the amount of capital invested in mines was greatly increased,1 and this does not point to loss. Many people in Cornwall, who had started with very small capitals, had become extremely wealthy, and although there were many small adventurers in mines, yet the great proportion of property was in the hands of a few. It is significant that during the seven years ending December 31, 1798, there had been a net profit of £42,168.4 The increasing difficulties in obtaining copper from the mines in this country were sufficient to cause a large increase in price, but it was the consumers who suffered most as a consequence. If, therefore, the price of copper in England was high, it seemed likely that importation would be encouraged and so bring about a fall in price; it would be cheaper to bring copper from abroad than to work the poor mines in Cornwall. But this brings us to the second reason for the shortage of supply. (2) Up to 1797 comparatively large quantities of unmanufactured copper and ore were imported, but in the last few years of the century imports were greatly reduced, and in 1799 it was stated that Ireland was the only country which sent supplies to England. This falling off in the import trade was chiefly due to the unsettled state of Europe at the time. The high prices ruling abroad, together with the heavy import duties, were sufficient to prevent any foreign supply from coming to the relief of the consumers in this country. But while practically no importation was taking place, large quantities were being exported from England by the East India Company at prices lower than those obtaining in the home market," for the State placed no restraint on exportation. The brass and copper workers, therefore, were unanimous in their desire to prohibit the export trade and to permit importation free of duty.8 Boulton, for instance, who at this time required large supplies of copper for his mint at Soho, was in favour of the prohibition, but Williams, urging the point of view of smelters and manufacturers, 1 Ibid., p. 658. Ibid., p. 660. 3 Ibid., p. 658. • Ibid., p. Ibid., App. 37, p. 727. The difficulty of obtaining copper led Roe & Co. of Macclesfield to purchase and work mines in Wicklow. They complained that the heavy import duties prevented them importing ores of low quality (Journals of House of Commons, liv, p. 470). • Ibid., App. 32, p. 719. 663. Ibid., p. 659. Ibid., App. 14, 15, p. 707; Journals of House of Commons, liv, pp. 405, 479. Ibid., p. 663. was against the placing of any restriction whatsoever upon export.1 To have prohibited exportation would doubtless have eased prices considerably in this country. But whether the remission of the import duty would have had the desired effect depended, of course, on the supplies available from abroad. It was maintained by some that these would be extremely small, because the greatest part of the copper produced abroad was used in the brass and copper industries of Germany, Austria, Sweden, etc.; but others believed that, in spite of this, considerable supplies might be obtained from Sweden, Norway, Germany, Russia, Siberia, Hungary, Spain, Barbary, Trieste, Persia and South America. If the amount that might be imported were negligible, it would have little effect on price in this country, and it would therefore seem a matter of indifference whether duties were imposed or not. To advocate the retention of duties implied that considerable quantities might be imported; but the smelters and copper companies took up the curiously contradictory position that, while they wished to have the duties retained, they also declared that there were practically no supplies to import. (3) The stagnation in the brass and copper trades was further increased by the war with France, which, as we have seen, commenced in 1793. The Midlands, and Birmingham in particular, carried on a very large export trade in such articles as buckles, buttons, toys and brass foundry goods, and by 1799 this trade was estimated to have been reduced by half. This was partly accounted for by the war, and partly by the development of brass and copper manufactories abroad.3 Almost one-quarter of all the brass and copper articles produced in Birmingham was exported to France and Italy, but because of the war these markets had practically disappeared; and, in the second place, in some parts of the Emperor's dominions, where manufactories which rivalled those in Birmingham had been established, English goods were prohibited, while in Prussia heavy duties were imposed. A large part of the lost trade must be attributed, therefore, not to loss of connection because of the high price of copper, but to the situation in 1 Ibid., p. 668. • Ibid., p. 664. 8 • Ibid., p. 660. 