destitute of it, who is not accounted a monster in his kind; for such, doubtless, are all idiots and change

admitting his plea, [page 86] that, by the principle of association, not only the ideas, but the concomitant belief may be accounted for, even this does not invalidate the doctrine he impugns. For, let it be observed, that it is one thing to assign a cause which, from the mechanism of our nature, has given rise to a particular tenet or belief; and another thing to produce a reason by which the understanding has been convinced. Now, unless this be done as to the principles in question, they must be considered as primary truths in respect of the understanding, which never deduced them from other truths, and which is under a necessity, in all her moral reasonings, of founding upon them. In fact, to give any other account of our conviction of them, is to confirm, instead of confuting the doctrine, that in all argumentation they must be regarded as primary truths, or truths which reason never inferred through any medium, from other truths previously perceived. My second remark is, that though this examiner has, from Dr Reid, given us a catalogue of first principles, which he deems unworthy of the honourable place asigned them, he has no where though proper to give us a list of those self-evident truths which, by his own account, and in his own express words, "must be assumed as the foundation o "all our reasoning." How much light might have been thrown upon the subject by the contrast? Perhaps we should have been enabled, on the comparison, to discover some distinctive characters in his genuine axioms, which would have preserved us from the danger of confounding them with their spurious ones. Nothing is more evident than that, in whatever regards matter of fact, the mathe. matical axioms will not answer. These are purely fitted for evolving the abstract relations of quantity. This he in effect owns himself [page 39]. It would have been obliging then, and would have greatly contributed to shorten controversy, if he had given us, at least, a specimen of those self evident principles, which, in his estimation, are the non plus ultra of moral reasoning.

lings. By madness, a disease which makes terrible havoc on the faculties of the mind, it may be in a great measure, but is never entirely lost.

Ir is purely hence that we derive our assurance of such truths as these: "Whatever has a beginning has 66 a cause. When there is in the effect a manifest adjustment of the several parts to a certain end, there "is intelligence in the cause. The course of nature "will be the same to-morrow, that it is to-day; or, "the future will resemble the past. There is such a thing as body; or, there are material substances in

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dependent of the mind's conceptions. There are "other intelligent beings in the universe beside me. "The clear representations of my memory in regard "to past events, are indubitably true." These, and a great many more of the same kind, it is impossible for any man by reasoning to evince, as might easily be shewn, were this a proper place for the discussion. And it is equally impossible, without a full conviction of them, to advance a single step in the acquisition of knowledge, especially in all that regards mankind, life, and conduct.

I AM sensible, that some of these, to men not accustomed to inquiries of this kind, will appear at first not to be primary principles, but conclusions from other principles; and some of them will be thought to coincide with the other kinds of intuition above mentioned. Thus the first, "Whatever hath a beginning "hath a cause," may be thought to stand on the same

footing with mathematical axioms. I acknowledge, that, in point of evidence they are equal, and it is alike impossible in either case, for a rational creature to withhold his assent. Nevertheless, there is a difference in kind. All the axioms in mathematics are but the enunciations of certain properties in our abstract notions, distinctly perceived by the mind, but have no relation to any thing without themselves, and can never be made the foundation of any conclusion concerning actual existence: whereas, in the axiom last specified, from the existence of one thing we intuitively conclude the existence of another. This proposition, however, so far differs, in my apprehension, from others of the same order, that I cannot avoid consider ing the opposite assertion as not only false, but con tradictory; but I do not pretend to explain the ground of this difference.

THE faith we give to memory may be thought, on a superficial view, to be resolveable into consciousness, as well as that we give to the immediate impressions of sense. But on a little attention one may easily perceive the difference. To believe the report of our senses doth, indeed, commonly imply, to believe the existence of certain external and corporeal objects, which give rise to our particular sensations. This, I acknowledge, is a principle which doth not spring from consciousness, (for consciousness cannot extend beyond sensation) but from common sense, as well as the assurance we have in the report of memory. But this was not intended to be included under the second VOL. I.

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branch of intuitive evidence. By that firm belief in -sense. which I there resolved into consciousness, I meant no more than to say, I am certain that I see, and feel, and think, what I actually see, and feel, and think As in this I pronounce only concerning my own present feelings, whose essence consists in being felt, and of which I am at present conscious, my conviction is reducible to this axiom, or coincident with it, "It is impossible for a thing to be and not to be at "the same time." Now, when I say, I trust entirely to the clear report of my memory, I mean a good deal more than, "I am certain that my memory gives such "a report, or represents things in such a manner," for this conviction I have indeed from consciousness; but I mean, "I am certain that things happened hereto"fore at such a time, in the precise manner in which "I now remember that they then happened." Thus, there is a reference in the ideas of memory to former sensible impressions, to which there is nothing analogous in sensation. At the same time, it is evident, that remembrance is not always accompanied with this full conviction. To describe, in words, the difference between those lively signatures of memory, which command an unlimited assent, and those fainter traces which raise opinion only, or even doubt, is perhaps impracticable; but no man stands in need of such assistance to enable him in fact to distinguish them, for the direction of his own judgment and conduct. Some may imagine, that it is from experience we come to know what faith in every case is due to memory. Büt it will appear more fully afterwards, that unless we

had implicitly relied on the distinct and vivid informations of that faculty, we could not have moved a. step towards the acquisition of experience. It must, however, be admitted, that experience is of use in assisting us to judge concerning the more languid and confused suggestions of memory; or, to speak more properly, concerning the reality of those things, of which we ourselves are doubtful, whether we remember them or not.

In regard to the primary truths of this order, it may be urged, that it cannot be affirmed of them all at least, as it may of the axioms in mathematics, or the assurances we have from consciousness, that the denial of them implies a manifest contradiction. It is, perhaps, physically possible, that the course of nature will be inverted the very next moment; that my memory is no other than a delirium, and my life a dream; that all is mere illusion; that I am the only being in the universe, and that there is no such thing as body. Nothing can be juster than the reply given by Buffier, "It must be owned," says he *,“ "that to main"tain propositions, the reverse of the primary truths "of common sense, doth not imply a contradiction, it

only implies insanity." But if any person, on account of this difference in the nature of these two classes of axioms, should not think the term intuitive so properly applied to the evidence of the last mentioned, let him denominate it, if he please, instinctive; I

*Premiéres Véritez, Part I. Chap. 11.