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Oeous, "if you wish the gods to be propitious to you, you must worship the gods;" Plat. Crit. p. 43 D: ei тaúтη toîs deoîs [ẻσtì] φίλον, ταύτῃ ἔστω, “ if it is pleasing to the gods in this way, so be it;” Isocr. Paneg. § 28: εἰ μυθωδὴς ὁ λόγος γέγονεν, ὅμως αὐτῷ καὶ vûv pηoñvaι πроońke, "if the story is fabulous, it is nevertheless proper that it should be spoken on this occasion."
(bb) The future in the protasis. Xen. Cyr. II. 1, § 8: eï Ti πείσονται Μῆδοι, εἰς Πέρσας τὸ δεινὸν ἥξει, “ if the Medes shall suffer anything, the danger will extend to the Persians;" Id. Anab. ιν. 7, § 3: τῇ στρατιᾷ οὐκ ἔστι τὰ ἐπιτήδεια, εἰ μὴ ληψόμεθα τὸ Xwpiov, "unless we shall take the place, there are no provisions for the army."
(cc) A past tense in the protasis. Thucyd. III. 54: ei ti äλλo ἐγένετο ἐπικίνδυνον, πάντων μετέσχομεν, “if any other danger arose, we took our share in all;" Id. Ibid. 55: ei άπоσтĥνaι оvk ἠθελήσαμεν, οὐκ ἠδικοῦμεν, “ if we refused to separate ourselves, we did no wrong ;” Id. Ibid. 65 : εἰ ἐμαχόμεθα καὶ τὴν γῆν ἐδῃοῦμεν, adiкoûμev, "if we fought and ravaged the land, we are in the wrong."
(B) The second class includes all conditional propositions, in which the protasis is expressed by éáv and the subjunctive, and in which the apodosis is the future indicative or some virtual equivalent. Plat. Euthyd. p. 288 c: τὸ ἑξῆς τούτοις πειράσομαι, ὅπως ἂν δύνωμαι, διελθεῖν, ἐάν πως ἐκκαλέσωμαι, κ.τ.λ., καὶ αὐτὼ σπουδάσηTOV, "I will endeavour, in such way as I shall be able, to investigate what follows, if in any way (as is probable) I can induce them, &c., and if they will be in earnest." And the subjunctive with ov un, being equivalent to the future, is also used in the apodosis to éáv (below, 545). But the present and even the perfect may take the place of the future (above, 423, (aa), (2), 425, (c)), and thus we find the following constructions: Xen. Anab. 1. 8, § 12: Kav ToÛTO νικήσωμεν, πάνθ' ἡμῖν πεποίηται, “ and if we shall have conquered in this, every thing is (will be) at once effected for us;" Dem. Ol. II. § 12: ἅπας λόγος, ἂν ἀπῇ τὰ πράγματα, ματαιόν τι φαίνεται καὶ KEVÓV, "all speaking, if actions are wanting, appears to be something vain and empty." It will be seen that in the expression of repeated acts (below, 580, (a)), the subjunctive with brav, &c. is the regular protasis to the present or future indicative.
(7) The third class includes all cases, in which the supposition is transferred from the region of fact and reality to that of imagination, when we have merely an idea, which may or may not admit of realization. Examples may occur in which it seems as if the possibility of the supposition was excluded by the nature of the circumstances themselves; and it may hence be supposed that there is an occasional confusion between this class of hypothetical propositions and the fourth. But it will always be found on a close examination, that, while the latter expressly deny the validity of the assumption, the optative always presumes that we are still within the limits of a wish or prayer, and that the fulfilment of our expectations, however chimerical, is at least supposable for the sake of argument. Thus we read in Plat. Resp. p. 359 B, C: ws dè xaì οἱ ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἀδυναμίᾳ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν ἀκόντες αὐτὸ ἐπιτηδεύουσι, μάλιστ ̓ ἂν αἰσθανοίμεθα, εἰ τοιόνδε ποιήσαιμεν τῇ διανοίᾳ, “that those who practise justice do so unwillingly through an inability to be unjust, we should best perceive, if we were to form the following supposition in our imagination ;" and a little lower down: ein & av ἡ ἐξουσία, ἣν λέγω, τοιάδε μάλιστα, εἰ αὐτοῖς γένοιτο οἵαν ποτέ φασι Súvaμiv tô Túyn, "and the liberty of which I am speaking, would be nearly as if they got the same power as they say was once obtained by Gyges;" and then follows a purely imaginative fable. We see the same resolution of the supposition into a mere mental conception in exaggerations, such as that in Esch. Pers. 431: κακῶν δὲ πλῆθος οὐδ ̓ ἂν εἰ δέκ ̓ ἤματα στιχηγοροίην οὐκ ἂν ἐκπλήoaí σo, "I could not make up the full tale of our misfortunes, σαιμί σοι, not even if I should recite them in order for ten days," which is of course an extravagant supposition. That the basis of this form of the hypothetical proposition is the idea of repeated action, namely, that the apodosis is regarded merely as coextensive with the protasis, is clear from the use of the optative in the corresponding temporal sentence (below, 580, (B)).
