, although the wish itself is present, because the mind passes to the desired object, which is regarded as still absent and to come, and because a sort of conditional possibility is implied; thus Eurip. Med. 259: τοσούτον ουν σου τυγχάνειν βουλήσομαι, ήν μοι πόρος τις μηχανή τ’ εξευρεθή, “I shall desire to obtain 80 much from you," if circumstances admit of my obtaining what I wish. Soph. Ed. Col. 1291; και ταύτ' αφ' υμών, ώ ξένοι, βουλήσομαι και ταϊνδ' αδελφαίν και πατρός κυρεϊν έμοί, «I shall desire to obtain these things from you," if you will oblige me. Ed.
. Τ. 1076: τoυμών δ' εγώ, κεί σμικρόν έστι, σπέρμ’ ιδείν βουλήσομαι, “I shall wish to see it," i.e.“ I shall be glad to see it.”