Resilience Engineering: Concepts and PreceptsProfessor David D Woods, Professor Nancy Leveson, Professor Erik Hollnagel For Resilience Engineering, 'failure' is the result of the adaptations necessary to cope with the complexity of the real world, rather than a breakdown or malfunction. The performance of individuals and organizations must continually adjust to current conditions and, because resources and time are finite, such adjustments are always approximate. This definitive new book explores this groundbreaking new development in safety and risk management, where 'success' is based on the ability of organizations, groups and individuals to anticipate the changing shape of risk before failures and harm occur. Featuring contributions from many of the worlds leading figures in the fields of human factors and safety, Resilience Engineering provides thought-provoking insights into system safety as an aggregate of its various components, subsystems, software, organizations, human behaviours, and the way in which they interact. The book provides an introduction to Resilience Engineering of systems, covering both the theoretical and practical aspects. It is written for those responsible for system safety on managerial or operational levels alike, including safety managers and engineers (line and maintenance), security experts, risk and safety consultants, human factors professionals and accident investigators. |
Contents
EMERGENCE | |
SYSTEMS ARE EVERCHANGING | |
Concepts Resilience Engineering | |
DEFINING RESILIENCE | |
Yushi Fujita | |
A TYPOLOGY OF RESILIENCE SITUATIONS | |
RESILIENT SYSTEMS | |
CHRONICLING THE EMERGENCE | |
LEARNING HOW TO CREATE RESILIENCE IN BUSINESS | |
OPTIMUM SYSTEM SAFETY AND OPTIMUM SYSTEM | |
AN INITIAL | |
REMEDIES | |
Hindsight and Safety | |
TEST CASE | |
RULES AND PROCEDURES | |
STATES OF RESILIENCE | |
ENGINEERING RESILIENCE INTO SAFETYCRITICAL SYSTEMS | |
IS RESILIENCE REALLY NECESSARY? THE CASE OF RAILWAYS | |
SYSTEMS ARE NEVER PERFECT | |
ORGANIZATIONAL RESILIENCE AND INDUSTRIAL RISK | |
AN EVIL CHAIN MECHANISM LEADING TO FAILURES | |
COGNITIVE FEATURES | |
FROM VASA | |
RESILIENCE ENGINEERING PRECEPTS | |
Why Things Go Wrong | |
The Way Ahead | |
Contributing Authors | |
AUTHOR INDEX | |
Other editions - View all
Resilience Engineering: Concepts and Precepts Erik Hollnagel,David D. Woods,Nancy Leveson Limited preview - 2006 |
Common terms and phrases
ability action activities adaptive capacity airline analysis approach ARAMIS audit aviation Barings plc barriers behaviour boundaries business system challenge Chapter cognitive components cope decisions defined demands discussion dynamic effective emergency environment example failure feedback Figure flight functioning goals hazard Hollnagel human error human factors human reliability ICAO identify improvement incident individual industry interactions investigation involved issue learning Leveson loops management system monitoring NASA Nick Leeson normal nuclear occur operational organisational organization’s patient potential proactive problems procedures Prorail railway reports resilience engineering resilient performance resilient system response result risk assessment risk control role rules safe safety culture safety management safety organization safety performance scenarios Shuttle situation socio-technical system strategy structure Swiss cheese model system dynamics system safety technical threat track trade-offs train Trinity College Dublin understanding variables Walkerton Westrum workers


