A minor can do no his rights &c to be made of such slave, that the slave was entitled to his freedom. See the case of Scott v. Negro Ben, 6 Cranch's Rep. 1. 12. HANEY V. WADDLE. May T. 1815. 3 Har. & Johns. Rep. 557. On a petition for freedom the court below held, that the petiact to affect tioner was entitled to his freedom, having been imported into the state by a minor. That a minor had no more authority to import slaves into this state than an adult, and that neither the one nor the other had such authority. The defendant appealed. under the act to pre vent the importation of slaves. The act directing the mode of tion must The court dissented from the opinion of the county court, on the ground that the minor could do no act to affect his rights, nor could his guardian for him; that the guardian of a minor importing a slave did not entitle him to freedom, nor did the assent of the minor, during his minority, give such a title. And see Sprigg v. Negro Mary, 3 Har. & Johns. Rep. 491. 13. NEGRO JAMES V. GAITHER. Dec. T. 1807. 2 Har. & Johns. Rep. 176. Held by the court, that parol evidence is not admissible to prove that a deed of manumission was attested in the presence of two emancipa witnesses, when it appeared only one had signed the instrument; be compli and that a deed of manumission executed in the presence of one witness only, will not give freedom to the slaves mentioned therein. By the act of 1752, ch. 1. § 5., two witnesses are necessary, and they must subscribe their names to the deed of manumission. ed with. Importa tion by a ing from 14. FULTON V. LEWIS. May T. 1815. 3 Har. & Johns. Rep. 564. Petition for freedom. John Levant removed from St. Domingo person fly in July, 1793, of which place he was a native, to the city of BaltiSt. Domin- more, to avoid the insurrection in the former place, and brought with him three negroes as his slaves. He sold one of the negroes, the petitioner, to Clem, who sold him to the defendant, and Levant returned to the West Indies in 1796. go. The court decided on this statement of facts, that the petitioner was entitled to his freedom; and on appeal to this court the judgment was affirmed. 15. COMMONWEALTH V. HALLOWAY. July T. 1816. 2 Serg. & nia gives the child of a slave who Habeas corpus for the body of Eliza, a negro girl. It appeared Birth in that Eliza was the daughter of Mary, a slave who absconded from Pennsylva her master in Maryland, and came to Philadelphia, where she re- freedom to sided about two years, when Eliza was born. And the question was, whether birth, in Pennsylvania, gives freedom to a child of a slave who had absconded from another state before she became pregnant. absconded from another state before she became Held by the court, that by the act of March, 1780, which de- pregnant. clares "that all servitude for life, or slavery of children, in consequence of the slavery of their mothers, in the case of all children born within the state, from and after the passing of this act, shall be utterly taken away and extinguished, and forever abolished," which not being repugnant to the constitution, or laws of congress, was clear in favor of Eliza, and that she was born free. Per Yeates, J. Whatever may have been our ideas of the rights of slave holders in our sister states, we cannot deny that it was competent to the legislature to enact a law ascertaining the freedom of the issue of slaves born after the passing of the act within this state. 16. COMMONWEALTH ex rel., HALL V. COOK. Sep. T. 1822. 1 Watts' Rep. 155. COMMONWEALTH V. ROBINSON, ibid. p. 158. A citizen Habeas corpus to bring up Hannah Hall, who had been a slave of the Disof Mrs. Williamson for life. Mrs. Williamson had resided in the District of Columbia with trict of Columbia removed into Pennsylvania to reside, and slave, who Hannah, and removed into Pennsylvania, bringing Hannah with her to reside, where she signed an indenture to serve her mistress, brought Mrs. Willamson, for the period of seven years. The indenture with her a stated, that it was entered into in pursuance of a parol agreement in considemade before their removal into Pennsylvania. No other proof of manumisthat fact, however, existed. The indenture was transferred to herself to Cook. And the question was whether an indenture, in considera- serve tion of manumission executed in Pennsylvania was valid. ration of sion bound sev en years, the court held the The Court. Rogers, J., held the indenture invalid. The con- indenture tract was nudum pactum. There was no consideration; the slave void. After a certificate is granted by a magistrate the writ de ho giando will not lie. The legis longs exclusively, on this subject, to the national was free the moment her mistress brought her into Pennsylvania to reside. And after referring to 1 Yeates' Rep. 365., 6 Binney's Rep. 204., 4 Serg. & Rawl, 218., held, that the indenture would be valid if it was executed in a state where slavery is recognized, by a person who was a slave. But this indenture was invalid, although made in pursuance of a parol agreement entered into in the District of Columbia. And see Commonwealth v. Clements, 6 Binney's Rep. 207. JACK, a negro man, v. MARTIN. July T. 1834. 