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agreement is made on the condition that they should give up their arms," &c.

613 We sometimes find that a subjunctive and optative both depend upon a verb in a determinate tense: here the subjunctive denotes the first, and the optative the second or ulterior consequence; thus in Thucyd. III. 22: παρανῖσχον οἱ Πλαταιῆς φρυκτούς, ὅπως ἀσαφῆ τὰ σημεῖα τοῖς πολεμίοις ᾖ καὶ μὴ βοήθοιεν, “ to make the enemies' lights unintelligible," which was the first consequence; and "to prevent the Thebans from coming to the aid of their friends," which was an ulterior consequence, resulting from the former one.

614 If the end is not possible, or assumed to be so, as in the fourth case of conditional propositions (502, IV.), the final clause is expressed by the indicative mood; as in Soph. Ed. T. 1386:

εἰ τῆς ἀκουούσης ἔτ ̓ ἦν

πηγῆς δι ̓ ὤτων φραγμός, οὐκ ἂν ἐσχόμην

τὸ μὴ ἀποκλεῖσαι τοὐμὸν ἄθλιον δέμας,

ἵν ̓ ἦν τυφλός τε καὶ κλύων μηδέν,

"if there had been besides a means of damming up the fountain of hearing through my ears, I would not have refrained from blocking up my miserable body, in order that I might be (what I am not and cannot be) both blind and hearing nothing;" and immediately after in the same passage:

τί μ' οὐ λαβὼν

ἔκτεινας εὐθύς, ὡς ἔδειξα μήποτε

ἐμαυτὸν ἀνθρώποισιν ἔνθεν ἦν γεγώς ;

"why, having taken me in, didst thou not slay me at once, to the end that I might never have shown to men (as I am now showing)," or, "in which case I should never have shown, whence I was born?" And similarly with the unattainable wish (517), Plat. Crito, p. 44 D: εἰ γὰρ ὠφελον οἷοί τ ̓ εἶναι οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἵν ̓ οἷοί τ ̓ ἦσαν καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὰ μέγιστα, “ would that men in general were able to perpetrate the greatest evils, in order that they might (on the condition that they might) also effectuate the greatest benefits."

§ IX. Causal Sentences.

615 The causal sentence contains the expression of some contemporary or antecedent fact, which explains or accounts for the main statement. Accordingly, the causal sentence may amount to a temporal sentence, expressed (a) by the participle (576, 577), or (b) by the particles signifying postquam (581). But it may also be expressed by the emphatic particle ye (c) in the combination with apa, or (d) after a relative; and (e) by the relative with avrí, diá, éveka, &c. The following are examples of each class of causal

sentences.

616 (a) Participle:

λέγω δὲ τοῦδ ̓ ἕνεκα, βουλόμενος δόξαι σοι ὅπερ ἐμοί (Plat. Phado, p. 102 D), "I speak for the following reason, because I wish you to take the same view that I do." This example is instructive, as showing, in connexion with the relative usage discussed below, the distinction between the final and causal sentences. In itself evexa may introduce a final sentence (above, 607, (a)). But we have it here as a sort of antecedent to the causal participle βουλόμενος =ὅτι βούλομαι, and οἵνεκα is equivalent to τούτου ἕνεκα, ὅτι. OT. Now the condition, though expressed by the relative sentence, and therefore grammatically consequent, is logically antecedent (above, 500). And the end is really a condition of action, and as such is expressed by a relative particle. Accordingly, what is consequent when expressed in the antecedent clause, is antecedent when expressed in the consequent clause. But the cause is before the effect. Therefore what is the expression of the effect (final sentence) in the one case, is the expression of the cause (causal sentence) in the other, simply because the structure of the final sentence with μn and the future or the subjunctive or optative transfers the end to the future or probable, and because the structure of the causal sentence with ou and some particle or some present or past tense of the indicative presents the circumstance as a matter of fact.

Obs. 1 The participles in the phrases τί βουλόμενος, τί μαθών, τί Tabuv (413, (ee)), and those in the absolute nominative (445), are all

causal.

Obs. 2 If the causal sentence involves a negation, we use ou and not μή; as οὐ ποιήσας τοῦτο, ἀγαθὸς εἶ (above, 530, (c)).

Obs. 3 When the cause is stated as a matter of opinion, we prefix to the participle expressing the cause, whether it be in an absolute case, or in agreement with the subject, the relative particle ws, wote, ate, äte Sn, ola, olov (compare the similar objective sentences, 590). Thus,

ὡς οὐκέτ ̓ ὄντων σῶν τέκνων, φρόντιζε δή

(Eurip. Med. 1311),

"since your children no longer exist, form your plans accordingly." are δὴ οὖν οὐ πάνυ τι σοφὸς ὢν ὁ Ἐπιμηθεὺς ἔλαθεν αὑτὸν καταναλώσας τὰς Svváμeis eis Tà aλoya (Plato, Protag. p. 321 B), i. e. "forasmuch, however, as Epimetheus was not at all (534) a wise man, he unconsciously (578) exhausted all the endowments on the brute creation."

617 (6) Particles signifying postquam:

νίκη δ', ἐπείπερ ἕσπετ ̓, ἐμπέδως μένοι (Esch. Αg. 827), “ and may victory, since it has followed us, remain with us continually." The negative used is of course où. Plat. Apol. p. 27 c: τionμí σe ὁμολογοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀποκρίνει, “ I assume that you agree, since you do not answer."

