Part IV. Men considered as endowed with passions. action recommended, argument may be employed to evince the reasonableness of the end, as well as the that we first perceive beauty, he says not how, and then having, by a careful examination, discovered the proportions which gave rise to the perception, denominate them true; so that all those elaborate disquisitions with which we are amused, amount only to a few insignificant identical propositions very improperly expressed. For out of a vast profusion of learned phrase, this is all the information we can pick, that "Beauty is truly beauty," and that "Good "is truly good." "Moral good," says a celebrated writer, "consisteth in fitness." From this account any person would at first readily conclude, that morals, according to him, are not concerned in the ends which we pursue, but solely in the choice of means for attaining our ends; that if this choice be judicious, the conduct is moral; if injudicious, the contrary. But this truly pious author is far from admitting such an interpretation of his words. Fitness, in his sense, hath no relation to a further end. It is an absolute fitness, a fitness in itself. We are obliged to ask, What then is that fitness, which you call absolute? for the application of the word in every other case invariably implying the proper direction of means to an end, far from affording light to the meaning it has here, tends directly to mislead us. The only answer, as far as I can learn, that hath ever been given to this question, is neither more nor less than this, "That alone is absolutely fit which is morally good" so that in saying moral good consisteth in fitness, no more is meant than that it consisteth in moral good. Another moralist appears, who hath made a most wonderful discovery. It is, that there is not a vice in the world but lying, and that acting virtuously in any situation, is but one way or other of telling truth. When this curious theory comes to be explained, we find the practical lie results solely from acting contrary to what those moral sentiments dictate, which, instead of deducing, he everywhere presupposeth to be known and acknowledged by us. Thus he reasons perpetually in a circle, and, without advancing a single 66 step Sect. IV. Men considered as endowed with passions. fitness of the means. But this way of speaking suits better the popular dialect, than the philosophical. The term reasonableness, when used in this manner, means nothing but the goodness, the amiableness, or moral excellency. If therefore the hearer hath no love of justice, no benevolence, no regard to right, although he were endowed with the perspicacity of a cherub, your harangue could never have any influence on his mind. The reason is, when you speak of the fitness of the means, you address yourself only to the head; when you speak of the goodness of the end, you address yourself to the heart, of which we supposed him destitute. Are we then to class the virtues among the passions? By no means. But, without entering into a discussion of the difference, which would be foreign to our purpose, let it suffice to observe, that they have this in common with passion. They necessarily imply an habitual propensity to a certain species of conduct, an habitual aversion to the contrary; a veneration for such a character, an ab step beyond it, makes the same things both causes and effects reciprocally. Conduct appears to be false, for no other reason but be→ cause it is immoral, and immoral for no other reason but because it is false. Such philosophy would not have been unworthy those profound outologists, who have blest the world with the discovery that "One being is but one being," that "A being is truly a being," and that “Every being has all the properties that it has," and who, to the unspeakable increase of useful knowledge, have denominated these the general attributes of being, and distinguished them by the titles, unity, truth, and goodness. This, if it be any thing, is the very sublimate of science. 66 Sect. IV. Men considered as endowed with passions. horrence of such another. They are, therefore, though not passions, so closely related to them, that they are properly considered as motives to action, being equally capable of giving an impulse to the will. The difference is a-kin to that, if not the same, which rhetoricians observe between pathos and ethos, passion and disposition *. Accordingly, what is addressed solely to the moral powers of the mind, is not so properly denominated the pathetic, as the sentimental. The term, I own, is rather modern, but is nevertheless, convenient, as it fills a vacant room, and doth not, like most of our newfangled words, justle out older and worthier occupants, to the no small detriment of the language. It occupies, so to speak, the middle place between the pathetic and that which is addressed to the imagination, and partakes of both, adding to the warmth of the former, the grace and attraction of the latter. Now the principal questions on this subject, are these two: How is a passion or disposition that is favourable to the design of the orator, to be excited in the hearers? How is an unfavourable passion or disposition to be calmed? As to the first, it was said already in general, that passion must be awakened by communicating lively ideas of the object. The reason will be obvious from the following remarks: A * This seems to have been the sense which Quintilian had of the difference between Tados and dos, when he gave amor for an example of the first, and charitas of the second. The word dis also sometimes used for moral sentiment. Sect. IV. Man considered as endowed with passions. passion is most strongly excited by sensation. The sight of danger, immediate or near, instantly rouseth fear; the feeling of an injury, and the presence of an injurer, in a moment kindle anger. Next to the influence of sense, is that of memory, the effect of which upon passion, if the fact be recent and remembered distinctly and circumstantially, is almost equal. Next to the influence of memory, is that of imagination; by which is here solely meant, the faculty of apprehending what is neither perceived by the senses, nor remembered. Now, as it is this power of which the orator must chiefly avail himself, it is proper to enquire what those circumstances are, which will make the ideas he summons up in the imagination of his hearers, resemble, in lustre and steadiness, those of sensation and remembrance. For the same circumstances will infallibly make them resemble also in their effects; that is, in the influence they will have upon the passions and affections of the hears. SECT. V....The circumstances that are chiefly instrumental in operating on the Passions. THESE are perhaps all reducible to the seven following, probability, plausibility, importance, proximity of time, connexion of place, relation of the actors or sufferers to the hearers or speaker, interest of the hearers or speaker in the consequences *. * I am not quite positive as to the accuracy of this enumeration, and shall therefore freely permit my learned and ingenious friend, Sect. V. Circumstances operating on the passions....I. Probability. PART I....Probability. THE first is probability, which is now considered only as an expedient for enlivening passion. Here again there is commonly scope for argument ‡. Probability results from evidence, and begets belief. Belief invigorates our ideas. Belief raised to the highest becomes certainty. Certainty flows either from the force of the evidence, real or apparent, that is produced by the speaker, from the previous notoriety of the fact. If the fact be notorious, it will not only be superfluous in the speaker to attempt to prove it, but it will be pernicious to his design. The reason is plain. By proving he supposeth it questionable, and by supposing actually renders it so to his audience: he brings them from viewing it in the stronger light of certainty, to view it in the weaker light of probability in lieu of sun-shine he gives them twilight. Of the different means and kinds of probation I have spoken already. PART II....Plausibility. THE second circumstance is plausibility, a thing to Dr Reid, to annex the et cætera he proposes in such cases, in order to supply all defects. See Sketches of the History of Man, B. ii. Sk. 1. Appendix, c. ii. sect. 2. In the judiciary orations of the ancients, this was the principal scope for argument. That to condemn the guilty, and to acquit the innocent, would gratify their indignation against the injurious, and their love of right was too manifest to require a proof. The fact, that there was guilt in the prisoner, or that there was innocence, `did require it. It was otherwise in deliberate orations, as the conduct recommended was more remotely connected with the emotions raised. |