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CHAPTER XLIII.-CAMPAIGN OF JENA.-FALL OF PRUSSIA.

Natural disadvantages of Prussia, 243.-Statistical details, 246.-Manners and

court of Berlin, 249.-Efforts of Prussia to obtain the aid of Russia and

England, ib.-The cabinet of Vienna resolves to remain neutral, 251.-The

lesser German powers incline to France, 252.-Preparations of Prussia, ib.—

Proclamation of Napoleon, 254.-Manifesto of Prussia, 255.-Preparatory

movements, 256.-Counter-movement of Napoleon, 257.-The theatre of

war, ib.-Death of Prince Louis, 259.-Movements preparatory to a general

action, 260.-Battle of Jena, 263.-Battle of Auerstadt, 267.--Disasters of

the retreat, 271.-Capture of Erfurth with fourteen thousand men, ib.—

Measures of Napoleon to follow up the victory, 272.-Saxony overrun by the

French, 274.-Hohenlohe compelled to surrender, 276.-Escape of the Duke

of Saxe-Weimar, ib.-Surrender of Stettin and Cüstrin, 277.-Blucher made

prisoner, 280.-Fall of Magdeburg, ib.-Fall of Hameln and Nienburg, 281.-

Napoleon detaches Saxony from the coalition, ib.-Refuses to treat with

Prussia, 282.-Visits Potsdam and the tomb of Frederick, 283.-Berlin,

Spandau, and Charlottenburg occupied by the French, ib.-Affair of Prince

Hatzfeld, 284.-Severity of Napoleon to the Duke of Brunswick, 286.—And

to the Queen of Prussia and the Elector of Hesse-Cassel, ib.-Contributions

levied on Prussia, 288.-Negotiations and first demands of Napoleon, 289.—

Berlin decree against English commerce, 290.-Affairs of Poland, 291.-

New conscription in France, 292.-Treaty between France and Saxony, ib.-
Results of the campaign, ib.

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HISTORY OF EUROPE.

CHAPTER XXXI.

CAMPAIGN OF MARENGO.

1. IMMENSE was the addition which the vigour and popularity of Napoleon, and the termination of the imbecile government of the Directory, made to the effective forces of France at this period. They were disposed, previous to the commencement of hostilities, in the following manner;-The Army of Italy, which occupied the crest of the Alps from the neighbourhood of Genoa to Mont Cenis, was thirty-six,thousand strong, of which twenty-eight thousand were assembled in Liguria, from the Trebbia to the Col de Tende, to guard the passes of the Apennines and protect Genoa from the Imperial forces, which were grouped in the plain round the walls of Alessandria. These troops, however, were for the most part in the most miserable condition. Their spirits were depressed by a campaign of unprecedented disaster, their clothing was worn out, their feet bare, their artillery broken down, their cavalry dismounted, and it required all the efforts of St Cyr and their other officers during the winter to retain them at their colours. The Army of Germany, which was afterwards called the Army of the Danube, was a hundred and twenty thousand strong, including sixteen thousand cavalry-of which immense force a hundred thousand men, including fourteen thousand horse, could be relied on for active operations. An army of reserve of fifty thousand men was at the same

VOL. V.

time formed, the headquarters of which were nominally at Dijon, but the bulk of the force was in reality disposed at Geneva, Lausanne, and the other towns which lay between the Jura and the Alps. This reserve was destined either to support the Army of Italy or that of Germany, as circumstances required, and it was formed of twenty thousand veteran soldiers, brought from Holland, under Brune, to La Vendée, which the pacification of that district rendered disposable for offensive operations, and thirty thousand conscripts, directed to that quarter from the central depots. These troops traversed France, with drums beating and colours flying, in the finest order, and their splendid appearance contributed much to revive the martial ardour of the people, which the disasters of the preceding campaign had seriously impaired. Berthier received the command of this army, and gave up the portfolio of minister of war to Carnot, whom Napoleon recalled from exile to fill that important situation.

2. On the other hand, the Imperialists had collected ninety-six thousand men in Piedmont and at the foot of the Maritime Alps, besides twenty thou sand who were dispersed in garrisons in the states of Venice, Lombardy, and Tuscany. Their forces in Germany were nearly as considerable, amounting to ninety-two thousand men, including

A

eighteen thousand superb cavalry, and | taken, the war in Germany was intendthey were followed by above four hun-ed to be merely defensive, and rather dred pieces of artillery. This was in- to occupy a considerable army of the dependent of the troops of Bavaria and enemy on the Rhine, than to make any the minor states in the English pay, serious impression on his territories in which amounted to twenty thousand that quarter. more, making in all a hundred and twelve thousand men. This great force, however, was scattered over an immense line, two hundred miles long, from the Alps to the Maine, insomuch that in the valley of the Danube, which was the decisive point of the whole, as it led straight to the Hereditary States, Kray could only assemble forty-five thousand men to resist the seventy-five thousand whom Moreau could direct against that point. The great error of the Austrians in this campaign consisted in supposing that Italy was the quarter where the decisive attack was to be made, and collecting in consequence the greater part of their reserves in that country; whereas the valley of the Danube was the place where dan ger was really to be apprehended, and against which the principal forces of the Republicans were directed. But they were deceived by the great successes of the preceding campaign; they were ignorant or incredulous of the rapid change produced on the French armies by the seizure of supreme power by Napoleon; and were dreaming of conquests on the Var and in Provence, when their redoubtable adversary was already meditating strokes in the heart of Bavaria.

