The German Mutual Insurance Company v. Grim. 836; Robertson v. Smith, 18 Ala. 220; Duglass v. Scott, 8 Leigh, 43; Fullerton v. Sturgis, 4 Ohio St. 529; Norwich Bank v. Hyde, 13 Conn. 279; Torrey v. Fisk, 10 S. & M. 590; Bank V. Curry, 2 Dana, 143. It is now well settled that, in order to impeach the title of a purchaser of current negotiable paper, it must be shown that he acted in bad faith, believing at the time of the purchase that there was some infirmity about the paper. Goodman v. Harvey, 4 Adol. & Ellis, 870; Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. (U. S.) 343; Steinhart v. Baker, 34 Barb. 436; Benior v. Paquin, 40 Vt. 199; Bassett v. Avery, 15 Ohio St. 299. But, if the paper be so filled up as to create a questionable appearance, or not according to he purport and tenor of such an instrument, it is sufficient to put the purchaser on his guard. Crosby v. Grant, 36 N. H. 273; Mchaime Bank v. Doylas, 31 Conn. 170. But if the defect does not appear on the face of the paper, it seems the purchaser may safely rely on the maker or indorser. Merriam v. Rockwood, 47 N. H. 81; Bank v. Goss, 31 Vt. 315; Haskins v. Lombard, 16 Maine, 140; Smith v. Maberly, 10 B. Monr. 266. A person who has signed a blank instrument for accommodation may revoke it at any time before its inception or delivery to a third party (Smith's Execrs. v. Wyckoff, 3 Sandf. Ch. 77); and the delegated power to fill up such a paper is revoked by the death of the signer, and if it be afterward filled and transferred, it seems the decedent's estate cannot be made liable, even when the instrument is in the hands of a bona fide purchaser without notice of the death. Smith's Execrs. v. Wyckoff, 3 Sandf. Ch. 77; Michigan Ins. Co. v. Leavenworth, 30 Vt.-REP. THE GERMAN MUTUAL INSURANCE Co., appellants, v. GRIM et al (32 Ind. 249.) Voluntary conveyance― Estoppel as to grantor - Equities of voluntary grantee as against subsequent purchasers — Reforming deed. A., owning certain lands, and intending to convey the same to his daughter as a gift, executed a deed, in which, through a mistake of the draughtsman, the premises were incorrectly described, and the name of the daughter's hus band inserted instead of her own as grantee. No consideration was paid or promised for the conveyance, although a consideration was named in the deed. The deed was delivered to the daughter and duly recorded, and she was placed in possession. Afterward the husband executed a mortgage, containing the same erroneous description of the premises, to a bona fide mortgagee, who, upon foreclosure, purchased the premises, and took a sheriff's deed containing the same erroneous description. Suit was brought by purchaser to correct the description; whereupon, A., having then first discovered the error in his former deed, executed and delivered to his daughter another voluntary deed, wherein she was named as grantee, and the premises correctly described. Held, 1. That the purchaser having acted in good faith, and without any notice of defect in the husband's title, A. was estopped from denying that the deed to the husband was made in good faith, or that the grantee was properly named therein. 2. That the daughter being a voluntary grantee, had no claim either under the original deed ncr under the one executed pending suit. 3. That the deed to the husband was not void for uncertainty in the description of the premises conveyed, and that the plaintiffs were entitled to have their deed reformed. The German Mutual Insurance Company v. Grim. SUIT to reform deed. The complaint alleged that the appellees Ritter and his wife, in February, 1867, sold and conveyed to the other appellee, Grim, a lot of land described in the deed, by mistake of the draughtsman, as “the middle twenty-two feet four inches of lot number 27, on Upper Spring street, being twenty-two feet four inches in front and rear, and extending back the same width sixty feet, being part of lot held by said Ritter under a deed from John Yager and wife, recorded in book W, page 363." That the correct description of the property intended to be conveyed was "all that part of lot number 27 on Upper Spring street, which is bounded by a line beginning seventytwo and one-third feet from the north-east corner of said lot on Upper Fourth street, and running thence southwardly with the line of said Upper Fourth street twenty-two and a third feet; thence westwardly at right angles to said street sixty feet; thence northwardly along the west line of said lot twenty-two and one third feet; and thence eastwardly sixty feet to the place of beginning.' That Grim mortgaged said premises to the plaintiff, by the same erroneous description, in 1861, to secure a note; that the mortgage was afterward foreclosed, and the premises purchased by the plaintiff at the foreclosure sale, the sheriff's deed containing the same erroneous description; and prayer was made for a reformation of these deeds and of the mortgage. Grim answered by a general denial, and Mrs. Ritter died pending the suit. Ritter answered by a general denial, and a second paragraph, which was struck out on demurrer; he then filed a third paragraph in the nature of a cross-complaint; he admitted that he was the owner of the property described in the complaint, and alleged that Mrs. Grim was his daughter; that, for the purpose of providing for her, he intended to make the conveyance to her as a gift, and not to her husband; that no consideration was ever paid or promised for said premises by Grim, nor by any other person; that by a mistake of the draughtsman the deed was made to Grim instead of his wife, and that when he executed the deed he believed that it conveyed the property to Mrs. Grim; that he delivered the deed to her and put her in possession; that the mistake in the name of the grantee, and in the description, was not discovered by him until after suit brought, since which he had conveyed the premises to Mrs. Grim by a proper description; and that said Mrs. Grim had an interest in the suit adverse to the plaintiff. Prayer, that she be The German Mutual Insurance Company v. Grim. made party defendant, and that her title to the premises be perfected and confirmed. Mrs. Grim was made party defendant and filed her answer, adopting the answer and cross-complaint of Ritter. The issue was tried by the court and judgment was rendered for the defendants, and Mrs. Grim's title was confirmed according to the prayer. T. L. Smith, M. C. Kerr, J. A. Ghormley and A. Seidensticker, for appellant. G. V. Hawk and R. M. Weir, for appellee. ELLIOTT, J. We are compelled to examine the important questions presented by the record in this case without any argument in behalf of the appellees. The material questions in the case