METHODS AND AIMS IN THE STUDY OF LITERATURE I ON METHOD IN GENERAL I. MILTON ON DISCIPLINE There is not that thing in the world of more grave and urgent importance, throughout the whole life of man, than is discipline. What need I instance? He that hath read with judgment of nations and commonwealths, of cities and camps, of peace and war, sea and land, will readily agree that the flourishing and decaying of all civil societies, all the moments and turnings of human occasions, are moved to and fro as upon the axle of discipline. So that whatsoever power or sway in mortal things weaker men have attributed to fortune, I durst with more confidence (the honor of Divine Providence ever saved) ascribe either to the vigor or the slackness of discipline. Nor is there any sociable perfection in this life, civil or sacred, that can be above discipline; but she is that which with her musical cords preserves and holds all the parts thereof together. . . . And certainly discipline is not only the removal of disorder, but, if any visible shape can be given to divine things, the very visible shape and image of virtue; whereby she is not only seen in the regular gestures and motions of her heavenly paces as she walks, but also makes the harmony of her voice audible to mortal ears.1 II. ART EQUALS METHOD According to the Standard Dictionary (New York, 1902), Art may be defined as 'the skilful and systematic arrangement or adaptation of means for the attainment of some desired end.' With this compare Aristotle (384-322 B.C.): 'Since there is no art which is not a habit of methodical production, nor any habit of methodical production which is not an art, it follows that the definition of Art is: "A habit of production in conscious accordance with a correct method." ' 2 It is to be noted that morality may be similarly defined, thus: A habit of action in conscious accordance with a correct method. III. JOHN BURNET ON ARISTOTLE AND METHOD The question of method is always vital to Aristotle, and he seems to have found his hearers very deficient in a due sense of its importance. He complains in one place that people dislike any method of exposition they are not accustomed to, and mean by intelligible no more than familiar. It is just the same as with the ancient laws, which are often childish, but have been sanctified 1 Milton, The Reason of Church Government 1. 1 (Prose Works, Bohn 2 Eth. Nic. 6. 4. Edition, 2. 441-442). CYTILOBI by long custom. Thus it is that some will not listen to a lecture unless it is put into mathematical form, while others demand examples and illustrations, and others again require the evidence of some poet. One class want everything put with minute exactitude; others are annoyed by precision, either because they are incapable of connected thought, or because they think it is mean and petty. There is something about it, in philosophy as well as in business, that repels them. What is wanted to remedy all this is Culture. We cannot be always looking for the method of knowledge and for knowledge itself at the same time. Neither is easy to find. It is clearly necessary, then, that we should have some preliminary training in these matters, so that we may know where we are entitled to demand mathematical precision, and where anything of the sort would be entirely out of place. ... In the Protagoras of Plato the young Hippocrates actually blushes at the suggestion that he is going to take lessons with any other view than to get that unprofessional culture which alone becomes a gentleman. It is clear, however, that Aristotle means something far more definite than this. With him the man of culture is above all things the arbiter of method. He is the judge of how much precision is fairly to be expected in any inquiry . . and in the Metaphysics we are told that it shows want of culture not to know what can be demonstrated and what can not. The clearest account of the matter, however, is to be found in a remarkable passage at the beginning of the treatise on the Parts of Animals. There we read that there are two ways of possessing any science, whether it be |