Goddard v. Grand Trunk Railway Company. In 1844, Lord Chief Baron POLLOCK said, that, in actions for malicious injuries, juries had always been allowed to give what are called vindictive damages. Doe v. Filliter, 13 M. & W. 50. In 1858, in an action of trespass for taking personal property on fraudulent bill of sale, the defendant's counsel contended that it was not a case for the application of the doctrine of exemplary damages; but the court held otherwise. No doubt, said POLLOCK, C. B., it was a case in which vindictive damages might be given. Thomas . Harris, 27 L. J. Ex. 353. In 1860, in an action for willful negligence, the defendant contended that the plaintiff's declaration was too defective to entitle him to exemplary damages; but the court held otherwise; and the judge who tried the case remarked that he was glad the court had come to the conclusion that it was competent for the jury to give exemplary damages, for he thought the defendant had acted with a high hand. Emblen v. Myers, 6 H. & N. 54. "Damages exemplary" is now a familiar title in the best English law reports. See 6 H. & N. 969. It was the firmness with which Lord CAMDEN (then Chief Justice PRATT) maintained and enforced the right of the jury to pun Ish with exemplary damages the agents of Lord Halifax (then sec retary of state) for the illegal arrest of the publishers of the North Briton, that made him so immensely popular in England. Nearly or quite twenty of those cases appear to have been tried before him. in all of which enormous damages were given, and in not one of them was the verdict set aside. In one of the cases a verdict for a thousand pounds was returned for a mere nominal imprisonment at the house of the officer making the arrest, and the court refused to set it aside. Beardmore v. Carrington, 2 Wilson, 244. "After this," says Lord CAMPBELL, in his " Lives of the Chancellors," he became the idol of the nation. Grim representations of him laid down the law from sign-post, many busts and prints of him were sold, not only in the streets of the metropolis, but in the provincial towns; a fine portrait of him, by Sir Joshua Reynolds, with the flattering inscription, in honor of the zealous asserter of English liberty by law,' was placed in the Guildhall of the city of London; addresses of thanks to him poured in from all quarters; and one of the sights of London, which foreigners went to see, was the great Lord Chief Justice PRATT." Goddard v. Grand Trunk Railway Company. In this country, perhaps Lord Camden is better known as one of the able English statesmen who so eloquently defended the American colonies against the unjust claim of the mother country to tax them. Lord Campbell says some portions of his speeches upon that subject are still in the mouths of school-boys. But in England his immense popularity originated in his firm and vigorous enforcement of the doctrine of exemplary damages. And we cannot discover that the legality of his rulings in this particular was ever seriously called in question. On the contrary, we find it admitted by his political opponents that he was a profound jurist and an able and upright judge. His stringent enforcement of the right of the jury to punish flagrant wrongs with exemplary damages, arrested not only great abuses then existing, but it has had a salutary influence ever since. It won for him the title of the "asserter of English liberty by law." In this country the right of the jury to give exemplary damages has been much discussed. It seems to have been first opposed by Mr. Theron Metcalf (afterward reporter and judge of the supreme court of Massachusetts), in an article published in 3 American Jurist, 387, in 1830. The substance of this article was afterward inserted in a note to Mr. Greenleaf's work on evidence. Mr. Sedgwick, in his work on damages, took the opposite view, and sustained his position by the citation of numerous authorities. Professor Green'eaf replied in an article in the Boston Law Reporter, vol. 9, p. 529. Mr. Sedgwick rejoined in the same periodical, vol. 10, p. 49. Essays on different sides of the question were also published in 3 American Law Magazine (N. S.) 537, and 4 American Law Magazine (N. S.) 61. But notwithstanding this formidable opposition, the doctrine triumphed, and must be regarded as now too firmly established to be shaken by any thing short of legislative enactments. In fact, the decisions of the courts are nearly unanimous in its favor. In a case in the supreme court of the United States, Mr. Justice GRIER, in delivering the opinion of the court, says: It is a wellestablished principle of the common law, that in all actions for torts the jury may inflict what are called punitive or exemplary. damages, having in view the enormity of the offense rather than the measure of compensation to the plaintiff. "We are aware," the judge continues, "that the propriety of this doctrine has been questioned by some writers; but if repeated judicial decisions for more than a century are to be received as the best exposition of Goddard v. Grand Trunk Railway Company. what the law is, the question will not admit of argument." Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363. In a case in North Carolina, the court refer to the note in Professor Greenleaf's work on evidence, and say that it is very clearly wrong with respect to the authorities, and in their judgment wrong on principle; that it is fortunate that while juries endeavor to give ample compensation for the injury actually received, they are also allowed such full discretion as to make verdicts to deter others from flagrant violations of social duty. And the same court hold that the wealth of the defendant is a proper circumstance to be weighed by the jury, because a thousand dollars may be a less punishment to one man than a hundred dollars to another. In one case the same court sustained a verdict which in terms assessed the actual damages at $100, and the exemplary damages at $1,000. The court held it was a good verdict for $1,100. Pendleton v. Davis, 1 Jones (N. C.), 98; McAulay v. Birkhead, 13 Iredell, 28; Gilreath v. Allen, 10 id. 67. In fact, Professor Greenleaf is himself an authority for the doctrine of exemplary damages. Speaking of the action for assault and battery, he says the jury are not confined to the mere corporal injury, but may consider the malice of the defendant, the insulting character of his conduct, the rank in life of the several parties, and all the circumstances of the outrage, and thereupon award such exemplary damages as the circumstances may in their judgment require. 