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Cormier v. Bienvenu.

Garry & Fournet, for plaintiff.

De Blanc & Perry, for defendant.

TALIAFERRO, J. The ownership of persons, as it formerly existed in this country, cannot be said to have extended beyond the right of the owner to exact, for his own use and benefit, the labor and services of the person subjected to that ownership without remuneration to him. The person hiring a slave had this right during the term of the lease to the same extent that the owner had. Both the owner and the hirer were entitled, by the laws that then existed, to exact from the slave his labor, without recompense to him. The hirer had, however, to account for the hire of the services to the owner of the slave. Then, the difference between the right of the owner and that of the hirer consisted only in the duration of the right, and in the obligation of the hirer to pay the owner of the slave for his labor and services. In the one case, the labor and services were to continue an indefinite period of time-that is, during the life of the slave. In the other case, a fixed term was established. By the abolition of slavery, all contracts existing at the time, relating to the sale of slaves, were annulled. The sale of a slave being, in substance, the sale of his services for life, the obligation, which was previously binding upon the purchaser, to pay for these services received, and to be received, became extinct. In like manner the obligation of the hirer to pay for the services. of the slave for a fixed period was canceled.

It is of no importance whether the period of the hire of the slave had terminated or not before the time of the extinction of slavery, nor whether the contract was valid prior to that time. With the end of the status or condition of slavery, every contract founded upon or growing out of that condition necessarily came to an end, also, whether such contract was previously valid or not. As well might it be decreed that the purchaser of a slave who had never paid any part of the stipulated price, and who had received the services of the slave for years before emancipation, should pay for these services, as to decree that the hirer of a slave should pay the stipulated hire, which became due before that event occurred. True, in the one case there was a special contract for hire; in the other there was not. But the analogy of the two cases is so strong, that whatever equity would require in the one case, it would equally VOL. II.-92

Cormier v. Bienvenu.

require in the other. The existence of a state of slavery, sanctioned by law, lay at the foundation of the contract of hire of slaves. The laws which authorized and enforced the contract were necessarily abolished by the subversion of slavery. Persons could no longer be sold or hired. Existing obligations for the price or the hire could not be enforced, for there was no longer any law authorizing their enforcement.

It will not do to say that these existing obligations were not impaired by the act of emancipation, and could not be. The high behest of the sovereign power is uncontrolled by prohibitions which restrain ordinary legislation. Its force destroyed all the objections depending for their efficacy upon the existence of laws maintaining slavery. Courts were therefore left without authority to enforce contracts of this character.

The case of Dickinson v. Maynard, 20 An. 66, in which this court awarded a small sum to the plaintiff, constructively as hire of a slave, was not a suit for hire of slaves, but for damages on account of an attachment wrongfully sued out by the defendant. The award was virtually in the nature of damages, and made on the authority of Phelps v. Coggshill, 13 An. 440. In this, as well as in another important feature, that case differs widely from the one before us.

In the case of Tate, adm'r, v. Fletcher et al., 19 An. 371, the judgment of the district court was reversed, as to that part of it which allowed the plaintiff hire for a slave, and the decision was based upon the doctrine of the case of Wainwright v. Bridges, 19 An. 234, then recently decided. This we consider as the settled doctrine in regard to the question of the right to recover the hire of slaves.

It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the district court be annulled, avoided and reversed. It is further ordered that there be judgment in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff and appellee paying costs in both courts.

Young v. Ship Princess Royal.

YOUNG V. SHIP PRINCESS ROYAL et al.

(22 La. An. 388.)

Jurisdiction in maritime claims..

A proceeding in rem against a vessel for the recovery of damages for a mari. time tort can be enforced only by the courts of the United States.

APPEAL from fourth district court, parish of Orleans. The facts appear in the opinion.

Randolph, Singleton & Browne, for plaintiff.

Race, Foster & E. T. Merrick, for defendant.

Hornor & Benedict, for warrantors.

