Upon the face of the indictment, the case is the same as The State v. Hall, 2 Hawks' Rep. 582. No fault is found with the rule then adopted, nor would be, if it were now open. But it is not open;

In a

for the question as it relates to a battery on a slave by a stranger is considered as settled by that case. But the evidence makes this a different case. Here the slave had been hired by the defendant, and was in his possession; and the battery was committed during the period of hiring. With the liabilities of the hirer to the general owner, for an injury permanently impairing the value of the slave, no rule now laid down is intended to interfere. That is left upon the general doctrine of bailment. The inquiry here is, whether a cruel and unreasonable battery on a slave, by the hirer, is indictable. The judge below instructed the jury, that it is. He seems to have put it on the ground, that the defendant had but a special property. Our laws uniformly treat the master or other person having the possession and command of the slave, as entitled to the same extent of authority. The object is the same, the service of the slave; and the same powers must be confided. criminal proceeding, and indeed in reference to all other persons but the general owner, the hirer and possessor of the slave in relation to both rights and duties, is, for the time being, the owner. This opinion would, perhaps, dispose of this particular case; because the indictment, which charges a battery upon the slave of Elizabeth Jones, is not supported by proof of a battery upon defendant's own slave; since different justifications may be applicable to the two cases. But upon the general question, whether the owner is answerable criminaliter, for a battery upon his own slave, or other exercise of authority or force, not forbidden by statute, the court entertains but little doubt. That he is so liable, has never been decided; nor, as far as is known, been hitherto contended. There has been no prosecutions of the sort. The established habits and uniform practice of the country in this respect, is the best evidence of the portion of power deemed by the whole community requisite to the preservation of the master's dominion. If we thought differently, we could not set our notions in array against the judgment of every body else, and say that this, or that authority, may be safely lopped off. This has indeed been assimilated at the bar to the other domestic relations; and arguments drawn from the well-established principles, which confer and restrain the authority of the parent over the child, the tutor over the pupil, the master over the

apprentice, have been pressed on us. The court does not recognise their application. There is no likeness between the cases. They are in opposition to each other, and there is an impassable gulf between them. The difference is, that which exists between freedom and slavery-and a greater cannot be imagined. In the one, the end in view is the happiness of the youth, born to equal rights with that governor, on whom the duty devolves of training the young to usefulness, in a station which he is afterwards to assuine among free men. To such an end, and with such a subject, moral and intellectual instruction seem the natural means; and for the most part, they are found to suffice. Moderate force is superadded, only to make the others effectual. If that fail, it is better to leave the party to his own headstrong passions, and the ultimate correction of the law, than to allow it to be immoderately inflicted by a private person. With slavery it is far otherwise. The end is the profit of the master, his security and the public safety; the subject, one doomed in his own person, and his posterity, to live without knowledge, and without the capacity to make any thing his own, and to toil that another may reap the fruits. What moral considerations shall be addressed to such a being, to convince him what, it is impossible but that the most stupid must feel and know can never be true; that he is thus to labor upon a principle of natural duty, or for the sake of his own personal happiness, such services can only be expected from one who has no will of his own; who surrenders his will in implicit obedience to that of another. Such obedience is the consequence only of uncontrolled authority over the body. There is nothing else which can operate to produce the effect. The power of the master must be absolute, to render the submission of the slave perfect. I most freely confess my sense of the harshness of this proposition. I feel it as deeply as any man can. And as a principle of moral right, every person in his retirement must repudiate it. But in the actual condition of things, it must be so. There is no remedy. This discipline belongs to the state of slavery. They cannot be disunited, without abrogating at once the rights of the master, and absolving the slave from his subjection. It constitutes the curse of slavery to both the bond and the free portions of our population. But it is inherent in the relation of master and slave. That there may be particular instances of cruelty and deliberate barbarity,

where in conscience the law might properly interfere, is most probable.

The difficulty is to determine, where a court may properly begin. Merely in the abstract it may well be asked, which power of the master accords with right. The answer will probably sweep away all of them. But we cannot look at the matter in that light. The truth is, that we are forbidden to enter upon a train of general reasoning on the subject. We cannot allow the right of the master to be brought into discussion in the courts of justice. The slave, to remain a slave, must be made sensible that there is no appeal from his master; that his person is, in no instance, usurped; but is conferred by the laws of man, at least, if not by the law of God. The danger would be great indeed, if the tribunals of justice should be called on to graduate the punishment appropriate to every temper, and every dereliction of menial duty. No man can anticipate the many and aggraved provocations of the master which the slave would be constantly stimulated, by his own passions, or the instigation of others, to give; or the consequent wrath of the master, prompting him to bloody vengeance, upon the turbulent traitor; a vengeance generally practised with impunity, by reason of its privacy. The court, therefore, disclaims the power of changing the relation in which these parts of our people stand to each other.

