Objection 6. From the infinite Goodness and Perfection of God, Divines ufually prove the Neceffity of the EternalCommunication of his Divine Nature to the Son and Holy Ghost; and thence infer that the World was not a neceffary, but free Product of the Divine Goodness, fince otherwise the Almighty fhould have communicated Being to the Creature, nolefs neceffarily, then he did his Effence to the Second and Third Perfon in the Bleffed Trinity, and consequently an infinite Perfeaion, contrary to what is demonstrated, Sest. 3. Answer. Though I fpeak of Gods being neceffitated to create, Sect. 3. Yet I exprefly there fay, that it is only by his Eternal immutable Wisdom and Goodness, and that they no otherways engage his Will, fave only to make the best Choice; not that God was ever undetermined in his Will, fince it is impoffible that his Wisdom, being effential to him, fhould not perpetually neceffarily know; and his Goodness no less effential to him, fhould not perpetually neceffarily in cline him to will, what is beft or most agreeable to both, and equally impoffible that his will,not really but notionly only distinct from either(whatfoever is in God being God, Sect. 1. Par. 11.) fhould not act according to them; fo that as all the internal Actings of God are effentially wife and effentially good, fo are they likewife effentially neceffary, whilst the Divine Wisdom, Goodness and Will are effentially the fame, and his internal Actings nothing elfe but his very Will effentially actuated with Wifdom and Goodness, and by confequence eternally and neceffarily fo actuated. And therefore the Instance from the neceffity of communicating the Divine Nature by the Father to the Son and Holy Spirit, for proof that the World was not neceffarily created, in ftead of difproving the neceffity of the Worlds Creation, is clearly an Argument for it. For feeing the Communication of the Divine Nature is rendred by the Objection (and truly) the neceffary Refult of the infinite Goodness and Perfection of God, it plainly argues a greater Perfection in an intelligent Being, to act out of neceffity of Nature, then to act with that Freedom which fuppofes a Liberty of acting, or not acting, or pleasure, and confequently, in regard there are no de J degrees of Perfection in God, who is essential Perfection it felf, that the Creation was as well a neceffary as voluntary Product of the Divine Will, and that the reason why the Universe is not of infinite Perfection anfwerable to the Maker of it, is from the Incapacity of the Subject, accordingly as was hewn, Sect. 3. Par. 1, 2, 3, 8. the World being a Complex of Things, the perfectest that could be created, ibid. Objection. 7. If the World could not have been eternal, as it is faid in Sect. 3. Par. 4. that it could not; the reason thereof must be, either because God could not have created it from Eternity for want of Power, or because the World it felf was incapable of exifting eternally: But neither of these is true; not the former, because God is always alike Omnipotent, fo that in refpect of him the World might as well have been created from Eternity, as when it was; nor the fatter, because no moment can be thought on wherein the World could have been more capable to be created then in any other. Ergo, the World might have been eternal. Anfier. Answer. The World was incapable of exifting ei ternally; for fince the glorious Structure thereof was fucceffively made, and not inftantaneously (as is clear from the account we have of its Origin, Genef. 1. and from thefe words alfo, On the Seventh day God ended his Work which he had made, Gen. 2. 2.) it implies a Contradiction that it should have been eternal; for what was done on the fecond, third, fourth, fifth and fixth day of the Creation, could not poffibly be eternal, otherwife whatsoever was done on any of those days would have been done as foon as that which was done on the first day, which is impoffible, because what was not done till the fecond, third, fourth, fifth or fixth day could not be done before, unless the fame thing might be done and not be done at the fame time. And as what was done on the fix latter days could not be eternal, fo neither that which was done on the firft; for in regard the first day was only one day before the fecond, two days before the third, three days before the fourth, four days before the fifth, and five days before the fixth; it is not poffible that what was was done on the first day should be any more eternal, then what was done upon any of the other, except the addition of one day to two, three, four, or five others could make their finite Number infinite. If it be faid that this indeed rationally makes it out, that the World, fuppofing the manner of the Creation as it is related by Mofes, could not be eternal. But what if God had pleafed to create the World in its full entire Glory inftantaneously at once, might it not then have been created from Eternity? I conceive not, for otherwife there would have been infinite fucceffions of times and things, which in Sect. 3. Par. 4. is made out to be impoffible. And therefore although it be not very apparent to Mans Understanding, but that fomething inftantaneously made by God might poffibly be eternal. Yet that any fuch thing could be created from eternity, the Creation whereof would imply the fuppofal of contradictory affertions to become true from thence, (as from the Eternity of the World, wherein things continually fucceed one another the Creation thereof would do, Sect. 3. Par. 4.) there's no appearance of any poffibility at all. Yea, if the Reafons given, Sect. 2. Par. 8. be found good. First, That God always of neceffi |