2 Greenl. on Ev., § 89. But if the great weight of Professor Greenleaf's authority were to be regarded as opposed to the doctrine, we have, on the other hand, the great weight of Chancellor KENT's opinion in favor of it. He says, surely this is the true and salutary doctrine. And after reviewing the English cases, he continues by saying it cannot be necessary to multiply instances of its application; that it is too well settled in practice and too valuable in principle to be called in question. Tillotson v. Cheetham, 3 Johns. 56 and 64. This brief review of the doctrine of exemplary damages is not so much for the purpose of establishing its existence, as to correct the erroneous impression which some members of the legal profession still seem to entertain, that it is a modern invention, not sanctioned by the rules of the common law. We think every candidminded person must admit that it is no new doctrine; that its existence as a fundamental rule of the common law has been rec Goddard v. Grand Trunk Railway Company. ognized in England for more than a century; that it has been there stringently enforced under circumstances which would not have allowed it to pass unchallenged, if any pretext could have been found for doubting its validity; and that in this country, notwithstanding an early and vigorous opposition, it has steadily progressed, and the decisions of the courts are now nearly unanimous in its favor It was sanctioned in this state, after a careful and full review of the authorities, in Pike v. Dilling, 48 Me. 539, and cannot now be regarded as an open question. But it is said that if the doctrine of exemplary damages must be regarded as established in suits against natural persons for their own willful and malicious torts, it ought not to be applied to corporations for the torts of their servants, especially where the tort is committed by a servant of so low a grade as a brakeman on a railway train, and the tortious act was not directly nor impliedly authorized nor ratified by the corporation; and several cases are cited by the defendants' counsel, in which the courts seem to have taken this view of the law; but we have carefully examined these cases, and in none of them was there any evidence that the servant acted wantonly or maliciously; they were simply cases of mistaken duty; and what these same courts would have done if a case of such gross and outrageous insult had been before them as is now before us, it is impossible to say; and long experience has shown that nothing is more dangerous than to rely upon the abstract reasoning of courts, when the cases before them did not call for the application of the doctrines which their reasoning is intended to establish. We have given to this objection much consideration, as it was our duty to do, for the presiding judge declined to instruct the jury that if the acts and words of the defendants' servant were not directly nor impliedly authorized nor ratified by the defendant, the plaintiff could not recover exemplary damages. We confess that it seems to us that there is no class of cases where the doctrine of exemplary damages can be more beneficially applied than to railroad corporations in their capacity of common carriers of passengers; and it might as well not be applied to them at all as to limit its application to cases where the servant is directly or impliedly commanded by the corporation to maltreat and insult a passenger, or to cases where such an act is directly or impliedly ratified; for no such cases will ever occur. A corporation is an VOL. II.-7 Goddard v. Grand Trunk Railway Company. imaginary being. It has no mind but the mind of its servants; it has no voice but the voice of its servants; and it has no hands with which to act but the hands of its servants. All its schemes of mischief, as well as its schemes of public enterprise, are conceived by human minds and executed by human hands; and these minds and hands are its servants' minds and hands. All attempts, therefore, to distinguish between the guilt of the servant and the guilt of the corporation; or the malice of the servant and the malice of the corporation; or the punishment of the servant and the punishment of the corporation, is sheer nonsense; and only tends to confuse the mind and confound the judgment. Neither guilt, malice, nor suffering is predicable of this ideal existence called a corporation. And yet under cover of its name and authority, there is in fact as much wickedness, and as much that is deserving of punishment, as can be found anywhere else. And since these ideal existences can neither be hung, imprisoned, whipped, nor put in the stocks, since, in fact, no corrective influence can be brought to bear upon them except that of pecuniary loss, it does seem to us that the doctrine of exemplary damages is more beneficial in its application to them, than in its application to natural persons. If those who are in 11.2 habit of thinking that it is a terrible hardship to punish an innocen: corporation for the wickedness of its agents and servants will for a moment reflect upon the absurdity of their own thoughts, their anxiety will be cured. Careful engineers can be selected who will not run their trains into open draws; and careful baggagemen can be secured, who will not handle and smash trunks and bandboxes as is now the universal custom; and conductors and brakemen can be had who will not assault and insult passengers; and if the courts will only let the verdicts of upright and intelligent juries alone, and let the doctrine of exemplary damages have its legitimate influence, we predict these great and growing evils will be very much lessened, if not entirely cured. There is but one vulnerable point about these ideal existences called corporations; and that is, the pocket of the moneyed power that is concealed behind them; and if that is reached they will wince. When it is thoroughly understood that it is not profitable to employ careless and indifferent gents, or reckless and insolent servants, better men will take their places, and not before. It is our judgment, therefore, that actions against corporations, for the willful and malicious acts of their agents and servants in |