We are happy to see, that there is daily less and less occasion for the interposition of the courts. The protection already afforded by several statutes, that all powerful motive, the private interest of the owner, the benevolence towards each other, seated in the hearts of those who have been born and bred together, the frowns and deep execrations of the community upon the barbarian, who is guilty of excessive and brutal cruelty to his unprotected slave, all combined, have produced a mildness of treatment, and attention to the comforts of the unfortunate class of slaves, greatly mitigating the rigors of servitude, and ameliorating the condition of the slaves.

The same causes are operating, and will continue to operate with increased action, until the disparity in numbers between the whites and blacks shall have rendered the latter in no degree dangerous to the former, when the police now existing may be further relaxed. This result, greatly to be desired, may be much more rationally expected from the events above alluded to, and now in process, than from any rash expositions of abstract truths, by a judiciary tainted with a false and fanatical philanthropy, seeking to

The statute penalty for harboring slaves and

servants is cumulative.

Justifica

pass.

redress an acknowledged evil, by means still more wicked and appalling than even that evil. I repeat, that I would gladly have avoided this ungrateful question. But being brought to it, the court is compelled to declare, that while slavery exists amongst us in its present state, or until it shall seem fit to the legislature to interpose express enactments to the contrary, it will be the imperative duty of the judges to recognize the full dominion of the owner over the slave, except where the exercise of it is forbidden by statute. And this we do upon the ground, that this dominion is essential to the value of slaves as property, to the security of the master, and the public tranquility, greatly dependent upon their subordination; and, in fine, as most effectually securing the general protection and comfort of the slaves themselves. Judgment below reversed; and judgment entered for the defendant.

7.

SCIDMORE V. SMITH. Aug. T. 1816. 13 John's Rep. 322.

Trespass for harboring the plaintiff's man servant. It was objected, that it ought to have been debt under the statute for the penalty.

Per Cur. The statute penalty for harboring slaves and servants, is cumulative, and does not destroy the common law remedy.

8.

BROWN and BOISSEAU. April T. 1810. 1 Munf. Rep. 288.

Trespass for breaking the plaintiff's close, and beating his tion in tres- slaves. The defendants pleaded, jointly, not guilty. On the trial they offered testimony tending to show in mitigation of damages, that the plaintiff had given a general permission to Brown to visit his negro quarters, and chastise any of his slaves who might be found acting improperly. The court refused to hear the testimony, although the beating of the negroes by Boisseau, was in the presence of Brown, and with his assent. It was admitted, that no Verdict for plaintiff.

permission had been given to Boisseau.

Per Cur. Tucker, J. The evidence was, in my opinion, most properly rejected. Roane and Fleming, Js., concurred.

(B.) FOR MAIMING OR KILLING HIM.

1.

CRAWFORD V. CHENEY. Sept. T. 1824. 15 Martin's Louisiana Rep 142.

Per Cur. Porter, J. This is an action brought to recover the price of a negro whom the plaintiff charges the defendant with having shot and killed. The evidence on which the jury found a verdict, comes up on the record, and the defendant renews here, a motion which he unsuccessfully made in the court below, for a new trial, on the ground of the finding being contrary to law and evidence. The testimony, it has been argued, is weak, and it is perhaps so; but the act charged here is one rarely committed in presence of witnesses; and the most that can be expected in cases of this kind, is the presumptions that result from circumstances. A most respectable jury, who knew the parties, have found a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and we are unable to say the evidence authorizes us to reverse the judgment rendered therein. We believe justice has been done, and when the proceedings of the inferior court terminate there, as we think they have in the instance before us, a stronger case than this must be presented, to induce us to send the cause to a new trial. Judgment affirmed.

2.

JOURDAN V. PATTON. July T. 1818. 5 Martin's Louisiana

Rep. 615.

She

injury to the plaintiff his full value, the property is

his slave

recovers

to the de

Per Cur. Mathews, J. The pliantiff claims damages for an If on an injury done to one of her slaves, by one of the defendant's. obtained judgment; and the defendant appealed. The injury done to the slave was of such a nature as to render him wholly useless his only eye having been put out. The parish court decreed that the plaintiff should recover twelve hundred dollars, the supposed transferred value of the slave, and a further sum of twenty-five dollars a fendant, on payment of month, from the time he was deprived of his sight; and that the the judg defendant should pay the physician's bill and two hundred dollars for the sustenance of the slave during his life, and that he should remain for ever in the possession of the plaintiff. We are of opinion, that this judgment is erroneous, in giving damages for the full value of the slave, and compensation for the loss of his labor, from the time he became blind, during an undetermined period.

ment.