4 Ibid., p. 663. Germany and, more particularly, to the interruption of trade with Spain, Italy and France. It is true, however, that from 1792 till the end of the century the demand for copper increased, owing to its demand for ship sheathing and for various war purposes; and the price consequently rose by leaps and bounds. It has been shown that this state of affairs was a real hardship to consumers of copper and brass, for the high prices they had to pay seriously hindered their trades and undoubtedly caused them to lose many important foreign markets. But the adventurers and smelters made increased profits, and it was the possibilities of the market that quickly brought their combination to an end in the summer of 1792, after which no further attempt was made by them to control the trade. In this chapter and the preceding one, we have seen that the formation of the Cornish Metal Company was merely an attempt on the part of the miners to break the power of the Associated Smelters, and so obtain control of the marketing side of their industry. But the Company, which was formed in 1785, had a very chequered career. The inherent defects of the combination, together with the lack of foresight and business enterprise shown by those in authority, very quickly brought it into disrepute. The capital of the concern was used merely as a fund to take ores off the hands of the mining companies, who, it will be remembered, were in a majority on the Board of the Metal Company. Thus output was encouraged, and it was only as the stocks of copper accumulated in the warehouses of the Company that serious attention was directed to controlling supply and marketing output. But the conflicting interests of the shareholders and the opposition of the mining and smelting companies which had remained outside the combine made the problem a very serious one; and in the end Williams of Anglesey was asked to dispose of the stocks of copper. Having thus obtained control of the Cornish Company, in 1790 he gained support for a plan of his own, which was to bring the whole copper trade of the country under his direction. The new combination was more of a smelters' combine than a miners' one, and so it met with opposition both from the people of Cornwall and from the brass and copper 1 Ibid., App. 16, p. 707, manufacturers of Birmingham and the Midlands. This combined opposition quickly brought to an end Williams' second effort to control the copper trade. In the closing years of the century the price of copper increased very rapidly, bringing a severe depression to the Midland trades. This state of affairs has been attributed to three factors: first, the exhaustion of mining in Cornwall and the consequent increased costs of production; second, the almost total cessation of imports of ore and copper, and the large exports of copper by the East India Company which took much-needed supplies off the home market; and third, the fall off in the export trade due to the unsettled state of Europe and the imposition of heavy tariffs levied by foreign countries. Although the century ended in the middle of a trade depression, the smelters and miners were not the main sufferers, for the war caused an increased demand for sheathing, bolts and various kinds of war munitions, while it practically wiped out the foreign markets for the produce of the brass and copper workers of Birmingham. Indeed, the almost complete control of the home market, and the profitable outlets opened up by the East India Company, created competition, and after 1792 we hear no further word of combination, either of smelters or miners. CHAPTER IX THE ASCENDANCY OF BIRMINGHAM In a previous chapter it has been shown that the brass and copper trades of Birmingham expanded very rapidly during the first half of the eighteenth century. The proximity of the town to the chief centres of brass production at Cheadle and Bristol gave it easy access to raw materials; and it had many other advantages for the prosecution of these two trades. But there were obstacles in the path of the progress of Birmingham which called for serious attention about the middle of the century; it lacked both transport facilities and natural sources of power. The prosperity of Birmingham, like that of other industrial towns far from the sea, has always been closely bound up with means of transport. The cost of marketing heavy iron commodities was probably a reason for its skilled artisans turning their attention to the production of articles which required much skill and labour; but, as these industries expanded in the town, the problem of obtaining raw materials and marketing the finished goods presented enormous difficulties. In 1726 Parliament appointed a committee to inquire into the condition of the Birmingham roads; and the evidence brought forward showed that they were in a ruinous condition, being almost impassable in some places because of the number of carriages, laden with iron and coal, which had been continually using them.1 By the middle of the century the condition of the roads was probably worse. The deep ruts, cut out by the wheels of waggons, made transportation almost impossible; for though packhorses were used as well, and on roads too bad for wagons, there were many things which they could not carry. Heavy goods used to be despatched to London once a week by the stage waggon, and the journey must have occupied 1 Journals of House of Commons, xx, pp. 746, 768; xxi, p. 88. |