Resilience Engineering: Concepts and PreceptsProfessor David D Woods, Professor Nancy Leveson, Professor Erik Hollnagel For Resilience Engineering, 'failure' is the result of the adaptations necessary to cope with the complexity of the real world, rather than a breakdown or malfunction. The performance of individuals and organizations must continually adjust to current conditions and, because resources and time are finite, such adjustments are always approximate. This definitive new book explores this groundbreaking new development in safety and risk management, where 'success' is based on the ability of organizations, groups and individuals to anticipate the changing shape of risk before failures and harm occur. Featuring contributions from many of the worlds leading figures in the fields of human factors and safety, Resilience Engineering provides thought-provoking insights into system safety as an aggregate of its various components, subsystems, software, organizations, human behaviours, and the way in which they interact. The book provides an introduction to Resilience Engineering of systems, covering both the theoretical and practical aspects. It is written for those responsible for system safety on managerial or operational levels alike, including safety managers and engineers (line and maintenance), security experts, risk and safety consultants, human factors professionals and accident investigators. |
Contents
THE CHALLENGE OF THE UNSTABLE | |
2ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RESILIENCE | |
DEFINING RESILIENCE | |
COMPLEXITY EMERGENCE RESILIENCE | |
Conclusion 5A TYPOLOGY OFRESILIENCE SITUATIONS | |
6INCIDENTS | |
CHRONICLING | |
ENGINEERING RESILIENCE INTO SAFETY | |
LEARNINGHOW TO CREATE RESILIENCE | |
16OPTIMUM SYSTEM SAFETYAND OPTIMUM | |
AN INITIAL VIEW | |
AUDITING RESILIENCE IN RISK CONTROL | |
Doesthe Model Encompass Resilience? | |
RULES | |
21STATES OF RESILIENCE | |
APPENDIX | |
9ISRESILIENCE REALLY NECESSARY? THE CASE | |
SYSTEMS ARE NEVER PERFECT YushiFujita 10 STRUCTURE | |
ANEVIL CHAIN MECHANISM LEADING | |
Analysis Conclusion 14 | |
Contributing | |
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Resilience Engineering: Concepts and Precepts Erik Hollnagel,David D. Woods,Nancy Leveson Limited preview - 2006 |
Common terms and phrases
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