" preme Judgment and Will, both these being fo infeparable Ingredients of the Legiflative Power, that it cannot fubfift without them. For whofo has not the Supreme Judgment, (or a Right invested in him to give final Judgment and Determination what is requifite and convenient to be enacted for procuring the Publick Good) he wants the Knowing part of a Law-giver, or that which legally enables one finally to judge and determine what will be a proper Means for the Confecution of the Common Good. And whoever has not the Supreme Will, (or a Right appropriated to him of enacting what is finally adjudged and determined to be good for the Commonweal) he is deftitute of the commanding part of a Law-giver, or that which legally empowers one to pafs, what is determinately adjudged requifite for procuring the general Good, into a Law. Which things being prefuppofed to be true, the Inference from them will be neceffarily this; That no Law enacted by a Sovereign Power can in Reafon be faid by any private Perfon to be bad, or not tending to the Public Good, (if it be not manifeftly contrary to his Law whofe Judgment is infallible.) For in that he has the Legislative Power, he is of ne ceffity ceffity fuppofed to have the Supreme Judg... ment, fo that no inferior Judgment (as the Judgment of every Subject, there being but one Supreme in one Government, neceffarily is) can without manifest Contradiaion to Reafon judge that he judges amifs. Object. 2. If Laws be therefore obliging, obedie because prefumed to be good; fince it is Ach certain, that no Command can be goods Pupi which is oppofite to Gods Law, it would follow, that no manner of Obedience, either Active or Paffive, is due to the Commands of Sovereigns, which are against the Moral, or a Divine Pofitive Law. Solut. If to do a thing commanded be cause commanded to be done, be to obey a Command, then to refufe to do a thing commanded, is to disobey a Command, and how a Man fhould at the fame time both obey and disobey the fame Command, I understand not. Actively, you'l say, he cannot do both at once; but may he not refuse to give an active Obedience to an unjuft Command, and yet at the fame Inftant be willing and ready to suffer for that his Refufal, in cafe it be required, that he should either actively obey, or undergo the Penalty enjoyned for not fo obeying? I anfwee anfwer that there is no Law can oblige a Man to be willing to fuffer for not actively obeying what is unlawful to be done; for by what Law is it poffible he should be obliged? Not by the Law of God, for that commanding him not to yield an Active Obedience, cannot alfo enjoyn him to be willing to fuffer for no other Cause, but that he observes what it commands. Nor by the Law of Reason, for how should this oblige him to be willing to be punished. for Non-obfervance of that, which it tells him he ought not to obferve? Some of the Roman Emperors fet forth Edicts that the Chriftians fhould either Sacrifice to their Idol-gods, or be put to Death; the Active fulfilling of which unjuft Commands, was to do Sacrifice, the Paffive to be put to Death; and yet divers good and godly Chriftians fled on purpose to avoid both; and doubtless did no wrong therein, (being warranted by Chrift himself, faying, When they perfecute you in this City, flee ye into another, Matth. 10. 23.) albeit they neither answered the Letter of the Edicts, nor the Intention of the Emperors, which was that one of the two (either facrificing or fuffering Death for not facrificing) fhould be done. (And by the way this is a remark able able Inftance, that Difobedience to a Command is not an Offence, as it meerly contradicts the Will of the Legiflator.) But there is not however the leaft Encouragement to be gathered from hence for Refifting or forcibly oppofing the Higher Powers; for tho there be no manner of Obedience due to an unjust Command; (for that Command which is unjust, has no obligatory Virtue in it, but is unlawful, that is, truly speaking, no Law.) Yet in that a Sovereign looses not, by commanding fomething which is unjuft, his Legislative Power or a Right to command whatfoever he deliberately thinks to be for the general Good, which is not againft the Divine Law, Moral or Pofitive, he ought not to be forcibly withstood. For whofoever has by Law the Supreme Judgment and Will (which together conftitute the Supreme Power) the fame Law prefumes that the common Safety depends on his Government; and therefore without violating of the Law, and through that the Common Safety, the Sovereign is not even in the Abuse of Government to be oppofed by Arms, because it is more convenient in refpect of the Whole, that fome Part fuffer unjustly, than that the Government it self should be rendred ufelefs, or fo obftructe obftructed that it could not protect and fecure the Laws, which it is always prefumed by the Law will fall out, when Subjects with Violence oppofe the Supreme Gover nour. Object. 3. Albeit the Lex Talionis be no part of the Law of Nature; yet feeing it is not difagreeable thereunto, (as 'tis evident by the Inftance of Adonibezek, Judges 1. 6, 7. that it is not) does it not rightly follow, that Punishments may be juftly Vindicative, though they are not neceffarily fo? Anfi. No it does not, for notwithstanding that it may be reasonable at fometimes to take an Eye for an Eye, a Hand for a Hand, c. yet will not Vindicative Punishment be found thereupon to be lawful; for if the taking Eye for Eye, Hand for Hand, &c. be at any time prudently thought by a Law-giver to be the best Expedient either for reclaiming Offenders, or for terrifying others, or for both, (as it may peradventure on occafion fall out to be) the exercife of that Strictnefs will be just, yet not Vindicative. For that which Men will have to be Vindicative Juftice looks not at all forward, but wholly backward, being purely defign'd and intended for Recompenfe or Satisfaction, for a pre fumed |