II

ON METHOD IN THE STUDY OF

LITERATURE

I. LEIGH HUNT ON RECONSTRUCTING THE SPIRIT OF THE PAST

We have the greatest contempt for learning, merely so called; together with the greatest respect for it when it sees through the dead letter of time and words into the spirit that concerns all ages and all descriptions of men. Every clever unlearned man in England, rich and poor, if we had the magic to do it, should be gifted to-morrow with all the learning that would adorn and endear his commerce to him, his agriculture, and the poorest flowerpot at his window. . . . Spirit is everything, and letter is nothing, except inasmuch as it is a vehicle for spirit.1

A little hearty love is better in this, as in all other cases, than a heap of indifferent knowledge. We are ashamed to say that we know less of Greek, in one sense of the word, than we did when young, and are obliged to look out more words in the dictionary; for to a dictionary we are still forced to resort, though we love the language next to Italian, and hold it in higher admiration. But then we know our ignorance better than we did at that time; are more aware of beauties to be enjoyed, and

1 A Jar of Honey from Mount Hybla (London, 1897), pp. 15, 16,

nice meanings to be discovered; and the consequence is that, whenever we undertake to translate a passage from Greek, we take our love on one side of us, and our dictionary on the other, and, before we set about it, make a point of sifting every possible meaning and root of meaning, not excepting those in words the most familiar to us, in order that not an atom of the writer's intention may be missed. We do not say, of course, that we always succeed in detecting it; but it is not for want of painstaking. The labor we delight in physics pain.

Now by a like respect for the good old maxim of 'slow and sure,' and by dint of doing a little, or even a very little, every day, there is no lover of poetry and beauty who in the course of a few months might not be as deep as a bee in some of the sweetest flowers of other languages.1

II. AUGUST BOECKH ON INTERPRETATION AND CRITICISM AS THE TWO DISTINCT FUNCTIONS IN THE STUDY OF THE PAST

The process of understanding is . . . on the one hand, absolute, on the other, relative. That is, every object must be understood, on the one hand, in and for itself; on the other, it must be understood in relation to other objects. This latter is accomplished by means of an act of judging, through the establishment of a relation between a part and the whole, or between one part and another, or through reference to an ideal. Absolute understanding is the function of Interpretation; relative

1A Jar of Honey from Mount Hybla (London, 1897), pp. 7, 8.

understanding, the function of Criticism. Under Interpretation is necessarily included every kind of explanation - grammatical, logical, historical, aesthetic; and under Criticism, every kind-higher and lower criticism, and so on; . . . for from the nature of the general conception it is simply inevitable that the entire formal side of philology [the study of language and literature] should be comprised in these two functions.1

III. PROFESSOR COOK'S ADAPTATION OF BOECKH TO THE STUDY OF A PARTICULAR MASTERPIECE

The study of a piece of literature, as distinguished from cursory reading of it, may be directed to either one of two principal ends - interpretation, or criticism. The object of interpretation is the understanding of the work -as a whole, in its organism, and in its details. The object of criticism is the judgment of the work, with reference both to its merits and defects. The object of both interpretation and criticism is intelligent admiration - admiration of that, and that alone, which is truly and eternally admirable.

Whatever study concerns itself with either of these two ends, interpretation or criticism, is literary study. That which is directed to other ends, or to no particular ends, may be useful in its way, and with reference to its own purposes, but has no right to be considered literary study.

The problem of literary teaching consists in the apportionment and adjustment to one another of the various

1 Boeckh, Encyclopädie und Methodologie der Philologischen Wissenschaften, p. 55.

forms of interpretation and criticism. For its solution no precise rules can be given; yet one statement can be made with confidence that the ambitious, but untrained and inexperienced, teacher is likely to fall into one of two cardinal and opposite errors: either he will aim at an analysis too particularistic, and lose sight of the whole in a consideration of details or constituent parts; or he will indulge in a synthesis too large, too vague, possibly too sentimental, and in any case not sufficiently built up and elaborated by and with his pupils.

To return to the two main divisions of interpretation and criticism. Interpretation is basic, and in its nature. precedes criticism. Criticism is supplementary, but indispensable to any literary culture which aspires to thoroughness. Interpretation involves the making clear to oneself of the meaning and function of the various constituent elements of a given piece of literature, and of the piece of literature as a whole. These constituent elements are such as words, sentences, and paragraphs; the organic divisions of a work of literary art, such as the Exordium, Statement of Facts, Proof, etc., of an oration; quotations or allusions; and figures of speech. On each of these attention should be bestowed. . . .

✓ Criticism, from its very nature, implies comparison —

comparison with principles assumed or deduced; comparison with other productions of the same class; or, with respect to the opinions enounced by the author, comparison with the statements or opinions of other persons worthy of credence or respect. Thus the structure of Burke's speech might be studied with reference to its conformity or non-conformity to principles deduced from

the practice of the ancients, or the speech might be systematically compared with other eminent examples of its class, ancient or modern, and its superiority or inferiority demonstrated. The style might be examined with respect to various qualities, and its specific merits determined. All information directly tending to confirm or disprove the statements, assumptions, or conclusions propounded by Burke would also be valuable in its bearing upon criticism, since it would increase the ability of the student to determine the trustworthiness of Burke as a guide. Finally, the estimates thus formed by the student might be carefully compared with those expressed by critics of established reputation, both among Burke's contemporaries and those of subsequent date. . . .

Both interpretation and criticism, at least in the case of a master-work like Burke's Speech on Conciliation, demand strenuous exercise of the intellectual faculties, as well as continual appeals to the moral nature. The combination of these two kinds of study ought to strengthen the reasoning powers, develop the imagination, cultivate the nobler sensibilities, and fortify the character.1

1 Burke, Speech on Conciliation (ed. Albert S. Cook), pp. lxi-lxiii. New York, 1896. By permission of Longmans, Green, & Co.