in the continental line, was entitled to one thousand acres of land. (B.) FOR HIS NEGLIGENCE, WHEREBY OTHERS ARE INJURED. WINGIS V. SMITH. Nov. T. 1825. 3 M'Cord's Rep. 400. Summary process against the defendant for the negligence of his servant. It appeared the slave drove his master's coach and left. ges from it standing at the door in the street, when the horses became frightthe negli- ened, ran away, and broke the plaintiff's bread cart. A master is not liable for dama gence of his slave. The court below supposed the accident to be owing to the gross negligence of the servant in not continuing on the box of the coach and watching his horses, and that the master was liable therefor. The defendant appealed to this court. Per Cur. Nott, J. After referring to the civil law, where a person was allowed what was called actio noxalis, by which a master was made liable for any damage done to another by his slave, such as theft, robbery, or any other damage, Cooper's Justinian, 354., and to Puffendorff, book 3., Grotius, lib. 2. ch. 17. 375. This point has been settled by our own courts in the case of Snee v. Trice, 2 Bay's Rep. 345. In that case, the defendant's negroes had suffered a fire to break out from the field where they were at work, and to burn up the plaintiff's crib of corn. The court held, that the defendant was not liable for the negligence of his servants. And the question was decided upon general principles, and not upon the particular circumstances of the case. Whether the result of the negligence be the burning of the crib of corn, or the breaking of a cart, the principle would be the same. The rule, however, does not extend to slaves who are tradesmen, carriers, &c., for there the master's security for their faithful performance of their duty depends upon his holding them out as capable of performing the work or business undertaken. (C.) FOR TORTS AND CRIMES COMMITTED BY THE slave. 1. GURRIERE V. LAMBETH. April T. 1836. 9 Louisiana Rep. 339. The master is liable for acts and injuries done The plaintiff brought an action of damages against the defendant, and alleged, that he rented a store of the defendant, and while he was absent, the defendant ordered one of his slaves to nail up a back window of the store to vex and harass him, the said plaintiff; by and the slave, in nailing up the window, spilt a large quantity of ink on the goods of the plaintiff, and damaged them. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant appealed. his slave, acting either by or with out his authority, and is liable for all damages occasioned by his offence, Per Cur. Bullard J. A bill of exceptions was taken to the refusal of the judge to instruct the jury, at the request of defendant's counsel, that the plaintiff could not recover, unless it was proved that the act from which the injury resulted, was done by the order fence." The court held, in Snee v. Trice, Bay's Rep. 345.,that a master is responsible for the acts of his servants and slaves, in all cases in the way of trade, or public employment, or where any injury is occasioned to another by any act done by a servant, in pursuance of his master's directions, but not for unauthorized proceedings; and it seems that the English law, which holds masters responsible for the negligence of their servants, is not applicable to slavery. or quasi of The extent of masters liability. agreement with his slave to manumit and authority of the defendant, or with his knowledge and approbation; and that even his subsequent knowledge and approbation of such act would not make him responsible. But the court charged, that the master was responsible if the damage had been caused by the slave, acting either by or without the master's order. We are of opinion, the court did not err. The civil code declares, that "the master shall be answerable for all the damages occasioned by an offence, or quasi offence committed by his slave, independent of the punishment inflicted on the slave." Art. 180. STATE V. FRANCIS ANONE. 2. May T. 1819. 2 Nott & McCord's Rep. 27.; S. P. SNEE V. TRICE, 2 Bay's Rep. 345.; STATE V. DAWSON, 2 Bay's Rep. 360. Per Cur. Richardson, J, The law is well settled, both in this state and abroad, that a master is not liable for the acts of his servants unless done by his authority; and that the principal is not liable for the criminal acts of his mere civil agents we fully recognize. And he cited Middletown v. Fowler, 1 Salk. Rep. 282.; M'Manus v. Cricket, 1 East's Rep. 106. 3. KETTLETAS V. FLEET. Feb. T. 1811. 7 John's. Rep. 324. A written This was an action to recover the price of a negro boy sold by by a master the plaintiff to the defendant. The defendant gave notice, with the general issue, that he would give in evidence, that the plaintiff had promised the boy in writing, that he would manumit him in eight gatory-it years from a certain period, upon condition of his faithful service during that period; and that the plaintiff had no right to transfer lence, and the boy for a longer period. The jury, under a charge from the tract. court, found for the defendant. him is obli rests in be nenevo not in con On a motion for a new trial it was contended, that the writing was not obligatory. Per Cur. The covenant of the plaintiff to manumit the negro in eight years, on condition of faithful service, was one that the slave could avail himself of if the condition was fulfilled. What was said by the court in the case of negro Tom, 5 Johns. Rep. 365., is to that effect. The manumission of a slave does not rest upon the principles of a contract, depending upon a consideration; but it is an act of benevolence, sanctioned by the statute, and made obligatory, if in writing. 