See VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
REVENUE STAMP.
See STAMPS.
The selectmen of a town, under the authority of a general statute, offered a
reward for the apprehension and conviction of a person guilty of the com
mission of a high crime. The plaintiff, claiming to have performed that
service, brought action to recover the reward. Held, on demurrer, that
the action was well brought. Held, also, that if two persons jointly per
formed the service they must be joined as plaintiffs. Janvrin v. Town of
Exeter, 185.
1. The defendants, in pursuance of authority granted them by the legislature,
built a dam which backed the water upon the ancient mill of plaintiff.
Held, that defendants were liable for the injury occasioned. Lee v. Pem
broke Iron Company, 59.
2. A legislative authority to do an act which will naturally result in damages
to private property must be coupled with provisions for ascertaining and
paying such damages in order to protect persons acting under such author
ity from liability at common law. Ib.
8 The defendant, owning land on one side of a river, built a break-water to pre-
vent the water's encroaching upon his land, which had the effect to throw
the current over upon and wash away the plaintiff's lands opposite. Held,
that the defendant was liable. Gerrish v. Clough, 165.
J, owning lands, on which was a strip called a street, but which was not laid
out or dedicated as a public highway, conveyed the same to S., by a con-
veyance, in which the said strip was mentioned as a boundary and described
as "St. Charles street." Subsequently S. conveyed a portion of such lands
to the plaintiff, "with all the privileges and appurtenances thereunto
belonging," referring to the so-called street, in the deed. The land so sold
did not abut or front upon such street, nor was there a right of way by
necessity over the land intermediate. Held, that the plaintiff did not
acquire any right of way over the so-called street. Dawson v. The St. Paul
Fire Insurance Co., 109.
A person traveling on the Sabbath day to the house of a friend for pleasure is
so far in violation of a law against traveling on the Sabbath day, unless for
charity or necessity, that he cannot maintain an action against a town for
Injuries from a defect in the way. Cratty v. City of Bangor, 56.
See STATUTE OF FRAUD, 1, 3; COVENANT.
SENTENCE.
See CRIMINAL LAW.
SHEEP KILLED BY DOGS.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2, 3.
SHERIFF.
See BANKRUPTCY, 4.
1. The defendant, in an action on a promissory note, alleged that the note was
given for slaves taken by the plaintiff from Missouri to Arkansas, after
the proclamation declaring that state in insurrection. Held, that the transac
tion was in violation of law, and that the note could not therefore be col-
lected. Carson v. Hunter, 530.
2 By the abolition of slavery all contracts existing at the time relating to the
sale of slaves were annulled. The sale of a slave being only the sale of his
services for life, there was no difference between the right of an owner and
of a hirer except in duration; obligations for the sale and also for the hirer
of slaves were canceled by such abolition, and it is of no importance that
the period of hire had terminated before the extinction of slavery, or that
the contract was valid prior to that time. Cormier v. Bienvenu, 728.
1 In an action of slander the defendant pleaded the general issue only, with-
out notice of special matter. At the trial he offered evidence tending to
prove the truth of the charge, for the purpose only of rebutting malice and
mitigating damages. Held, that such evidence was admissible. Huson v.
Dale, 66.
2. If the defendant wishes to rely on the truth of the charge as justification,
he must plead it; but he may introduce evidence tending to prove its truth,
to rebut malice, under the general issue and without notice. Ib.
3. In an action of slander, for calling plaintiff a "deserter," without alleging
special damage, held, that as the offense alleged was only cognizable by a
court-martial, the action could not be maintained. Hollingsworth v.
Shaw, 411.
4. In an action of slander, if the alleged slanderous words charge an act to
have been done in another state or country, which is not a crime by the
common law, in order to make them actionable the pleading should show
and the evidence establish its criminality by the laws of such state or coun-
try. Bundy v. Hart, 525.
5. In an action of slander, the words charged and the words proved must be
substantially the same; that they both convey the same idea, will not be
sufficient to sustain the action. Ib.
1. Congress has no power to impose a stamp tax upon official bonds given to a
state by its officers. State v. Garton, 315.
2. The failure to properly cancel United States revenue stamps affixed to an
instrument does not render it invalid or incapable of being introduced in
evidence. D'Armond v. Dubose, 718.
1. If A. voluntarily conveys land to B., the latter having taken no measures to
procure the conveyance, but accepting it, and verbally promising to hold the
property in trust for C., the case falls within the provision of the statute
of frauds requiring trusts to be expressed in writing, and a court of equity
will not enforce the parol promise. Lantry v. Lantry, 310.
2. The plaintiff became surety on the note of an individual member of a firm,
on the assurance of the firm that the money to be raised was for their use,
and that they would pay it. The maker of the note became insolvent, and
plaintiff paid the note, and brought suit against the remaining partner for
the amount. Held that the engagement of the firm was in effect a promise
to indemnify against their own obligation, and was, therefore, not void
under the statute of frauds. Garner v. Hudgins, 520.
3. A. contracted with B. for the sale of a lot of land, the only written evidence
of the contract being several receipts, signed by A. and his agent, acknowl.
edging the receipt of certain sums of money from B. "in part payment for a
house and lot," without describing the premises, or furnishing any data for
ascertaining their locality. Held, that said writings were insufficient to take
the case out of the statute of frauds, and that part performance of the agree
ment was also insufficient in this state. McGuire v. Stevens, 349.
