three mine which he had previously received from Parmenon." On the other hand Polybius uses this middle verb in what ought to be the sense of the active (v. 56, § 4): τοῦ ̓Αντιόχου πρὸς αὐτὸν ȧvloμoλoynoaμévov, "Antiochus having admitted to him;" and ἀνθομολογησαμένου, absolutely (xxx. 8, § 7) : διὰ τῶν βασάνων ἐλεγχόμενος, ἀνθωμολογεῖτο καὶ σύμφωνος ἦν πᾶσι τοῖς συνθήμασιν, “ being put to the torture he confessed and gave the same evidence as the secret correspondence.” In διομολογοῦμαι we have the sense of mutual agreement, which springs, as we have seen, from the causative use of the middle, with πpós c. accus. of the person and accus. rei; Dem. c. Aphob. II. 840, 6: διωμολογημένος πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ὅσαπερ ἐκεῖνος γράψας κατέλιπεν, “having made an agreement with my father with regard to all that he had left in writing." Or with the accusative alone, c. Dionysod. 1284, 14: SioμoλOYOÛνTAι TOÙS TÓKOUS, "they agree mutually as to the interest of the loan."

"APXOMAI, as distinguished from apxw in the sense "I am first, I begin," implies that the person who commences also continues the action, whereas apxw means that the example is proposed by the agent, but followed by some other persons or things. Thus in Thucyd. 1. 144, § 3: πολέμου οὐκ ἄρξομεν, ἀρχομένους δὲ ȧuvvοúμela, "we will not be the first to take up arms, we will not set the example of hostilities; but if they engage in the war, begin with the view to continue it themselves, we will defend ourselves against them." As Böckh says (Corp. Inscript. I. p. 878): "exspectabatur apxovтas: at qui belli initium faciunt, non modo ut ab aliis id continuetur, ejus faciunt initium, sed sibi faciunt ejus initium, ut id bellum ipsi continuent: itaque etiam ȧpxoμévovs dici potuit, hoc est év ȧpxô övras." Just so we might say: čap apxeTai, "the spring begins," i.e. to be followed by the spring as long as that season lasts; but ἔαρ ἄρχει τοῦ ἔτους, “ the spring begins the year," because the rest of the year is not all spring. This meaning is implied in äpxw, "I rule," for the äpxwv is not one of those who follow him.

ται,

'AÞAIPOTMAI, "I take away to myself, I deprive entirely," is more common in the middle than in the active, which bears a meaning not easily distinguishable. Demosthenes uses the two forms together in an emphatic passage, Lept. 462, 2: ó Toívvv TηV πίστιν ἀφαιρῶν τῶν δωρεῶν νόμος οὗτος, ᾧ μόνῳ κρείττους εἰσὶν αἱ παρ ̓ ὑμῶν δωρεαί, τοῦτ ̓ ἀφαιρεῖται, “ this law then, which

takes away the security of the gifts, entirely deprives your gifts of their only distinctive superiority." The explanation of this is more simple than it appears at first sight. He, who takes away for the purpose of appropriating the object to himself, is supposed to effect a more complete deprivation than the person who abstracts, it may be partially, without any such object on his own account. Compare Shakspere's distinction between "stealing a purse" and "filching a good name" (Othello, Act III. sc. 3).

ΒΙΩΣΚΟΜΑΙ, “I come to life,” ΑΝΑΒΙΩΣΚΟΜΑΙ, “I come to life again," are used in the causative sense of the middle, not only in the 1 aor. but even in the present. Thus we have Hom. Od. VIII. 468:

σὺ γάρ μ' ἐβιώσαο, κούρη,

"for you have brought me to life, O damsel." And Plat. Crito, 48 ε: τῶν ῥᾳδίως ἀποκτιννύντων καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων γ ̓ ἄν, εἰ οἷοί Te nσav, “of those who make no difficulty about killing, and would restore to life again, if they had the power.'

BOTKOAOTMAI, "I tend cattle for myself," is used once with an accusative of the object in the sense "I collect my thoughts, I think about, dwell upon;" Æsch. Eumen. 78: кaì μǹ πρóкаμve Tóvde BoνKoλoúμevos πóvov, "do not anticipate, forestall, your troubles by meditating on this toil;" and the active is used in the same sense, with the dative opovrío to explain it, in Agam. 669: ἐβουκολούμεν φροντίσιν νέον πάθος, “we meditated on our new misfortune." So that the primary idea must be that of cogito= co-agito, just as Sophocles (Aj. 607) has the phrase opevòs oioßáTas, in the sense "self-willed." In the same sense the passage cited by Hesychius, βουκολεῖσθαι χρησταῖς ἐλπίσιν, must be understood, though Toup (Emend. III. 258) proposes to add amaтâσbai, which was one of the later meanings of Bouroλeîola, derived perhaps from an intermediate sense of Bovkoλeiv, "to alleviate by meditation;" cf. Luc. Ocypus, 8: äñas yàp avтòv Вovkoλeî Yevdoσтоμŵv, and see the passage quoted by Wyttenbach ad Select. Histor. p. 380. It must not however be supposed that Boukoλŵ is not used in its natural sense by the best writers. We have in Hom. Il. XXI. 448:

Φοίβε, σὺ δ ̓ εἰλίποδας ἕλικας βοῦς βουκολέεσκες,

and though there is a metaphor in Xen. Cyr. 1. 4, § 13: xáρiev

66

γὰρ εἰ ἕνεκα κρεαδίων τῇ θυγατρὶ τὸν παῖδα ἀποβουκολήσαιμι, “ it were a pretty business, if, for the sake of a little meat, I were to allow my daughter's son to go astray and get lost," i. e. like a sheep from the flock; yet in this passage there is a distinct reference to the original meaning of the term.

гPAÞOMAI, “I write down for myself or get written," is used of the first sketch or memoranda of a treatise, in opposition to ypápw, which implies the completion of the writing itself, the filling up of the outline; Plat. Theœtet. p. 143 B: éypaɣáμnv pèv τότ ̓ εὐθὺς οἰκάδ ̓ ἐλθὼν ὑπομνήματα, ὕστερον δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν ἀναμιμνησκόμενος ἔγραφον—ὥστε μοι σχεδὸν πᾶς ὁ λόγος γέγραπται, as soon as I reached home, I got some memoranda written down (aorist), and afterwards, as I recollected the details, I proceeded to write them down at my leisure (imperfect), so that nearly all the conversation is committed to writing." Again (Ibid. B) : ἐγραψάμην δὲ δὴ ούτωσὶ τὸν λόγον, “ this was the way in which I got the conversation written down"-showing the book; but in speaking of the composition he adds immediately after: Toúτων ἕνεκα ὡς αὐτὸν αὐτοῖς διαλεγόμενον ἔγραψα, " this was the reason why I made him, in my writing, converse in the first person."

AIAAΣKOMAI in the middle means both "I teach myself," i. e. "I learn," and "I get another taught," e. g. my son. The latter or causative meaning, which is the common use of the middle of this verb, has been illustrated above (432). The former or reflexive meaning occurs in Soph. Antig. 356: kaì þ0éyμa kaì ἠνεμόεν φρόνημα καὶ ἀστυνόμους ὀργὰς ἐδιδάξατο, “man has taught himself (i.e. has learned without a master) language and lofty thought and the dispositions of a well-ordered citizen" (see our note on the passage). But besides these two meanings didáσkopai is used in a sense, which it is hard to distinguish from the active, and which can only be explained by a reference to the intensive use mentioned above (432, (2), (bb), Obs.). In such passages as Plat. Mener. 238 Β, οἱ (θεοὶ τὸν βίον ἡμῶν κατεσκεύασαν πρός τε τὴν καθ ̓ ἡμέραν δίαιταν τέχνας πρώτους παιδευσάμενοι καὶ πρὸς τὴν ὑπὲρ τῆς χώρας φυλακὴν ὅπλων κτησίν τε καὶ χρῆσιν διδαξάμενοι, it may be doubtful whether the two middle participles do not imply that the gods provided for our being taught, instead of undertaking our instruction themselves. But in the following cases it is obvious

that the immediate instructors are the subjects of the verb. Simonides, Fr. 54, p. 377 Gaisford: dida§áμevos xopòv åvdpŵv, of the poet or χοροῦ διδάσκαλος; Pind. Οl. VIII. 59 : τὸ διδάξασθαι δέ τοι eidóτi páτepov, of the gymnastic trainer; Aristoph. Nub. 781: oỦK v dıdağaíμnv o'eri, of Socrates; and it might seem impossible to discriminate between the active pрodidáσкw and the middle πpoSidáσkoμaι in the two following passages of Sophocles, Aj. 162: où δυνατὸν τοὺς ἀνοήτους τούτων γνώμας προδιδάσκειν, and Trach. 680: ἐγὼ γάρ, ὧν ὁ θήρ με Κένταυρος προὐδιδάξατο, παρῆκα θεσμῶν οὐδὲν ἀλλ ̓ ἐσωζόμην. Unless in these passages it is sufficient to understand that the teacher taught diligently and from his own knowledge, which is expressly implied in the passage of Pindar, we must fall back on what was perhaps the origin of the causative middle, namely, the causative use of the passive, and understand didáçaobai as meaning here "to cause to learn," for the passive Sidάokoμaι means simply "to learn" in Soph. Antig. 726; Eurip. Пlec. 299; Aristoph. Plut. 473; Soph. Phil. 1374. To add to the irregularities in the use of the voices of this particular verb, it is to be observed that didάoxw sometimes means "I get my son taught." Aristonymus ap. Stob. Floril. 4, 106: Toroì adiknévтES ÚTÒ ῥητόρων τοὺς υἱοὺς ῥήτορας διδάσκουσιν, where the context shows that the fathers were not competent to teach rhetoric themselves.

