In Campion v. Cotton, (a) Sir WILLIAM GRANT said, "I do not think it can be inferred from the evidence that she knew he was in such circumstances as to make his bounty to her a fraud upon any one," and on that ground he held the settlement in that case to be good against creditors. But can it be said that a person in the condition of the bankrupt was in such circumstances as to fairly covenant to settle 5007. upon his marriage?

Re Meaghan (b) was also referred to.

Mr. Shapter was not called on to reply.

THE LORD JUSTICE KNIGHT BRUCE. We have to decide as to the effect to be given to a marriage settlement containing no reference to bankruptcy, but containing a simple and immediate covenant on the part of the intended husband.

How the case would have stood if the intended wife had been implicated in any design to defraud the creditors of the intended husband, it is not necessary to say. Nor is it necessary to say what would have been the result if the settlement had been grossly out of proportion to the station and circumstances of the husband. For this settlement appears to have been one which an honest woman, reasonably advised, might have reasonably supposed to be

fair and proper. That seems to dispose of the whole case; * 447 she is not implicated in any fraudulent intention which the husband may have had. I say thus much for myself; Lord CRANWORTH concurs with me in the conclusion at which I have arrived, that there does not appear in this case sufficient to exclude the proof.

THE LORD JUSTICE LORD CRANWORTH.-I not only concur in the conclusion to which my learned brother has come, but do so for the reasons which he has given. I do not think that the wife was a particeps criminis, if fault there was. Here there was not only no fraud upon the bankrupt laws apparent upon the face of the settlement, but its provisions were the fairest possible. The trust for the separate use of the wife was not a provision to awaken

(a) 17 Ves. 263.

(b) 1 Sch. & Lef. 44, 179, 180.

1 See Goldsmith v. Russell, 5 De G., M. & G. 547; Columbine v. Penhall, 1 Sm. & Gif. 228; Simpson v. Graves, Riley Ch. 232; Bulmer v. Hunter. L. R. 8 Eq. 46; Frazer v. Thompson, 4 De G. & J. 659.

any suspicion, and the commissioner finds that the intended wife was acting bona fide. I give no opinion upon the case of a settlement containing on the face of it something so extravagant as that it ought to awaken inquiry. I guard myself against pronouncing an opinion that such a settlement could be insisted upon.

The proof was ordered to be admitted, and the costs to be paid out of the estate.

* Ex parte HUGH MATHESON.

In the Matter of HUGH MATHESON, a Bankrupt.

1852. February 11. Before the LORDS JUSTICES.

*448

Railway stock is within the 201st section of the Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, which provides that no bankrupt shall be entitled to a certificate who has, within the period mentioned in the Act, lost 2007. by any contract for the purchase or sale of any government or other stock.1

THIS was the appeal of the bankrupt from the decision of Mr. Commissioner Perry, refusing to grant to the petitioner a certificate of conformity. The allowance of the certificate was objected to before the commissioner upon the following grounds: first, of reckless trading; secondly, incurring debts without means of payment; thirdly, the improper keeping of accounts; fourthly, excessive speculation in shares; fifthly, the destruction of books and accounts; and on the further ground that the bankrupt had lost the sum of 2007. upon a contract for the purchase of railway stock.

The commissioner, by a memorandum in writing, stated that he had refused the certificate upon the first, second, and fourth of the above grounds, and declared that the bankrupt appeared to him also not entitled to such certificate, he having brought himself within the penal provision of the 201st section (a) of the

(a) "That no bankrupt shall be entitled to a certificate of conformity under this Act, and any such certificate, if allowed, shall be void if such bankrupt shall have lost, by any sort of gaming or wagering, in one day 201., or within one

See Ex parte Wade, 8 De G., M. & G. 241; Ex parte Mellor, 8 De G., M. & G. 248; Ex parte Copeland, 2 De G., M. & G. 914.

* 449 Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, 1849, by a loss of *2007. within one year next preceding the filing of the petition for adjudication in this matter, upon a contract for the purchase of railway stock, called Leeds stock; and by a loss of 2007. within the like period, upon another contract for the purchase of Edinburgh and Glasgow stock, being also railway stock; which two several contracts were respectively entered into by the bankrupt, and were not to be performed within one week after the date of each respective contract.

Mr. Bramwell and Mr. W. M. James, in support of the petition. Railway stock is not within the meaning of the section. In Hewitt v. Price (a) it was contended that the 5th section of the Stockjobbing Act (7 Geo. 2, c. 8), which provides that no money shall be paid or received for compounding difference for the not delivering any public or joint-stock or other public securities, applied to shares in a railway company. But CRESWELL, J., said it was difficult to show how the Act could apply to such shares, as they were not public stock or public securities. And accord*450 ing to the intimation of the opinion of the Court in that

case, even the words "joint-stock or other public securities" would not include railway shares. If that view is correct, it concludes the present case. In Wells v. Porter, (b) BOSANQUET, J., said, "Where we find the expression public stock,' we must in

year next preceding the issuing of the fiat or filing of the petition for the adjudication of bankruptcy 2007., or if he shall, within one year next preceding the issuing of the fiat or the filing of such petition, have lost 2007., by any contract for the purchase or sale of any government or other stock, where such contract was not to be performed within one week after the contract, or where the stock bought or sold was not actually transferred or delivered in pursuance of such contract, or if such bankrupt shall, after an act of bankruptcy, or in contemplation of bankruptcy, or with intent to defeat the object of this or any other statute relating to bankrupts, have parted with, concealed, destroyed, altered, mutilated, or falsified, or caused to be concealed, destroyed, altered, mutilated, or falsified any of his books, papers, writings, or securities, or made, or been party or privy to the making of any false or fraudulent entry in any book of account or other document, with intent to defraud his creditors, or shall have concealed any part of his property; or if any person, having proved a false debt under the bankruptcy, such bankrupt being privy thereto, or afterwards knowing the same, shall not have disclosed the same to his assignees, within one month after such knowledge.

(a) 4 Man. & Gr. 355.

(b) 2 Bing. N. C. 722.

tend the public stocks of this country." And as this is a penal clause, it must be construed strictly. In the Bubble Act, 6 Geo. 1, c. 18, much more extensive words are used, such as "transferable stock,' ""capital stock," and "any stock or pretended stock," and the same would have been introduced into this Act if it had been intended to extend to such securities. Their omission shows the intention of the legislature. Moreover, the words in question were introduced into the bankrupt law before any stock of this description was in existence. Would a trustee, having authority to invest trust moneys upon government or other stock, be justified in investing them upon railway stock?

They also referred to London Grand Junction Railway Company v. Freeman. (a)

Mr. Rolt and Mr. Kinglake, for the respondents, were not called upon.

THE LORD JUSTICE KNIGHT BRUCE.-The Bankrupt Act of 1849, singularly enough, considering the general import and object of the Act, does not appear to contain a provision found in other Acts. of Parliament which preceded it, that the Act shall be construed beneficially for creditors. If that provision had been carried into it, I do not think that any doubt could be entertained on the present case. Still it is a rule applicable to the construction of * all statutes from the earliest time, so to construe them as * 451 to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. Now, no reasonable doubt exists that railway stock is within the mischief intended to be prevented by the Act, as much or nearly as much as ordinary government stock; and, therefore, ought to be within the remedy. The words are "government or other stock." And railway stock is described by the legislature in other statutes in a way to warrant the application of the term "stock" to it.

It was said, however, that the 201st section is a penal section. I do not wish it to be understood that I agree in that view; but whether it is a penal section or not, I apprehend still that the words must be interpreted as I have said. I think this description of property, "other stock," within the meaning of the

statute.

THE LORD JUSTICE LORD CRANWORTH. — I am of the same opin

(a) 2 Man. & Gr. 606.

ion. I think "other stock" means stock transferable in the books

of a company, in the same manner as government stock is transferable in the books of the Bank of England. An argument was attempted to be derived from earlier statutes, where more words are used. But so also in the older Acts for preventing gaming, (a) the different descriptions of gaming are specified, as by cards, dice, tennis, &c. All such enumeration is left out here, probably because in modern Acts the legislature has been in the habit of omitting such enumeration of particulars. Then it was said that

stock of this kind cannot be within the meaning of these * 452 * words, because when they were first introduced into the bankrupt statutes, shares of this description were not in existence. I think, however, that it would be unsafe to infer that stock of this kind was not intended to be included merely on that ground. With regard to the ingenious argument adduced by Mr. James that a trustee for investment in government or other stock would not be justified in investing in this stock, the answer is that a trustee is not justified in investing in foreign stock.

The petition was dismissed, with costs.

Ex parte BATES.

In the Matter of WILLIAM WILLIAMS, WILLIAM WILLIAMS the Younger, and THOMAS ROBERT WILLIAMS, Bankrupts.

1852. February 17. Before the LORDS JUSTICES.

The removal of assignees is a matter within the discretion of the commissioner, with which the Appellate Court will not interfere merely because it doubts whether it would have acted as the commissioner has done.

Therefore, where the commissioner gave the assignees time to consider whether they would remove solicitors whom they had appointed, and who were related to the bankrupt, or would themselves retire, and the assignees declined to do either, and the commissioner removed the assignees, the Court dismissed, with costs, an appeal from the commissioner's decision.'

(a) See 16 Car. 2, c. 7; 9 Anne, c. 14. In the latter Act the words are "where the whole or any part of the consideration for such conveyances or securities shall be for any money or other valuable thing whatsoever, won by gaming or playing at cards, dice tables, tennis, bowls, or other game or games." 1 See Ex parte Singlehurst, 3 De G. & J. 451.

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