1. In an action on a promissory note given in Arkansas, the defendant alleged
that the action was barred by the statute of limitation of that state; held,
that the lex fori and not the lex loci contractus was to govern. Carson v.
Hunter, 530.
2. After a cause of action has become barred by the statute of limitation, a
defendant has a vested right to rely upon that statute as a defense, and
neither a constitutional convention nor the legislature has power to
divest the right, and revive the right to maintain the action. Girdner ▾
Stephens, 700.
STAY OF PROCEEDINGS.
See BANKRUPTCY.
1. A., B. and C. executed to the plaintiff, a bank, a joint and several bond, in the
penalty of $15,000, with a condition reciting that A. had become a member
of a certain firm, rendering it probably necessary for him to use more funds
in the business than he had at command, and which he proposed to borrow,
and then proceeding thus: "Now the foregoing bond is to be in force, and
VOL. II.-96
binding upon us, according to its terms, for the full amount of any loans
and advances the said bank may make to said A., in connection with his said
business, not to exceed in amount $15,000, for which sum, by the foregoing
bond, we acknowledge ourselves his sureties, and, in case of his failure to
pay any such loans or advances as aforesaid, that the same shall and may
be collected off us. Unless such loans and advances are made to said A. in
his business aforesaid, upon the faith of this bond, the same is null and
void," etc. The plaintiff alleged that, on the faith of this bond, and for the
purposes therein specified, it loaned A. a sum of money on the checks of
two other parties, indorsed by A., and that these checks were protested for
non-payment. Held, that the bond was not an overture to guaranty by the
sureties, but an actual undertaking.
Held, also, that B. and C. were sureties, and not guarantors, and, therefore, not
entitled to notice of loans made on the credit of the bond, and of the default
of the principal debtor. McMillan v. The Bull's Head Bank, 323.
2. The surety is bound with his principal as original guarantor, and his obliga
tion to pay is equally absolute, irrespective of any notice of the principal's
default, while a guarantor is an individual contractor, to answer only for
the consequences of the default of the principal, and is therefore entitled
to notice of such defaults. Ib.
8. The parties were sureties on an official bond, upon which judgment had been
recovered and paid by the plaintiff. In an action against the co-sureties for
contribution, the latter alleged, in defense, that they had never been served
with process, nor appeared in the action on the bond; that the plaintiff had
appeared for them without authority, and suffered judgment to be entered,
to defraud them; that he had, without their knowledge, entered into a
special contract with the relators in that action to pay the judgment out of
funds then in his hands, belonging to the principal on the bond, and, in con-
sideration of such agreement, received an extension of one year's time on
said judgment; that but for such extension of time the judgment could
have been made out of the property of the principal. Held, that these facts
did not constitute a defense to the action. Baggott v. Mullen, 351.
4 The defendants further alleged that they signed the bond out of which the
liability arose at the request of the plaintiff. Held, that they were, never-
theless, liable to contribution. Ib.
SURVIVORSHIP.
See WILL, 1, 2,
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 1; NATIONAL CUR
A tax duly assessed is not a debt within the meaning of that provision of the
constitution which prohibits the legislature from passing any law impair
ing the obligation of a contract. City of Augusta v. North, 55.
TENANTS BY ENTIRETY.
See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 4
TEN HOUR LAW.
See CONTRACT, 1.
The plaintiff gave to his place of business the name of “Antiquarian Book
Store," by which name it became widely known. The defendant, having a
rival store, adopted substantially the same name. Held, that the name could
not be appropriated as a trade-mark. Choynski v. Cohen, 476. -
1. An affidavit filed in conformity to the acts of congress, passed 27th July,
1866, and 2d March, 1867, relating to removal of causes from state to United
States courts, cannot be traversed in the state court. Stewart v. Cutts, 555.
8. The right of a defendant to a transfer of the cause is not defeated by the
fact that his co-defendant is a resident of the same state with the plaintiff,
provided a severance can be had, and the rights of the petitioner can be
determined separately. Ib.
A party entering upon land in good faith, under the belief that he has the
title thereto, is not a naked trespasser, though the title be in fact in
another; and he is entitled to all legal protection to his improvements and
property placed upon the premises, given by the statute to parties in pos-
session under color of title. Mississippi & Tennessee R. R. Co. v. Devaney
608.
TRIAL BY JURY
SEE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 4.
R. & Co., having a debt against B., attached certain property then in posses-
sion of H., by virtue of a deed of trust executed to him by B., in favor of S.
& B., and, as appeared on the face of the instrument, to secure the payment
of a $40,000 note. It appeared, from an agreement bearing the same date,
that the trust deed was intended to secure future advances as well as pres
ent liabilities; of which agreement the attaching creditor had no knowl.
edge. The trustee gave a bond, and the right of property was tried. Held
that the deed of trust was valid, although it did not show upon its face that
it was to secure future advances, and that the possession of the trustee was
good against the claim of R. & Co., whose demand was contracted subse
quent to the recording of the deed Summers and Brannin v. Roos & Co.
653
See STATUTE OF FRAUDS, 1.
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