Obs. When eί is causal it properly takes où, if a negative is required. The exceptions are chiefly found in the later writers, as Lucian, Hermot. 21, 9, 47; Vera Historia, II. 31; Plut. Thes. 28. In Thucyd. VIII. 38, fn.: ἐπεὶ δὲ μὴ ἀντανάγοιεν, ἡσύχαζον, ἐπεί is not causal, but temporal, and the sentence is frequentative, like those with oπTÓTE μÝ, Thucyd. II. 15, § 1; 11. 68, § 1.

618 (c) The particle yáp:

The particle ye="verily" combined with apa="therefore" or "further," is written yáp. This combination does not differ very much in signification from γοῦν = γε οὖν. Γάρ signifies “ the fact is," "in fact," "as the case stands;" it may often be rendered "for," but this English particle is much less extensive in its applications. Toûv signifies "at all events," "at any rate," "if it is not so in other cases, it is so in this;" it may also be rendered "for," but in still fewer instances than yáp. Immediately following xaí, the particle yap often introduces a sentence, with the meaning "and in fact," et profecto. In the same sense it is frequently placed after ἀλλά and ἀλλ ̓ οὐ. The collocation οὐ γὰρ ἄν is often used to introduce a contradictory alternative, as où yàp ầv deûp' ikóμŋv, “I should not otherwise have come hither." With the interrogative, γάρ expresses the effect of something observed ; thus, τί γὰρ σὸν ὄμμα σVVTÉTηKE; (Eurip. Med. 689), "ah! why is thine eye bedimmed?"

γάρ

The following passage will show the slight difference between yap and ἐπεί:

οὐ γὰρ ἐν ἁμετέρᾳ γνώμᾳ λύρας

ὤπασε θέσπιν ἀοιδὰν

Φοῖβος, ἁγήτωρ μελέων· ἐπεὶ ἀντάχησ ̓ ἂν ὕμνον

ἀρσένων γέννα (Eurip. Med. 424),

i.e. “the fact is, that Phoebus did not bestow the gift of lyric poetry on our sex: since, if he had, we should have given the males song for song.” But γάρ might have been written for ἐπεί, cf. Asch. Prom. 333 : πάντως γὰρ οὐ πείσεις νιν· οὐ γὰρ εὐπιθής, “ the fact is, you will altogether fail to persuade him: indeed, he is not easily persuaded." See Porson, ad Eurip. Med. 139, 140. Táp is often placed first with an explanatory clause, which is sometimes followed by οὖν, as in Herod. VI. 11: ἐπὶ ξυροῦ γὰρ ἀκμῆς ἔχεται ἡμῖν τὰ πρήγματα—νῦν ὦν, κ. τ. λ.

619 (d) The particle ye:

Te alone is sometimes nearly equivalent to yáp, especially when it follows μέν: before μέν or μήν, it simply conveys an asseveration. But the use of ye in causal sentences is chiefly after the relative, to which it gives the same sense as the Latin quippe qui. Thus,

οἵ γε τὸν φύσαντ ̓ ἐμὲ

οὕτως ἀτίμως πατρίδος ἐξωθούμενον
οὐκ ἔσχον οὐδ ̓ ἤμυναν

(Soph. Ed. C. 428),

i. e. "for they did not maintain or defend me."

620 (e) The relative with a preposition :

Οἵνεκα for τούτου ἕνεκα ὅτι; ἀνθ' ὧν for ἀντὶ τούτων ὅτι (above, 407) are common forms for the expression of the causal sentence; as ἐποικτείρω δέ νιν,

ὁθούνεκ' ἄτῃ συγκατέζευκται κακῇ

(Soph. Aj. 123),

"I pity him because he has become the yoke-fellow of a pernicious

distraction."

Obs. The connexion between the causal and the illative sentence is best shown by the transition from the use of γάρ, γοῦν, &c. in the former, to that of ἆρα, τοίγαρ, οὖν, &c, in the latter (above, 604).

§ X. Concessive Sentences.

621 The concessive sentence differs from the hypothetical clause in the same way as εἰ οὐκ ἐᾷς differs from εἰ μὴ ἐᾷς, namely, as an assertion of fact differs from a mere assumption; but we sometimes find conditional clauses used in a concessive sense, just as etiamsi may approximate in meaning to quamquam; and in a lively and vivid style the assumption may be stated as a fact past and gone; thus kai dý="even now" or "just now," may be used with the perfect indicative in the hurried statement of an hypothesis, e.g. καὶ δὴ τεθνᾶσι· τίς με δέξεται πόλις; (Eurip. Med. 386), i. e. "they are just now dead (= suppose them dead): what city will receive me?"

The commonest mode of expressing our "although" in Greek is by the participle, either alone (530, (c)), or followed by πep (in the poets), or preceded by κal Teр. The student must be careful not to suppose that xaí πep, in itself, signifies "although." This fancy is the cause of the common blunder of placing κal Teρ before περ a finite verb in modern Greek composition'. The participle, which alone occurs in this combination, expresses the concession, and rai περ TEρ means "even very much;" like the Latin quam-vis, quantumvis, "as much as you please." If a negative is required, it must

be où.

The concessive sentence is sometimes strengthened by oμws, eiтa, čπeɩтa, “nevertheless," which, though belonging to the verb, are sometimes, apparently, attached to the participle. Thus,

πιθοῦ γυναιξί, καί περ οὐ στέργων, ὅμως

(sch. Sept. c. Theb. 709),

"albeit you love them not, still yield to women."

καγώ σ' ἱκνοῦμαι, καὶ γυνή περ οὖσ ̓, ὅμως

(Eurip. Orest. 679),

"I too, although I am a woman, nevertheless beseech you."

622 The concession is often expressed by κaí Toi, “of a truth," which is generally used with the finite verb, in the sense

1 For the correction of the three passages, in which alone xal rep seems to be used with a finite verb, see our remarks in the Journal of Philology, I. p. 220.

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