(8) With regard to the fourth case the following points deserve notice :
(aa) That the past tenses of the indicative, thus used in the hypothetical clause and its apodosis, really exclude the supposition which is made, appears clearly from the following examples: Thucyd. III. 53, § 3: ὁ μὴ ῥηθεὶς λόγος αἰτίαν ἂν παράσχοι ὡς, εἰ ἐλέχθη, σωτήριος ἂν ἦν, “the non-spoken speech would involve
the charge that if it had been spoken it would have ensured their safety.” Herod. VII. 47: εἴ τοι ἡ ὄψις τοῦ ἐνυπνίου μὴ ἐναργὴς οὕτω ἐφάνη, εἶχες ἂν τὴν ἀρχαίην γνώμην, ἢ μετέστης ἄν ; “ if the vision of your dream had not appeared to you so clear (i. e. if it had not been what it was), would you retain your former opinion, or would you have changed it?" Hyperid. pro Euxenippo, col. 30: εἴτ ̓ εἰ μὲν ἀπέφυγες τὴν γραφήν, οὐκ ἂν κατεψεύσατο οὗτος τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐπειδὴ δὲ συνέβη σοι ἁλῶναι, Εὐξένιππον δεῖ ἀπολωλέναι, "if you had been acquitted, my client would not have given a false report about the god; but since it so happened that you were convicted, Euxenippus must needs be ruined."
(bb) When the imperfect is used, the supposition excluded has reference properly to the present time, and this reference is sometimes directly expressed, as in Thucyd. 1. 71, § 2: póris 8 ầv πόλει ὁμοίᾳ παροικοῦντες ἐτυγχάνετε τούτου· νῦν δ ̓, ἀρχαιότροπα ὑμῶν τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα πρὸς αὐτούς ἐστιν, “you would scarcely ensure this, if you were (now) living by the side of a similar state; but now (as the case is) your principles are old-fashioned as compared with them." It may appear, however, that this distinction is neglected in certain cases. Thus in Demosth. Mid. 523, 10: ταῦτ ̓ εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι πάντ ̓ ἂν ἔλεγεν οὗτος τότε, it seems that we ought to render it, "I am well assured that he would have said all these things at that time." But the context shows that the meaning really is, "I know that he would now be saying all these things, if I had adopted the other course." In Soph. Antig. 388, σxoλî ποθ' ἥξειν δεῦρ ̓ ἂν ἐξηύχουν ἐγώ, ταῖς σαῖς ἀπειλαῖς αἷς ἐχειμάσθην τότε, compared with Asch. Αg. 480, οὐ γάρ ποτ' ηὔχουν μεθέξειν, the av creates so much difficulty that it seems almost necessary to read av' for ává, in the sense of "back again."
