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production is superior to the force of population, is only in other words to say that the causes tending to advance society are on the whole more powerful than the causes tending to retard it; the name 'force of production' being given to the one set of causes, and that of force of population' to the other. It is, in short, a mere reproduction of the fact of progress under another form, but does not advance us a step towards an explanation of that fact which is the problem to be solved. It is as if a person should argue that the fact of a train leaving Dublin and arriving in Belfast proves the ascendency in railways of the force of locomotion' over the 'force of immobility,' on the ground that the actual progress of the train could be due to no other cause; and the argument would be valid,--a similar assumption being made to that latent in the reasoning I have quoted, namely, that the force of locomotion' included all the causes propelling the train, and the force of immobility,' all the causes retarding it. The engineer, however, who should make the discovery would scarcely find that he had added much to his stock of useful knowledge.

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§ 4. I have now endeavoured to show that the comparisons suggested by Mr. Rickards in lieu of that which Malthus instituted, lead to no economic principle whatever, and furnish no aid towards the solution of any problems connected with the phenomena of wealth. In further proof of the entire irrelevancy, with reference to the ends of the science,

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of Mr. Rickards' exposition of the laws of population, I may add that, having established these laws, apparently to his own satisfaction, he nevertheless does not apply them to the solution of any problems of wealth, nor does he attempt to make them the ground of any practical suggestions; on the contrary, such practical lessons as he does inculcate on the subject of population are directly at variance with his own theoretical conclusions.

You have seen that, while Malthus maintained that population tended to increase faster than subsistence, he held, consistently with this, that the principle of population was a power which it was desirable to restrain, and advocated, as a means to this end, the formation of habits of prudence and self-control. Mr. Rickards, as you have also seen, emphatically denies this doctrine: he maintains, on the contrary, that subsistence tends to increase faster than population-that it does so both in the 'abstract' and in the 'concrete,' both 'potentially' and ' actually'; and further that 'production' as compared with 'population' is the greater power of the two?' Mr. Rickards having thus given a direct negative to the principle of Malthus, it would be natural to suppose that in the practical treatment of the question he would be equally at variance with him. It would be natural to suppose that, as he maintains that subsistence both potentially' and 'actually' tends to outstrip population, he would be released from all apprehension as to the danger of population outstripping subsistence. If 'production' be the

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'superior power,' there seems no reason,-provided only men be industrious, provided only the machinery of production be kept in motion-that mankind should not multiply without stay or limit, since, on this hypothesis, it is always competent to them to keep the means of physical comfort in advance of their increase. There seems no reason, in short, that the population of every country in Europe should not advance at the American rate, constantly doubling itself in periods of twenty-five years; or, at least, if there be any reason for restraining population, we should not expect to find it in the difficulty of procuring subsistence. You will, therefore, probably be surprised to find that Mr. Rickards, not only recognises the necessity of placing a restraint on the principle of population, but does so on the express ground of the limits placed by nature on the increase of subsistence.

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"Individual prudence," he says, "is the proper check to precipitate marriages; an appeal to the consequences which will recoil on the parties themselves and their innocent offspring, is the appropriate and cogent argument to deter them from rash engagements. Let it not be said," he continues, “that in thus arguing I am substituting a principle of selfishness for one of duty. It is not so: prudence is here an obligation of morality." . . . "Whatever fluctuations," he adds, "may betide the labour market, let each man, in forming his private connections, act with the forethought and discretion that become a

1 P. 204.

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responsible being, and society will have no cause of complaint against him, for over-population will be impossible." This is excellent advice. But what are the grounds of it?-why should over-population' be possible in the absence of forethought and discretion? why should prudence in respect to marriage be an obligation of morality? Simply, Mr. Rickards tells us, quoting the language of M. Say (not to refute but to adopt it), because "the tendency of men to reproduce their kind, and their means of doing so, are, we may say, infinite; but their means of subsistence are limited." 1

I must leave Mr. Rickards to reconcile his practical lessons with his theoretical conclusions-his advocacy of a restraint on population on the ground of the limitation of subsistence, with his doctrine that subsistence 'potentially' and 'actually' tends to increase faster than population. It appears to me that the conclusion is inevitable-either his doctrines, in the sense in which he understands them, are irrelevant to the purposes of Political Economy, or his precepts are in direct contravention of his doctrines.

Before concluding I must notice one more position of Mr. Rickards. In the preface to the work which I have been noticing he puts this dilemma: "If the conclusion of the Essay on Population be true, it seems to me to involve this inevitable consequencethat there has been a miscalculation of means to ends

1 P. 186.

in the arrangements of the universe-either man has been made too prolific, or the earth too sterile." 1 Let us meet this argument frankly. The conclusion of Malthus does undoubtedly involve the consequence that the earth is too sterile for the fecundity of man -for the possible increase of mankind; the earth cannot for ever yield food as fast as human beings can multiply; neither in this case, nor in any other, has provision been made for the unlimited gratification of any human propensity. Not even the most amiable instinct, not even the instinct of compassion, can be released from the control of prudence and conscience without entailing injury, alike on the possessor and on society. Whether this be a ground for charging the Creator of the universe with a 'miscalculation of means to ends' it is not for me to say; but the fact, I apprehend, is indisputable. If it be an end' of creation that the human species should multiply unrestrained, the conditions under which man has been placed in the world do not, it must be confessed, seem well calculated for this purpose, and the arrangements of the universe' do certainly, on this hypothesis, seem liable to the charge conveyed in the passage I have quoted. For my part, I do not take this view of the 'ends' for which 'the arrangements of the universe' have been

1 “Wherever Providence brings mouths into the world, it will find wherewithal to feed them;' the profane form of the theory," says the Cambridge Don, "is, that you ought to marry, because your relations can't let you starve."

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