4. STEVENSON V. SINGLETON. Feb. T. 1829. 1 Leigh's Rep. 72. cannot en Gibbon made a contract with his slave Singleton, that he would Chancery emancipate him on the slave's paying him one thousand dollars, force a and the slave paid him $566. But no deed of emancipation was between executed by Gibbon. contract master and slave, tho' his part. Per Cur. Cabell, J. In the case of Sawney v. Carter, 6 Rand's the slave perform Rep. 173., the court refused, on great consideration, to enforce a promise by a master to emancipate his slave, where the conditions of the promise had been partly complied with by the slave. It is impossible to distinguish that case from this. The court proceeded on the principle, that it is not competent to a court of chancery to enforce a contract between master and slave, even although the contract should be fully complied with on the part of the slave. 5. EMERSON V. HOWLAND et al. May T. 1816. 1 Mason's Rep. 45. mariner slave is dis charged from on The plaintiff shipped his slave on board the Ann Alexander, for Where a Norfolk to Liverpool, and from thence to ports in Europe. The ship was captured on her passage from Liverpool to Archangel in Russia, and carried into Norway, and the slave discharged by his own consent. The ship was restored, and arrived in Boston, when this suit was commenced by the master for his wages. Per Cur. Story, J. Capture does not dissolve the contract for wages. The slave could not consent to be discharged. The contract was entered into, by the owner in Virginia, and must be construed with reference to the lex loci contractus. In Virginia, slavery is expressly recognized, and the rights founded upon it, are incorporated into the whole system of the laws of that state. The owner of the slave has the most complete and perfect property in him. The slave may be sold, or devised, or pass by descent, in the same manner as other inheritable estate. He has no civil rights or privileges. He is incapable of making or discharging a contract, and the perpetual right to his services belongs exclusively to his owner. The slave was illegally discharged, and the master is entitled to recover his full wages up to the time when he might have returned to the United States. 30 board a ship illegally, the mas ter may reCover wa ges up to the time when he might have returned to the United States. 6. An owner THE STATE v. JONES. Dec. T. 1828. 2 Devereaux's North Negro Charles, the property of the defendant, had been convicted notice of a of a rape, and executed. who has capital charge a gainst his slave, in case of a conviction is not only bound to pay the prison fees, butalso the of 1797, (Rev. ch. 484.) for carrying the sen tence into A question was made before his honor Judge Norwood, whether the defendant, as the owner of the slave, was liable to his prison charges, and to the fee of ten dollars allowed for carrying the sentence of death into execution. Both questions were decided for the state, and the defendant appealed. Per Cur. Hall, J. From the two acts of assembly recited in fee allowed the case of the State v. Isaac, decided at this term, 2 Dev. Rep. by the act 47., the defendant, Jones, the owner of the slave, is liable for the costs of prosecution against him, because if the slave had been a freeman, his estate would be liable. With respect to the fee of £5 for executing Charles, it is included, I think, in the costs of execution. prosecution. In the act of 1797, (Rev. ch. 484,) amongst other fees to which the sheriff is entitled, for apprehending and carrying criminals to jail, ten shillings is allowed for carrying any sentence or decree of the court into execution, where the convict is to be corporally punished, and £5 for the execution and decent burial of any one. By the same act, provision is made for the payment of such fees by the state, provided they cannot be got out of the estate, or body of the prisoner. The owner may be prosecuted civilly for damages for theft, &c. of his slave be But it declares, that no such claim shall be allowed, until a fieri facias shall have issued to the county in which the prisoner may be supposed to have owned property, and the sheriff's return thereon, that nothing was to be found, nor until a capias ad satisfacendum, shall have issued, and if it was executed upon the body of the criminal, not until he discharged himself by taking the oath of insolvency. From this act it appears that the estate of the slave would be liable in case he was a freeman. It follows, of course, that his owner is so. Judgment affirmed. 7. MOFFIT V. VION. March T. 1833. 5 Louisiana Rep. 346. The plaintiff sued the defendant to recover the value of goods stolen from his store by the defendant's slave. The defendant excepted on the ground, that no previous criminal prosecution of the slave had taken place. The judge sustained the exception and secution is dismissed the petition. Plaintiff appealed. fore a criminal pro instituted. |