CHAP. XI.

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Remarks on the Russian Campaign of 1812.-Unfounded Opinion that the Disasters of Bonaparte were owing either solely to the Opposition of the Russians, and the Rigour of the Climate, or solely to the Mistakes and Obstinacy of Bonaparte.--Both these Classes of Causes operated to his Discomfiture. They ought therefore to be considered conjointly.-View of the first Class of Causes dependent on Russia: first, the Constitution of the Russian Army; the Cossacks.-In the second place, the Character of the Russian Generals and Officers Bonaparte, by making War on the Commerce of Russia, made War against their Interests.—In the third place, the Plan of the Campaign adopted by the Russian Government. In the fourth place, the Character of the Russian Peasantry,-their Conduct contrasted with that of the German Peasantry, in the former French Wars. In the fifth place, the Character of the Emperor Alexander.-Lastly, the Nature of the Country and Climate. All these Causes strengthened by the Óbstinacy of Bonaparte.

FROM the consideration of the glorious and decisive events which occurred in the year 1812, we turn our attention to the still more glorious operations of the allies in Germany. Before however we proceed to detail these, it may be proper, as it certainly will be interesting and instructive, to examine briefly and rapidly the causes which led to the discomfiture of Bonaparte in his Russian Campaign of 1812. It scarcely ever has fallen to the lot of the historian or annalist to narrate such disasters and when we consider that these disasters befel a man who, from a low station in society, had raised himself to the very summit of power, to an extent of dominion and influence never before witnessed in Europe; that this man, for the purpose of a mad, bloody, and desperate ambition, had trampled on all

the laws and usages of justice and civilised society; and that he considered himself, and called upon the world to acknowledge and fear him, as absolutely beyond the reach of fate, as something more than mortal: when we moreover reflect on the peculiar interest which this country felt in all that befel him, since against this country was his most implacable and deadly hatred directed; and from that hatred, as we have observed on a former occasion, his ruin indirectly originated: when we take all these things into our account, we must acknowledge that we cannot examine too closely, or scrutinize too minutely, the causes of his failure in the Russian campaign.

It appears to us that these causes may be classed under two general heads: in the first place, those which proceeded from the nature of the country which he invaded, and the characteristic qualities of its inhabitants; and in the second place, those which originated from the peculiar character of the invader. Unless we take into our account the operation of both these classes of causes; and view them, not only as operating distinctly and separately, but also as acting together, and towards the accomplishment of the same effect, we cannot satisfactorily and philosophically explain the real cause of Bonaparte's disasters. We are well aware that many persons are disposed to attribute these disasters solely and exclusively to the policy of the allies, and to overlook, or consider as of no account or influence, the personal character of Bonaparte: but this view is extremely partial; and if examined closely, it will be found neither supported by facts, nor capable of explaining what has occurred. Others, on the con trary, ascribe all the disasters of Bonaparte to the madness of his ambition and obstinacy; and over look the circumstances which at first produced, in the Russian campaign, this mad obstinacy, and

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afterwards. overwhelmed him in ruin. .therefore, separate these two classes of causes, not for the purpose of ascribing to either of them the whole of the disasters which befel Bonaparte, but for the purpose of tracing their respective operation distinctly, and afterwards their conjoint operation.

In the first place, the constitution of the Russian army, and the character of the Russian soldiers, contributed in no small degree to the fate of Bonaparte. The Russians no doubt, when compared with most of the other nations of Europe, are barbarians; their notions and feelings are those of a half-civilized race: but to this fact, added to other peculiarities of their character, their fitness for opposing the French may be ascribed. They are, from their infancy, most devoutly attached to their emperor, and to their nobility. Philosophers may ridicule the idea, or disbelieve the assertion, that the common people of Russia are attached to those who act towards them, in too many instances, as tyrants. But history is conversant with facts, not with theories and speculations; and the fact is, that the Russian common people, even before they enter the army, are most devoutly attached to their emperor and nobility. This attachment becomes still more strong and influencing when they enter the army:-they then regard themselves, in a more special manner, as entirely at the service of their sovereign; and look upon it as the highest honour which can befal them, to suffer any privation or misery, or even death itself, at his command, and for his sake. Military discipline, with the troops of most other nations, is a habit acquired late in life-irksome, and abhorrent to former habits, and broken through whenever it can be done with safety. But it is far otherwise with the Russian soldier: he knows no habits, he has no feeling or sentiment, incompatible with the strictest military discipline: on the contrary, all his

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other habits, feelings and sentiments, work to the accomplishment of the same end: all serve and contribute to render him an excellent soldier, so far as strictness of discipline is concerned. Knowing no disgrace so great as disobedience to the orders of his officers, and especially to the commands or even wishes of his sovereign, he never stirs from his post till he is expressly directed so to do: the idea of flight never enters his mind. But his steadiness is not merely passive; endowed with great bodily strength, and with a robustness of constitution superior to every fatigue or privation, he wearies out his more skilful and experienced opponent, by whom he may be out-manoeuvred or slain, but cannot be forced to fly,

Hence Bonaparte never met with more obstinate resistance than he did from the Russians at the battle of Eylau: his troops were weary with slaughter, but still they could not defeat the Russians; and had the French emperor been a man who could be taught mortifying or disagreeable truths by experi ence, after his first campaign against the Russians, on the borders of their own country, he never would have attempted to conquer them, in the very heart of their vast empire, and in the midst of a Russian winter.

It might be supposed, that, as the Russian soldiers are so stubborn in their military steadiness and discipline, they would be destitute of that activity and enthusiasm which are absolutely essential to the suc cess of offensive warfare. But this is far from being the case; the very weakness of their character; the absolute and blind devotion to their emperor; hold that their priests have over their feelings and their consciences, contribute to infuse into them a large portion of enthusiasm. And this enthusiasm was heightened, or rather maddened into hatred, when they met the French as the invaders of the

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soil of their beloved country; as the destroyers of their holy cities; as the sacrilegious overthrowers of the objects of their worship.

Hitherto we have considered the Russian armies as composed solely of one class of men; but in contemplating them as having contributed to the defeat and overthrow of Bonaparte, we must not forget the Cossacks, who formed a singular and separate portion of that army. When we reflect on what the French emperor had achieved at the head of his troops; on the character and fame of those troops; soldiers who had scattered, like the dust before them, the warriors of Prussia and Austria, at the battles of Jena and Ulm; we are astonished that they, as well as their emperor, should have trembled at the approach or the very name of a Cossack. But for the species of warfare for which they were called from the banks of the Don and the Wolga, no troops could have been so well qualified: constantly on horseback; extremely rapid in their movements; superior to fatigue, or the influence of climate or hunger, they hang on the skirts of a retreating army: it is absolutely impossible to guard against their attacks, for it is impossible to conjecture on which side they will be made. Even in the stillness and repose of the night, they are active and hostile. Against such soldiers as the French while marching in a compact body, in a country possessed of good roads, they would have been utterly impotent; but against the French divested of their confidence in their leader, worn down with fatigue, cold, and hunger, wandering they scarcely knew whither, in the midst of the rigours of a Russian winter, with scarcely bodily strength sufficient to fire a musket or wield a sabre, the Cossacks were almost omnipotent.

In the second place, the character of the Russian generals contributed not a little to the defeat Bonaparte: his avowed object, in his invasion of Russia,