ΔΙΩΚΟΜΑΙ, as distinguished from διώκω, means "I cause to go swiftly for myself or from myself;" thus in Hom. Il. xxi. 691, 2, we have

ὁ δ ̓ ἐπέσσυτο ποσσι διώκειν

ἕως ὁ τὸν πεδίοιο διώκετο πυροφόροιο, κ. τ. λ. "Achilles hastened to pursue him (i. e. to put him to flight); and while he urged the pursuit (followed it earnestly, and with interest) over the ground productive of corn, &c." In the Odyss. XVIII. 8, ὅς ῥ ̓ ἐλθὼν Ὀδυσῆα διώκετο οἷο δόμοιο, it seems to mean “ he eagerly endeavoured to drive away Ulysses."

ΔΟΥΛΟΥΣΘΑΙ, as distinguished from δουλοῦν, means “to subject to oneself," "to make oneself permanently the master;" as Thucyd. I. 18: ὁ βάρβαρος τὴν Ἑλλάδα δουλωσόμενος ἦλθεν, "the Persian king came with the intention of subjugating Greece." See χειροῦμαι.

EIΣПРATTOMAI, "I get in or exact for myself," is used in its proper sense as an appropriative middle in such passages as

Lys. c. Alcib. I. p. 142, 14 : τελευτῶν δήσας ἀργύριον εἰσεπράττετο, "at last he put him in prison and exacted the money from him." But it may be sufficient to express the effect on the debtor without referring in the particular case to the interests of the creditor; and this leads to occasional carelessness in the use of the voices. Thus in the same passage of Demosthenes, c. Apatur. p. 900, we have middle, passive and active with the necessary varieties of meaning, though the two former seem to be confused: 1. 9, dià tí οὐκ ἐπράττετο τὴν ἐγγύην; “why did he not sue me for my bond?” 1. 11, αὐτὸς γὰρ εἰσεπέπρακτο ὑπ ̓ ἐμοῦ τὰς χιλίας Spaxuás, "for he had himself had the 1000 drachmæ exacted from him;” 1. 16, εὐθὺς τότε εἰσέπραττεν ἄν με τὴν ἐγγύην, “ he would exact the bond of me at the moment," because the pressure of the creditor is brought forward more prominently than his wants, which are not mentioned till the next sentence.

"EAKOMAI seems to mean "I weigh or measure for myself, I cause to weigh,” in Pind. Pyth. II. 90: σтálμas tivos Éλkóμevol περισσᾶς.

'EIIAN IZOMAI, "I colour myself with" blood, is the proper force of this middle verb in a passage of Eschylus, Agam. 1434, where we should read νῦν δὲ τελείαν πολύμναστον, ἐπηνθίσω αἱμ' ἄνιπτον, “ but now having destroyed (ὀλέσασα) the last of these lives (Teλeíav fʊxýv), one much to be remembered, you have stained yourself with blood not to be washed out." That erravisw means "to colour" (floridum reddere) is shown by a number of passages.

'EIIIAEIKNTMAI means "I make an exhibition of myself or something peculiar to myself." Xen. Anab. IV. 6, § 15: vûv μáλa σοι καιρός ἐστιν ἐπιδείξασθαι τὴν παιδείαν, “ now it is quite the time for you to show off your education." The Scholiast on Plat. Alcib. I. p. 105 B, says: τὸ ἐνδείξασθαι ἐπὶ τοῦ λογισμοῦ τάττει, τὸ δὲ ἐπιδείξασθαι ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀποστάδην, i. e. of that which is directly or really exhibited. The distinction which Schleiermacher in his version of Plato makes between these two verbs is as follows: he translates évdeltaodai, sich sehen lassen, "to show oneself off;" èπideiçaodai, sich hören lassen, "to hold forth," "to make a formal display of one's powers of speaking." But although an éπídeĝis is often technically used to signify an oratorical exhibition, a set speech, both the noun and the verb have the general force