arise upon the third paragraph of Ritter's answer and cross-complaint, which was also adopted by Mrs. Grim, and to which the circuit court overruled a demurrer. Was that ruling correct? We will first examine the questions raised by the complaint and the answer with reference to the position and rights of Ritter in opposition to the appellant. The points presented by the answer are, that the deed from Ritter to Grim was voluntary, and made without any valuable consideration whatever; that it was intended to be made to Mrs. Grim as a gift, and, under the belief that she was named as the grantee, the deed was delivered to her, and she was put into the possession of the premises intended to be conveyed, but that, by the mistake of the draughtsman, the conveyance not only failed to contain a proper description of the premises, as alleged in the complaint, but the name of Louis Grim was inserted in it, erroneously, as the grantee, instead of his wife, Catharine Grim, as was intended by the grantor; and that Ritter, upon the discovery of said mistakes, after the commencement of this suit, executed to Mrs. Grim another deed, containing a proper description of the premises. These facts seem to have been regarded by the circuit court as sufficient to raise a superior equity in Mrs. Grim, and te constitute a valid defense to the action on the part of Ritter. The only averments in the answer which Ritter could possibly rely upon as a defense are, that the deed to Grim was made without any valuable consideration, and that, by mistake of the draughtsman, it was The German Mutual Insurance Company v. Grim. made to Louis instead of Catharine Grim. The appellant occupies the relation of an innocent purchaser, for a valuable onsideration, from Louis Grim. The deed from Ritter to Grim purports upon its face to have been made for the valuable consideration of $200, paid by Grim to Ritter, the receipt of which is acknowledged. It was placed on record on the day of its execution. The answer con tains no averment of notice to the appellant, at any time, that the conveyance to Grim was voluntary, or of the alleged mistake in the name of the grantee. In the absence of such notice, the appellant was authorized to presume that the deed was made upon a valuable consideration, as expressed upon its face, and that the proper grantee was named therein; and the appellant having become a purchaser for a valuable consideration, in good faith, from the grantee named in the deed, Ritter must be held as estopped to deny that the deed was made for a valuable consideration, or that the grantee was properly named, and thereby defeat the appellant's title under it. Guard v. Bradley, 7 Ind. 600; Trimble v. The State, 4 Blackf. 435. And the fact that the appellant was compelled to appeal to the chancery powers of the court, to correct the mistake in the description of the land, does not avoid the estoppel. Such estoppels, when consistent with the principles of equity and good conscience, are recognized and enforced in courts of equity the same as at law. Here the appellant, relying upon the facts apparent on the face of the deed from Ritter to Grim, became the purchaser under the latter, in good faith, for a valuable consideration, and it would be a fraud on the appellant if Ritter were now permitted to deny the truth of the recitals in his deed, and thereby defeat the appellant's title, which equity will not sanction. We will now examine the question as to the claims of Mrs. Grim, and see whether her position is a more advantageous one than that occupied by Ritter. The claim of Mrs. Grim is, that the conveyance from Ritter, which in fact was made to her husband, was intended to be made to her as a voluntary gift from her father. If, then, the deed had been made to Mrs. Grim, as she claims it was intended to be, she would have occupied the position of a volntary grantee, without a valuable consideration; but if the conveyance did not describe the premises intended to be conveyed, it would still have been inoperative, and for that reason would not have been an executed gift; and as the conveyance was merely vol The German Mutual Insurance Company v. Grim. untary, it did not invest her with any equity which she could have enforced, even as against Ritter, and much less as against a purchaser for a valuable consideration, in good faith, from the grantee named in the deed. It is settled, at least in this state, that a voluntary executory contract for the conveyance of land will not be specifically enforced; nor will a voluntary deed be corrected of misLakes on the application of the grantee against the grantor, though it will be on the application of the grantor against the grantee, where, by mistake, the conveyance is for a larger estate than was intended. Andrews v. Andrews, 12 Ind. 348; Froman v. Froman, 13 id. 317; Randall v. Ghent, 19 id. 271. In Froman v. Froman, supra, a father made a voluntary conveyance of a tract of land to one of his sons, but, by mistake, described the land as being the south-east quarter of a certain section, instead of the south-west quarter. Subsequently the father made a voluntary conveyance of the land, by a proper description, to his other children. On an application for partition among the latter, the son to whom the first conveyance was made set it up to defeat the subsequent conveyance, and asked that the mistake in the description of the land might be corrected. It was held, on appeal to this court, that equity would not aid in perfecting a title under a voluntary deed in such a case. Cases are found in which a distinction is attempted to be drawn in such instances between a voluntary executory contract or conveyance to a stranger and one to a child, where it is deemed to be founded on a meritorious consideration. The case of Ellis v. Nimmo, Ll. & G. temp. S. 333, is a leading one of this class, in which it was held, that a voluntary contract in writing, by a father to make a post-nuptial provision, or settlement upon his daughter, might be enforced against him in equity, as being founded on a meritorious, although not a valuable, consideration. Justice STORY, in commenting on that case, says: "But this doctrine has been since denied, and the general rule seems now established, that the court will not execute a voluntary contract, but will withhold assistance from a volunteer, whether he seeks to have the benefit of a contract, or a covenant, or a settlement." Story Eq. § 793 d. See, also, § 164. A distinction seems to be drawn between cases of this character and those of a defective execution of a power, in which it is said relief may be granted in favor of a voluntary donee. From the decree rendered in the case, it may be inferred that the VOL. II.-44 |