3. The plan of the Austrians was to resume the offensive vigorously in Italy, where the great numerical superiority of Melas, as well as the warlike and experienced quality of the troops he commanded, promised the most important results; to throw Massena back into Genoa, and capture that important city; drive the French over the Maritime Alps, and carry the war into the heart of Provence. To co-operate with this design, an English expedition, having twelve thousand troops on board, was to proceed to the Mediterranean, and aid the Imperialists either in the south of France or on the Maritime Alps. This being the quarter where active operations were to be under

4. On his side, Napoleon determined to prosecute the contest vigorously where the Austrians proposed only to pursue defensive measures, and to liberate Italy by the blow struck at the Hereditary States in the heart of Germany. The possession of Switzerland, like a central fortress, gave the French the advantage of being able to take the line of the enemy's operations in rear, either in Italy or Suabia. Napoleon had intrusted the command of the army of Germany to Moreau-a generous proceeding towards so formidable a rival, but one which his great military talents, and the unbounded confidence of the army of the Rhine in his capacity, as well as the important services which he had rendered to the First Consul on the 18th Brumaire, rendered indispensable. The plan which he proposed to his great lieutenant was to assemble all his forces in the neighbourhood of Schaffhausen, cross the Rhine by four bridges near that town, move directly in an imposing mass on Ulm, and thus turn the left of the Imperialists, and take in rear all the Austrians placed between the Rhine and the defiles of the Black Forest. By this means he hoped that the army, in a week after the opening of the campaign, would be at Ulm, and such of the Imperialists as escaped would have no alternative but to throw themselves into Bohemia, leaving Vienna and the Hereditary States to their fate. That these brilliant anticipations were not chimerical, is proved by the result of the campaigns of 1805 and 1809; and so strongly was Napoleon impressed with their importance, that he at one time entertained the project of putting himself at the head of the army of the Danube, and directing the army of reserve to its support, which would have brought a force of a hundred and eighty thousand men to bear upon the Austrian line in Germany.

5. But Moreau would not submit to the indignity of acting as second in

command to his former rival ;* and the disposition of his troops was too republican, and their attachment to their general too strong, to render it prudent to run the risk of revolt in so powerful an army, even for the sake of the greatest external advantages. An angry discussion took place between the two generals, which terminated in the retention of the supreme command by Moreau, and the adoption of a modified plan for the campaign in Germany, in lieu of the brilliant but hazardous one projected by the First Consul. In consequence, Napoleon resolved to direct the army of reserve to Italy, and in person renew the struggle on the scene of his former triumphs on the plains of Piedmont. The First Consul had no alternative in this determination; the relinquishment of the command of the army of the Rhine to Moreau had become a matter of necessity. At that period the soldiers of that army were far from cordially supporting the government of the First Consul. Independent of the republican principles with which, in common with all the other French troops, they were more or less imbued, they were in a peculiar manner jealous of the audacious general who had placed himself at the head of affairs, and seized the sceptre which they thought would have been more worthily held by his less interested rival. Any attempt to displace Moreau from the command of this great army would probably have led to a collision which might have proved fatal to the infant authority of Napoleon.

6. Field-Marshal Kray had his headquarters at Donauschingen; but his chief magazines were in the rear of his army, at Stockach, Engen, Moeskirch, and Biberach. The right wing, twentysix thousand strong, under the command of Starray, rested on the Maine; its headquarters were at Heidelberg, and it guarded the line of the Rhine from Renchen to the Maine. The left, under the orders of the Prince of Reuss, * He said, "I have no notion of seeing a little Louis XIV. at the head of my army,

If the First Consul takes the command, I will

send in my resignation."-ST CYR, ii. 103,

Histoire Militaire.

was in the Tyrol; it consisted of twenty-six thousand men, besides seven thousand militia, and occupied the Rheinthal and the shores of the lake of Constance. The centre, forty-three thousand strong, under the command of Kray in person, was stationed behind the Black Forest in the environs of Villingen and Donauschingen; its advanced posts occupied all the passes of that woody range, and observed the course of the Rhine from the lake of Constance to the neighbourhood of Kehl; while fifteen thousand men, under Keinmayer, guarded the passes from Renchen to the Valley of Hell, and formed the link which connected the centre and right wing. Thus, though the Imperialists were nearly one hundred and ten thousand strong, their detachments were stationed at such a distance from each other as to be incapable of rendering any effectual aid in case of need; and were rather to be regarded as three separate armies, the largest of which could not bring above forty thousand men into the field at any one point.

7. The French army, at the opening of the campaign, was also divided into three corps. The right, thirty-two thousand strong, under Lecourbe, occupied the cantons of Switzerland from the St Gothard to Bâle, won from the Imperialists at the expense of so much blood in the preceding campaign; the. centre, under St Cyr, who had been transferred to that command from the army of Genoa, consisted of twentynine thousand men, and occupied the left bank of the Rhine, from New Brisach to Plobsheim; the left, under Sainte-Suzanne, twenty-one thousand strong, extended from Kehl to Haguenau.

Independent of these, Moreau himself was at the head of a reserve, consisting of twenty-eight thousand men, which was assembled in the neighbourhood of Bâle, and which, if added to either of the divisions of the army, would give it a decided preponderance over that of the enemy to which it was opposed. Thus Moreau could, by uniting the reserve and centre, bring nearly sixty thousand men to bear upon the Austrian force of forty

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