(cc) The particle av may be omitted with the past tense of the indicative in the apodosis, by a sort of rhetorical artifice, to indicate the certainty of the immediate consequence; thus Eurip. Hec. 1111: εἰ δὲ μὴ Φρυγῶν πύργους πεσόντας ᾖσμεν Ελλήνων δορί, φόβον παρέσχεν οὐ μέσως ὅδε κτύπος, “ did we not know that the towers of the Phrygians had fallen by the spear of the Greeks, this noise had caused us fear in no slight degree." Id. Troad. 397: Πάρις δ ̓ ἔγημε τὴν Διός γήμας δὲ μή, σιγώμενον Tò Kĥdos eixev év Sópois, " Paris married Jove's daughter, but if he had not married her he must have continued to keep his marriage
affinity in the obscurity which originally belonged to it." Diphilus, ap. Athen. IV. p. 165 F: εἰ μὴ συνήθης Φαιδίμῳ γ ἐτύγχανεν ὧν ὁ Χαβρίου Κτήσιππος, εἰσηγησάμην νόμον τιν ̓ οὐκ ἄχρηστον ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, “ if Ctesippus the son of Chabrias had not been intimate with Phædimus, I had introduced a certain law, not without its use as I conceive." The same omission is observed in later writers, as in Paul, ad Rom. VII. 7: τὴν ̔Αμαρτίαν οὐκ ἔγνων, εἰ μὴ διὰ Νόμου, “I had not known Sin, but through Law." And we have a corresponding idiom in Latin, as in Juv. x. 123: Antoni gladios potuit contemnere, si sic omnia dixisset. In Greek it is particularly common with the impersonals ἐχρῆν, ἔδει, ὠφελον, προσῆκε, εἰκὸς ἦν, ἄξιον ἦν, δίκαιον ἦν, καλὸν ἦν, καλῶς εἶχε, αἰσχρὸν ἦν, κρεῖττον ἦν, ἐξῆν, ἐνῆν, ὑπῆρχε, ἦν, ἔμελλε, and with words expressing an inclination, as ἐβουλόμην and ἤθελον. Thus Soph. Electr. 1505 sqq.: χρῆν δ ̓ εὐθὺς εἶναι τήνδε τοῖς πᾶσιν δίκην, ὅστις πέρα πράσσειν γε τῶν νόμων θέλει, κτείνειν· τὸ γὰρ πανοῦργον οὐκ ἂν ἦν, “ it were right that this retribution were immediately exacted from all, namely, to slay any one who wishes to violate the laws, for then villainy would not exist.” Thucyd. I. 38, § 3: καλὸν δ ̓ ἦν, εἰ καὶ ἡμαρτάνομεν, τοῖσδε μὲν εἶξαι τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ὀργῇ, ἡμῖν δ ̓ αἰσχρὸν βιάσασθαι τὴν τούτων μετριότητα, “it were right, even if we were erring, that these should yield to our passion, and then it would be disgraceful for us to put violence on their moderation.” Aristoph. Ran. 866: ἐβουλόμην μὲν οὐκ ἐρίζειν ἐνθάδε, “ I should prefer not to contend here."
503 Circumstances may occur, under which the apodosis of one of these cases may follow the protasis of another: thus, we may have the protasis of I. with the apodosis of III., as in Soph. Antig. 901 :
ἀλλ ̓ εἰ μὲν οὖν τάδ ̓ ἐστὶν ἐν θεοῖς φίλα,
where a special supposition is followed by a general sentiment. We have the protasis of IV. (a), as well as of III., with the apodosis of III., in Plat. Apol. p. 28 Ε: δεινὰ ἂν εἴην εἰργασμένος, εἰ τότε ἔμενον καὶ ἐκινδύνευον, νῦν δὲ ἀπολίποιμι τὴν τάξιν, because the facts of his past life are opposed to the mere supposition which he makes. We have the protasis of II. with the apodosis of III.
in Soph. d. Τ. 216: τἄμ' ἐὰν θέλῃς ἔπη κλύων δέχεσθαι, ἀλκὴν λάβοις ἂν κανακούφισιν πόνων, “ if you shall be willing to hear and receive my words, you would get succour and an alleviation of your troubles," where the mind supplies the intervening consequence, "I will speak, and perhaps my words might produce the effect.” We have the protasis of III. with the apodosis of I. (502, (α), (cc)), or of IV. (α), without ἄν (502, (δ), (cc)), in Xen. Cyr. II. 1, § 9: ἐγὼ μὲν ἂν εἰ ἔχοιμι ὡς τάχιστα ὅπλα ἐποιούμην πᾶσι Πέρσαις, as this is followed by the second case: κἂν ταῦτα παρασκευάσῃς ἡμῖν μὲν ποιήσεις, κ. τ. λ., and immediately preceded by the third case: οὐδ ̓ εἰ πάντες ἔλθοιεν Πέρσαι, πλήθει γε οὐχ ὑπερβαλοίμεθ ̓ ἂν τοὺς πολεμίους, before which we have in succession (§ 8): εἰ οὕτως ἔχει, τί ἂν ἄλλο τις κρεῖττον εὕροι; and εἴ τι πείσονται Μῆδοι, εἰς Πέρσας τὸ δεινὸν ἥξει, we may see that in the whole passage the protasis and apodosis are changed to suit the various shades of confidence or uncertainty with which the assumptions are put forth.
504 The apodosis is very often used in cases III. and IV. without any protasis, and with the same distinction of meaning as if a protasis had been expressed; thus we have in Soph. Aj. 88: μένοιμ ̓ ἂν ἤθελον δ ̓ ἂν ἐκτὸς ὢν τυχεῖν,
where the optative is used, as it very often is, to express a constrained future, "I suppose I must remain," and the indicative expresses, "but if it were possible, I should like to be out of the way."
505 The most common substitutes for ei, in all these cases of protasis, are the participle without the article, and the relative with indefinite antecedent. Thus we can say, with scarcely any difference of meaning: