The conscience competent to decide religious questious

7. The sense of Wisdom differs from Goodness in this, that 'Goodness is seen in the choice of ends, Wisdom in the direction of the means.' The antagonist Divine wisdom has to overcome consists of human will, which Mr. Newman regards as independent.

8. The sense of Reverence is that which follows the discernment of a mighty and inscrutable Being in the Universe. 'Reverence is the beginning of true religion. He who reverences God is a religious man, and whatever his other defects, is an accepted worshipper.' The source of reverence Mr. Newman seems to place in the perception that the great power who presides over Nature must needs possess Moral qualities similar to our own, though every way more perfect. It is this feature that raises what was Paganism into Rational Religion. In such a portraiture of God as this, so consonant to the moral sense, commending him to the affections by its sweetness and to the intellect by its purity, how gentle and yet how effectual is the refutation of the gloomy picture of the avenging Deity whom our popular theology preaches to us!

'The most decisive moral effects produced by the devotional posture of the soul,' expressed by the term reverence, are explained (p. 50) to 'depend on consciousness that it has met the eye of God.' To ensure this sentiment pure, lofty, and progressive, Mr. Newman hesitates not to warn the reader that even the Bible is not to be regarded as an Ideal, unless the conscience is too dull to rise above the Bible-that in no case must the conscience be depressed to any standard, not even to the Biblical standard (p. 62.) Mr. Newman gives this salutary piece of instruction, by which the entire Christian world might largely profit. All Christian apostles and missionaries,' says he, 'like the Hebrew prophets, have always refuted Paganism by direct attacks on its immoral doctrines, and have appealed to the consciences of heathens as competent to decide the controversy' (p. 59.) The same boldness of simple and true faith, by which the born votary of Paganism breaks away from the errors of his national creed to follow [what he is told are] the revelations of God in his soul, will also authorise and require the Romanist to reject the Authority of his Church, and the Protestant that of his Bible, whenever the one or the other inculcates upon him as divine that which falls beneath the highest Ideal of his soul' (p. 57.)

This treatise on the Soul, in relation to that spiritual religion which is so distasteful to the world when dispensed from the pulpits by men of crude knowledge and vulgar nature, is the Philosophy of Evangelical Piety.' Mr. Newman throws a new light on Sin-a subject so treated that no new light was deemed possible; so badly treated, indeed, that no new light was felt to be wanted. When it comes to be 'distinctly conceived that the God of Nature is the God of our consciences, and that all wrong doing is frowned on by Him, the two new terms, Holiness and Sin, are needed' (p. 65.) To perceive, as even old Herodotus did, 'that the Gods hate and punish the desire of sin,

The moral uses of religion described.

as itself a sin, is the germ of all spirituality' (p. 66.) We get more light than comes from many sermons in a single definition; as that of Remorse, for instance, which is explained as 'the convulsion of the Soul, as it consciously stands under the eye of God' (p. 69.)

The purposes of religion, the condition of its purity and test of its perfection, are thus described-'The moral uses of religion are to enliven man's conscience, strengthen his will, elevate his aspirations, content him with small supplies to his lower wants, rouse all his generous tendencies, and hereby ennoble him altogether; but it can do none of these things effectually, except when it keeps him steadily looking into the face of the Infinite and Infinitely Pure One' (p. 70.) 'Guilelessness is the whole secret of divine peace' (p. 74.) ‘A conscious uprightness is obviously necessary to any spiritual peace, nor does the heart need any other testimony than its own to the fact of its uprightness' (p. 89.)

Mr. Newman points out that what is popularly termed 'the total depravity of human nature,' is more correctly the imperfection of nature. 'In order to be morally perfect we should need at once infinite wisdom and affections of infinite power; and these are incommunicable prerogatives of God' (p. 84.) The necessary imperfection of our constitution cannot be appropriated to us as sin. This rational sense of sin does not, however, degenerate into contentment with imperfection, for the Soul is taught to aspire daily to higher and higher perfection. To distinguish between the testimony of a Good Conscience and the dangerous complacency of Self-righteousness, Mr. Newman observes, that the moment we begin to admire ourselves, we are satisfied with the state of goodness already attained, and cease (for so long) to aspire after anything higher thus the life-blood of the soul is arrested, and putrefying stagnation is to be feared' (p. 92.)

In treating of the sense of Personal Relation to God, Mr. Newman no longer appeals to reason to the same extent as in the preceding portions of his work. We therefore take his descriptions of this phenomenon. The man,' says he, 'who at the same moment that he adores perceives that his adoration is perceived and is accepted, has already begun an intercourse with God' (p. 123.) Mr. Newman's theory is, however, consistent with itself in all attractiveness of worship. He tells us that God does not act towards us (spiritually) by generalisations, which may omit our individual case-his perfection consists in dealing with each case by itself as if there were no other' (p. 126.)

Spiritual progress Mr. Newman does not hold to consist merely in suppressing some worse and lower tendency, very necessary and desirable, from which a comfortable mediocrity is all that will result. The moral perceptions must keep rising (p. 169)—the better part which we choose must keep elevating.

The views of a future life developed in this work are new, modest, and pure. The author considers that there are no arguments either

Mr. Newman's axiom of human thought. His answer to Byron's question.

of Scripture or of Reason appreciable by the un-spiritual consciousness proving the immortality of the soul. Future existence seems not to him necessary, either to soften sorrow or animate hope. Pure love to God simply requires that nearness of spirit which is obedience and purity. Trustful aspiration seems to be the condition of the soul with respect to eternity-and whatever assurance can be had of everlasting life, comes best from the spiritual conviction that from being a child of God we shall be heirs of God-of his kingdom, the kingdom of the Prophets and the Messiah. (Vide chap. v.)

6

In a passage, which must command the respect of philosophy, and which gives us the author's key to the True Religion, he observes:— The immense progress of pure intellect must show every thoughtful man the impossibility (not to say wickedness) of sacrificing the Intellect to the Soul, and wherever there is true Faith, there is an unhesitating conviction that there cannot possibly be any real collision between these two parts of human nature' (pp. 179, 180). To sacrifice Imagination and Intellect, and to sacrifice Domestic Affection, are about on a par. It seems to be quite an axiom of thought that the human mind was meant to labour for the Useful, to contemplate the Beautiful, to possess itself of the True, and to contend for the Right, as well as to worship the Holy, or imitate the Bountiful One' (p. 190). He who attempts to render the work of another should, as far as possible, render it in the spirit in which it is written. This I have endeavoured to do, placing myself, as well as I was able, in the author's place, endeavouring to think his thoughts, and to forget that my own views differed from his. In 'Childe Harold' Byron asksFoul Superstition! howsoe'er disguised,

Idol, saint, virgin, prophet, crescent, cross,
For whatsoever symbol thou art prized,
Thou sacerdotal gain, but general loss!

Who from true worship's gold can separate thy dross?

The author of The Soul, her Sorrows and her Apirations,' has higher pretensions to have answered this question than any other religious writer of our times whose works have come under my notice.

Religious persons have often remarked to me, 'You will find the same genial utterances of piety in the writings of many other divines in Mr. Newman's.' In one sense this is true; there are passages of generous inspiration in the works of many eminent preachers, but expressed with less explicitness, and besides, followed by a certain equivocation which leaves you in doubt whether you may trust them. With Mr. Newman there is an unmistakableness which you feel to be at once reliable. There are no subtle texts of Scripture coming in to dilute his meaning-there are no theories of divinity crushing the vitality out of every generous affirmation. What he says once he says all through—not in one or two passages, but on every page. His speech is constantly gentle-one tone pervades all-he sweeps away all that contradicts genial utterance. It is this wholeness, this permanence of spirit, that makes him unlike other religious writers.

The transmutation of attributes into entities one of the habits of Theists.

The advantage of a book of this character to all who desire the rationalisation of religion is incalculable. It constitutes a standard by which to try the low types of the Christian faith. Any who hold the popular and degrading forms of Christianity, we may point to the teachings of this book, and thus hope to elevate them. To Freethinkers it has the great value of showing us the ablest things that can be urged by a man of candour and genius, and in what is excellent in such delineation we see what we have to equal or surpass, if we are compelled to reject that set forth by our opponent. A book so consummate as the Natural History of the Soul, is a standard, therefore, by which to try others and ourselves. And opponents learning what we object to in this, will take warning and not demand our assent to anything inferior.

Yet is this not a hard book to answer from our point of sight-the difficulty is in refuting the argumentative foundation it has without giving the impression that we undervalue its moral developments.

Mr. Newman sees in the Soul and the Conscience specific senses. But the recurrence to us in action of our ideal of justice or duty is all that we mean when we speak of Conscience. The frequent query to the unjust or supine man― Have you no conscience ?' means, have you no sense of justice or duty? We have seen the Soul defined as that part of our nature by which we are in contact with the Infinite.' But the Soul, like the Conscience, is an attribute, not an entity. From the observation of the near we pass to the contemplation of extended phenomena. The illimitableness of the unknown has a deep influence over us. Doubtless we desire to discover our relation, if any, to it. The sense of the Infinitude around us is an extension of our Consciousness or Soul. All reflections on nature amplify our conscious life without making consciousness an independent existence. To refer each class of functions to separate moral senses is convenient and distinctive, but we must beware of the transmutation of these terms into entities by this specious and frequent use. From speaking of infinite phenomena we come to abridge it into 'the Infinite :' the unknown parts of nature come to be spoken of by Goethe as the Unknown.' The Infinite and the Unknown, by the aid of isolation and capital letters, assume the rhetorical force of personalities, and the attribute insensibly glides into an Entity. It appears to me that the logical force of this book upon believers lies in the unnoticed metamorphoses which such leading words undergo.

The Atheist sees also with Mr. Newman, that all human knowledge is bounded; and he, too, seeks to draw the line where our knowledge ends and our conjectures begin: but the 'illimitable haziness' surrounding our existence, of which he also is sensible, fails to enable him to draw up a confession of religious belief-it indeed excites his 'imagination,' but fails to guide his understanding.' The region of dimness is not without relation to his moral state,' but the relation is not that which shapes itself into definite propositions.

The Infinite is open to us as well as to the Theist, and therefore the

New statement of the argument of Design.

generous side' of the nature of the moralist may be nurtured and expanded by its contemplation. Every aspect of nature has its lesson for reflective man. The boundlessness of the starry region impresses us with the littleness of all strife. In the presence of such immensity we are taught humility and love. We cannot look on Nature at peace without inspiring gentleness and tranquillity. The same forms of moral loveliness our author delineates with a master's hand, seem equally discernible and equally to belong to the student of nature.

Mr. Newman unites a Catholic explicitness to Evangelical doctrine, so opposite to the evasiveness of many rational religionists. Mr. Newman does not pretend to compete with logic. He is too much of the scholar to deprecate it. He concedes its great claims as the security of intelligence, but he erects a system independently of it, openly, respectfully, but daringly without it.

The affections of Awe, Wonder, Admiration, do not denote any necessary belief in a Personal Deity (p. 49). Order, Design, Goodness, and Wisdom are the attributes of nature which are held to bring in a personal Deity. But with respect to Order in the universe, we do not learn from any observation that it must necessarily have an external origin. Mr. Newman does not seem to discover in nature proof that it has a Ruler over it. He says that if a man believe that in the human mind an originating Will exists, he will believe that the same species of Will has been exercised on nature. But if he discern within himself no first principle of movement, he of course needs none out of himself. If in his own actions he see no marks of (what others call) Will, why should he see them in Nature? (pp. 29, 30) This is precisely the case with the Atheist. Law (which is the name given to the uniformity of operations, to the calculable forces of Nature) seems to him also to pervade mind. Intelligence seems no more exempt from law than inorganic matter. Will is merely desire, intellectual or sensuous, excited by external influence.

The Atheist therefore has little to answer: his case remains intact. He knows that no opinion will finally prevail but that which is founded on or coincident with logic. With respect to the argument of Design, Mr. Newman fails to establish any case which affects the position of the Atheist, The line of reasoning adopted by Paley, followed by Chalmers, and illustrated by Brougham, Mr. Newman gives up as untenable, and proposes a new statement of the argument. Thus :'To believe in a divine architect, because I cannot otherwise understand by what train of causation an Eye could have been made, is one thing: (does the Theist any the more comprehend ?) But to believe in a Designer, because I see the Eye to be suited to Light, is another thing (p. 36). This latter view rests on the intuitive perceptions of the Soul; the former on the accuracy of strict logical deduction— which can easily be shown to be inconclusive. Such Fitnesses as meet our view on all sides bring a reasonable conviction that Design lies beneath them; and to confess this, is to confess the doctrine of an intelligent Creator' (p. 34).