Dawson v. The St. Paul Fire Insurance Company. rate for the purposes of this opinion. All the land exhibited on the diagram, and lying between Third and Bench streets, including the strip marked "St. Charles street," was conveyed to Jackson, except the part marked "Hopkins' lot." On the 19th day of January, 1849, Jackson conveyed the part marked "Cavalier lot," to one Charles Cavalier, and in the deed to Cavalier the part so conveyed is described as follows, viz. The following piece or parcel of land, etc., etc., known and designated v follows, viz. fronting on St. Charles street fifty feet, and bounded Dawson v. The St. Paul Fire Insurance Company. on the north by the line of Daniel Hopkins, one hundred feet, south by the line of Henry Jackson, one hundred feet, and west by the land of said Henry Jackson, fifty feet, the said lot being fifty feet in front, and one hundred feet in depth." On the 22d day of January, 1849, and on the 21st day of January, 1850, Jackson conveyed to Franklin Steele all the land mapped on the foregoing diagram, and lying on the east and west sides of St. Charles street, except the two lots designated as the Hopkins lot and Cavalier lot. On the 16th day of August, 1851, Steele conveyed the tract marked on the diagram as the Mahoney lot to Jeremiah Mahoney, and, on the 13th of June, 1860, Mahoney conveyed the same to the plaintiff. The deeds from Jackson to Cavalier, from Jackson to Steele, from Steele to Mahoney, and from Mahoney to the plaintiff, all refer to and mention St. Charles street, either as a boundary, or as a starting point from which distances are reckoned; and the premises conveyed by each of said deeds are conveyed with all the privileges and appurtenances to the same belonging. The complaint also alleges that, through sundry mesne conveyances, the plaintiff has become and is the owner of a portion of the tract conveyed as aforesaid to Cavalier, and of a portion (other than the Mahoney lot) of the tract conveyed to Steele as aforesaid, with all the privileges and appurtenances to such portion belonging; but no particular description of either of such portions is given in the complaint, nor does it appear whether or not they front on or adjoin St. Charles street. The complaint further alleges that St. Charles street was, on the 18th day of January, 1849, and prior thereto, and ever since has been, and is, a strip of land thirty-five feet in width, and three hundred and thirty feet in length, extending from Third street to Bench street, then and ever since, and now, two public streets in the city of St. Paul, in said county, and that said Henry Jackson was the owner of the fee in said strip from the time of the said conveyance to him by Louis Roberts, until the year 1856, and that said strip of land was, at the time of said conveyance and prior and subsequent thereto, and at the time of the conveyance to Cavalier, hereafter referred to, used and styled by the public and said Jackson, as a street, and that said Jackson prior to said purchase by said Steele, and at said purchase, exhibited to said Steele a plat of said block 31, which said plat exhibited and showed said strip of land to be a street, and that said Steele in making said purchase relied upon the representation on said map that said strip of land Dawson v. The St. Paul Fire Insurance Company. was a street; and that this plaintiff when he purchased the said parcel of land from said Mahoney, and the other parcels of land of which he claims to be the owner as aforesaid, "believed that said strip of land was a public street, and relied on such belief in paying to said Mahoney and the parties from whom plaintiff purchased" the other parcels "the purchase-money therefor." The plaintiff's claim of a private way is stated in these words, viz.: The complaint further shows that under and by virtue of said conveyances the plaintiff became seized and entitled to a right of way over said St. Charles street, as an appurtenance and privilege belonging to said grants and that he is now so entitled, and that by said conveyances said strip of land was a street as to this plaintiff." From the plaintiff's brief we gather that the claim to a private way over St. Charles street is placed upon two grounds: First, that the references in the deeds from Jackson to Cavalier, and to Steele, to St. Charles street as a boundary, gave to Cavalier and Steele and their assigns a right of way over the same by implication or estoppel, and that the plaintiff, who derives title from Cavalier and Steele to a portion of the land conveyed to them by Jackson, takes such right of way as appurtenant thereto. So far as this position is concerned, the claim to the right of way reats upon the fact that the land conveyed to Cavalier and Steele, of which the plaintiff's premises are parcel, abuts or fronts upon St. Charles street. And the general doctrine is, that under such a state of facts, and in the absence of qualifying circumstances, a grantor, if he be the owner of the so-called street, is estopped, as against his grantee, to deny that it is a street, and a right of way over the same passes to his grantee by implication of law. O'Linda v. Lothrop, 21 Pick. 292. But this implication of law rests upon the fact that the grantor has bounded, abutted or fronted the premises conveyed upon the street. It is also true, as a general proposition, that if the premises to which the right of way attached are divided, the right of way passes to each portion into whosesoever hands it. may come, but only so far as applicable to such portion. Hills v. Miller, 3 Paige, 256, 257; see also Washburne on Easements, 182. This rule is stated more broadly in Watson v. Bioren, 1 Serg. & Rawle, 227, and in Underwood v. Carney, 1 Cush. 285, cases cited by plaintiff; but in both the right of way was claimed in connection with premises abutting upon the way. Such was also the fact in Huttemeier v. Albro, 2 Bosw. 546, and 18 N Y. 48; and in Whitney VOL. II.