LUDELING, C. J. The plaintiff complains that, by a collision in the port of New Orleans, his flat boat and a cargo of flour were damaged by the fault of those in charge of the ship Princess Royal, to the extent of $1,332.18. He alleges that he has a privilege on the ship to secure the payment of the damages; that her owners are non-residents and unknown to plaintiff; and he prays for an attachment against the vessel and for judgment against the master and owners for the sum above stated, with interest and costs, and with privilege on the ship Princess Royal, her tackle, etc. The usual affidavit and bond for attachment were made, and a writ of attachment issued.

The defendants appeared, and for answer filed a general denial; they called the master and owners of the tug-boat Tuscarora in warranty, alleging that they had the ship Princess Royal in tow, and that they were responsible for any damages done to the plaintiff, etc. They alleged that the master and owners of the Tuscarora are non-residents; they allege that under the law of the state they have a privilege on the ship, and pray for an attachment, etc.

The warrantors excepted, on the grounds following: That the court "was without jurisdiction over the matter and things involved in" the suit; that no law authorized the call in warranty; that no cause of action is stated against the warrantors.

Young v. Ship Princess Royal.

Subsequently they filed a rule to quash the attachment for the reasons following: That the court is without jurisdiction; that no law of the state accords to the defendant a right to a writ of attachment; that the affidavit is insufficient; that the damages claimed are not due, and that the bond is not good. The exceptions and rule were dismissed, and the warrantors filed for their answer a general denial.

Later in these proceedings the defendants and warrantors filed an exception to the jurisdiction of the court, on the ground that the case was within the exclusive admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States courts.

This exception was sustained, and the suit was dismissed, and the plaintiff has appealed.

If this action be considered as a proceeding in rem for the enforcement of a privilege given by law (R. S. 1855, p. 538, §) on the vessel, for the recovery of damages for a tort, the state courts are without jurisdiction. The case would be one of maritime tort, creating an admiralty lien, which can be enforced against the ship only by the courts of the United States. 4 Wall. 424, 561.

If the suit be regarded as an attachment, whereby the absent defendants are brought into court through their property, the suit cannot be maintained, for, under the settled jurisprudence of this state, attachment suits cannot be maintained on a claim for damages arising ex delicto. 2 An. 943; 3 id. 436; 12 id. 110.

It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the district court be affirmed, with costs of appeal.

INDEX.

ACCEPTANCE.

See BILL OF EXCHANGE.

ACTION.

In an action to recover the value of property alleged to have been stolen
from the plaintiff by the defendant, held, that the right of action was not
suspended until the determination of a criminal prosecution against the
offender. Howk v. Minnick, 413.

2. An action may be maintained on a judgment rendered by a court of com-
petent jurisdiction in another state, notwithstanding an appeal from such
judgment is pending. Taylor v. Shew, 478.

See PROMISSORY NOTE, 1, 4; REWARD.

ADMINISTRATOR.

1. Acquiescence in the payment of funds by an administrator to certain persons
under mistake of the legal rights of such persons does not estop the true
heir from asserting her claim to such funds on being apprised of her
rights. Davis v. Bagley, 570.

2. An administrator, who in good faith makes investments of funds in his pos
session, which, on account of subsequent events beyond his control, become
worthless, is relieved from responsibility under the constitution and laws
of this state; and an administrator, who pays funds to persons at the time
apparently entitled to such payment, but afterward found to be not
entitled, is protected under the said relief provisions. Ib.

ADMIRALTY.

An attachment was issued against a vessel navigating the Yazoo and Missis-
sippi rivers, to recover for repairs. These rivers were navigable by vessels
of ten tons burden and upward from the sea; the vessel was a steamboat
owned and having her "home port" in Mississippi. Held, that the vessel
was within the maritime jurisdiction of the United States; that the state
courts had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and could not be invested
with such jurisdiction by the legislature of the state. Dever v. Steamboat
Hope, 643.

ADMIRALTY LAW.

See JURISDICTION.

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