12 Wendell's 17. Rep. 311. Per Cur. Nelson, J. Where a slave escapes from one state mine repli- into another, and is pursued by his owner, and taken before a magistrate, and the magistrate, in pursuance of the law of congress, lation be examines into the matter, and grants a certificate, that the slave owes service or labor to the person claiming him, and allows the claimant to remove him to the state from which he fled, the claimant cannot be prevented from removing him by a writ de homine ment. The repligiando sued out under the authority of a state law. The right of legislation on this subject belongs exclusively to the national yield to the superiority government; and if such right be conceded to have been origiof the genally concurrent, after the exercise of its power by the national government. vernment, all control over the subject by the state governments neces govern state laws neral go It is not ne that the cessary sarily ceases, so as to avoid the effects of adverse and conflicting owner of a legislation. In cases of collision, state laws yielded to the superior citizen of authority of the laws of the general government. slave be a the state from which the slave To entitle the owner of a slave to the benefit of the provisions of the constitution and law of the United States, in this respect, it is not necessary that he should be a citizen of the state from which the to the pro- slave fled; it is only incumbent upon him to show, that under the fled, to entitle him visions of the consti- laws of the state from which the slave escaped, he is entitled to laws of the the srvice or labor of the slave. tution and U. S. Bringing a slave into the state contrary to the statute of 1815, is an indicta 18. COMMONWEALTH V. GRIFFEN. Oct. T. 1832. 7 J. J. Marshall's Rep. 588.; COMMONWEALTH V. GREATHOUSE, ibid. p. 590. The court, Robertson, J., held, that bringing a slave into Ken ble offence. tucky by a person not protected by any of the exceptions in the statute of 1815, although he intends to export, and afterwards exports the slave to another state for sale, is an importation in this state, in violation of the statute. And an importation for any purpose, or by any person not authorized by the statute, is an indictable offence. And the indictment need not charge a sale of them. Importation is one specific offence, and a subsequent sale is another. (F.) BY IMPLICATION. 1. Bringing an action against an other is a OATFIELD V. WARING. May T. 1817. 14 Johns Rep. 188. The court seemed to apply the principle, that where a person brings an action against another, he cannot afterwards claim him as his slave. Spencer, J., observed, that the fact that the defendant concession had sued the plaintiff for harboring his slave, goes a great way in establishing that he was free; at all events it is a very solemn concestion of the defendant that he was so. And consequently had a right to bring the action. 2. HALL V. MULLIN. June T. 1821. 5 Har. & Johns. Rep. 190. Trespass quare clausum fregit. The plaintiff claimed title to the close in question by the will of Henry L. Hall, who devised as follows: "I give and devise to Dolly Mullin one hundred and forty acres of land, being part of the tract called Partnership," &c. Dolly Mullin was the slave of the testator. Judgment was entered for the plaintiff, by consent, and the defendant appealed to this court. Per Cur. Johnson, J. At the time of the will of Henry L. Hall, it was in his power to have set Dolly Mullin free; and the question is, has he done so by implication? It was admitted, and could not be denied, that by the devise of the land, and the bequest of other property, she must be freed in order to give effect to such devise and bequest. Her freedom could certainly be implied from the devise itself. Per Chase, Ch. J. I am also of opinion that Dolly Mullin, being the slave of Henry L. Hall, the will of the said Henry L. Hall will operate, and is effectual to manumit and give freedom to Dolly Mullin, and that she acquired a capacity, and was rendered that he is free, and cannot be claimed as a slave. A slave un der thirty years of age cannot be pre have been ted. capable of taking, and did take the lands devised to her under the will. 3. MEILLEUR et al. v. COUPRY. May T. 1829. 20 Martin's Louisiana Rep. 128. Per Cur. Martin, J. The heirs of Louise Rilieux obtained a rule against Coupry, who had obtained letters testamentary on her estate, to show cause why they should not be revoked, and sugsumed to gesting that he was a slave, and therefore incapable of exercising emancipa- the office of testamentary executor. He contended that he was a freeman. The court thought otherwise. The letters were revoked, and he appealed. It was admitted, that he was born of a slave mother; that his mother's owner has ever resided, and still resides, in New Orleans; that he is twenty-seven or twenty-eight years of age; that he has enjoyed his freedom for fourteen years, and been married as a freeman. On these facts, it is clear, he was born a slave, and must continue so, unless he was emancipated; as he is under the age of thirty years, and the lawful emancipation of a slave cannot take place before that age, the presumption of a legal emancipation, which might result from his long possession of his freedom, is repelled from the evident impossibility his legal emancipation having taken place and the legal impossibility of a slave becoming free without a legal emancipation. Prescription can no more avail him, than it would the possessor of property evidently out of commerce. Judgment affirmed. NOTE. It will be seen by this chapter that the owner of slaves may emancipate them by deed, will, or by a contract executed. But to this benevolence of the owner there are, in the most of the states, restraints upon the exercise of this power by the owner. Slaves are recognized wherever the system is tolerated as property, and are subject to all the rules in the acquisition, possession, and transmission of property. It would seem, therefore, upon a first view of the case, that the owner should do with his property whatever he pleased, and should have the privilege of renouncing his right to it whenever he pleased, and without being qualified by any public laws or regulations upon the subject. Such, how |