-15 Dawson v. The St. Paul Fire Insurance Company. v. Lee, 1 Allen, 198. Now what are the facts in the case at bar? It does not appear that any portion of the plaintiff's premises abuts upon St. Charles street, and certainly it is for the plain tiff to aver that fact if his right depends upon it. It further appears that a portion of his premises fronts upon a public street called Third street, and it does not appear that every portion of his premises is not accessible from Third street. It follows, that there is nothing to show that he has any way of necessity over those portions of the land of Cavalier and Steele not conveyed to him, for a way of necessity is a way of strict necessity. Washburne on Easements, 164, McDonald v. Lindall, 3 Rawle, 492; Gayetty v. Bethune, 14 Mass. 49; Leonard v. Leonard, 2 Allen, 543; Nichols v. Luce, 24 Pick. 102. How, then, can it be said that the right of way over St. Charles street, which passed to Cavalier and Steele, is in any degree applicable to the premises of the plaintiff? The right of Cavalier and Steele arose from the fact that the lands conveyed to them fronted upon St. Charles street. And their right was a right to pass and repass over the way to and from and over and upon the front of their lands. And if, either by express grant from Cavalier and Steele, or by such a grant as the law implies from the necessity of the case, the plaintiff had acquired the right to pass and repass ever the land of Cavalier and Steele, not conveyed to him, in order to reach St. Charles street in going to and from his premises, then he might contend with great force of argument that he was entitled to a right of way over St. Charles street. But upon the facts stated in the complaint it does not appear that there was any such grant, either express or implied, so that the plaintiff's premises are cut off from St. Charles street by an intervening tract of land which excludes him from any beneficial participation in the right of way. In other words, the right of way is not applicable to the plaintiff's portion of the land conveyed to Cavalier and Steele. The case seems to us to stand upon the same footing as if Jackson had con veyed the plaintiff's premises to him without any express grant, or grant implied from necessity, of a right of way over St. Charles street, and had subsequently conveyed to Cavalier and Steele all that he did convey to them, plaintiff's premises excepted. It would hardly be contended in the case supposed that the plaintiff would acquire any private right of way in St. Charles street. Upon the whole, then, we are of opinion that the plaintiff, so far as the complaint discloses the situation of his premises, did not acquire Dawson v. The St. Paul Fire Insurance Company. any right of way over St. Charles street, under the references to the same in the deeds to Cavalier and Steele, and the other conveyances before spoken of. The other ground upon which the plaintiff claims the right of private way is taken upon the facts stated in the following extract from the complaint, viz.: "That said Jackson prior to said purchase by said Steele and at said purchase exhibited to said Steele a plat of said block 31, which said plat exhibited and showed said strip of land to be a street, and that said Steele in making said purchase relied upon the representations on said map that said strip of land was a street," etc. Block 31 appears to have embraced all the land represented on the foregoing diagram west of St. Charles street. We do not perceive that this ground of claim is to be distinguished in principle, or in any essential substantial respect, from the first. If the exhibition of the map and Steele's reliance upon it are of importance, it is because such exhibition was a material representation, the truth of which good faith estops Jackson and those claiming under him, to deny. If St. Charles street was in fact a public street, then, as we have already seen, it is not for the plaintiff, upon the facts appearing in this case, to complain of its obstruction. The plaintiff's contention is, however, that the effect of the exhibi tion of the map was to confer upon Steele and those claiming ander him a private right of way over St. Charles street. Whether this result would follow from the simple exhibition of a plat or map to which no reference was made in the deed of conveyance is by no means altogether clear. See Squire v. Campbell, 1 Mylne & Craig, 459, 478. But admitting that such would be the effect of a simple exhibition of the plat, it seems to us that the representation to be implied would be substantially the same as that inferred from the call of a deed bounding the premises conveyed upon a street. That is to say, it would be a representation that the premises conveyed abutted or fronted upon a strip of land over which the grantee and those claiming under him would have a right of way; a right arising from the frontage, and in all respects resembling the right which we have before endeavored to define in considering the effect of the language of the deeds to Cavalier and Steele. The case of Wyman ▾. Mayor of New York, 11 Wend. 487, cited by plaintiff and referred to in Wilder v. St. Paul, 12 Minn. 203, is to be distinguished from the case at bar, because it was a case in which lots were conveyed according to a map, either by the express |