pursuit of Bragration; it was necessary for the latter to cross the Dnieper, and Davoust, aware of this, moved on to Mohilow, near the source of that river: here he was surprised by the Russian general; the battle was extremely obstinate and bloody; it lasted upwards of nine hours, and at the conclusion of the battle Bragration, so far from being worsted, was enabled to pursue his route unmolested to Smolensk. In the course of the Russian campaign there occurred several instances besides this one of Davoust, in which the most experienced and active of the French generals were surprised; and this circumstance we cannot help thinking in a great measure attributable to the character of the Russian peasantry in every other country in which the French had fought, the inhabitants, either intimidated or seduced by them, were in the regular and constant habit of bringing them accurate and early information respecting the movements and operations of the hostile army; whereas in Russia, neither threats or promises could induce a single peasant to be in any degree or respect instrumental in assisting the French army; and if the French sent out small parties to reconnoitre they were almost certain of being either cut off by the armed peasantry, or of being misled and misinformed by them, if they were too weak to attack them; therefore, as well as in several others already noticed, Bonaparte, early in the campaign, experienced the difference in fighting in Russia and in the other countries which he had overrun and conquered; and hence there is in all his bulletins such a peevish tone of reproach against his generals, either for want of caution and information, or not for pursuing the enemy with sufficient activity and vigour. We have already stated, that when the

main Russian army retired on Witepsk, one of the corps took a northern route for the protection of Petersburgh. This corps was under the command of Wittgenstein; against him Oudinot was sent by Bonaparte. The plan of the French general was to cross the Dwina, to come round upon Riga, and thus cut off the communication with Petersburgh. For this purpose he actually crossed the river towards the end of July, and on the 30th and 31st a very severe action was fought, the result of which was that Oudinot was compelled to recross the Dwina, with the loss of 3,000 prisoners and some cannon. But the incidental and ultimate consequences of this engagement were far. more important. Petersburgh was rendered secure, the communication between it and the main Russian army was established; and the operations of the French against Riga were considerably retarded. Against this latter place Macdonald, who commanded the Russians in the service of Bonaparte, had been sent; and the intention of Bonaparte seems to have been, if he could have got possession of Riga, that Macdonald should have marched forward and threatened Petersburgh.This part of Bonaparte's plan was evidently founded on the idea that the main Russian army would retreat on Petersburgh, and consequently that, by following it he would be able before he reached that city to have formed a junction with Macdonald. This plan, however, was rendered abortive by the route which the main Russian army pursu ed in their retreat, and by the circumstance that Macdonald could make no impression on Riga. The defence of this place was in some measure assisted by a British naval force. The British cabinet had certainly not urged or encouraged Russia to commence hostilities; but as soon as

hostilities were determined on, Russia proposed terms of accommodation with Great Britain which were immediately acceded to, and every promise of assistance given. The Russian cabinet, however, declined any assistance, except such as might be procured by inciting the Crown Prince of Sweden to join in the war against France. For this purpose a negociation was entered into with him. The prospect of regaining Swedish Pomerania was held out to him, and it was fixed that he should land an army there, or still further north, in order to act in the rear of Bonaparte; but, after much delay, preparation, and change of plan, the Crown Prince suffered the campaign to close without crossing the Baltic. The Russians did not make a stand at Witepsk, but, as soon as the enemy approached, they retired on Smolensk. In the beginning of August the following were the positions of the French army :

Head quarters at Witepsk, with four bridges on the Dwina; the fourth corps at Samai, occupying Veluj, Porietche, and Ousirath.

The King of Naples at Roudence with the three first corps of cavalry.

The first corps, commanded by marshal the Prince of Eckmuhl, at the mouth of the Beressina, on the Borysthenes, with two bridges over this last mentioned river, and one bridge upon the Beressina, with double tetes-de-pont.

The third corps, commanded by marshal the Duke of Elchingen, at Etozna.

The eighth corps, commanded by the Duke of Abrantes, at Orcha, with two bridges and tete-depont upon the Borysthenes.

The fifth corps, commanded by Prince Poniatowski, at Mohilow, with two bridges and tete-depont upon the Borysthenes.

F

The second corps, commanded by marshal the Duke of Reggio, upon the Drissa, advanced before Polotsk, upon the road to Sebri.

The Prince de Schwartzenberg with his corps at Slonim.

The seventh corps upon Razana.

The fourth corps of cavalry, with a division of infantry, commanded by General Count Maubourg, before Brobunsk and Mazier.

The tenth corps, commanded by the Duke of Tarentum, before Dunaberg and Riga.

The ninth corps, commanded by the Duke of Belluno, at Tilsit.

The eleventh corps, commanded by the Duke of Castiglione at Stettin.

It appears from this statement how widely dispersed the different divisions of the French army were; in fact the nature of the country, and the mode of warfare followed by the Russians were such, that in the campaign Bonaparte could not pursue his usual plan: he could not advance in one solid mass, and bear down all before him: he was, even before he reached Witepsk, considerably annoyed, harrassed, and impeded by the Cossacks, a species of soldiery calculated only for such a country and climate as that of Russia, and which can act with the greatest advantage and success, where more regular forces are comparatively useless, and when an enemy is least able to resist them they were under the command of their hetman, the celebrated Platoff, who had signalized himself in the last war with France.

The position of two of the corps of the French army, as given in the above statement, may excite surprise; and the ninth, under the command

*We shall in another chapter, for the information of our readers, give an account of the Cossacks.

of the Duke of Belluno, at Tilsit, and the eleventh, under the command of the Duke of Castiglione, at Stettin. It is evident, from these corps being stationed so far in the rear of the main army, and not in the line of their retreat, if they should be compelled to retreat, nor in such positions that would enable them to keep open the communica tion with the supplies that were constantly coming from Germany, that Bonaparte was apprehensive that Bernadotte, at the head of a Swedish army, would land in his rear. On no other supposition can we account for these corps being left in a great measure idle and useless, at a time when Bonaparte must have perceived that he would have occasion for all his troops on the more immediate scene of action. During the whole of his advance to Witepsk he had been unable to compel the Russians to hazard a general engagement: in all the partial rencontres where he himself was engaged, he had indeed succeeded so far as to drive them from their frontiers, and thus to occupy the whole of Russian Poland and Lithuania; but the corps under the command of his generals were by no means successful. We have already mentioned the defeat of Oudinot by Wittgenstein; and though the latter, by pursuing his adversary too far, and in too unguarded a manner, in his turn received a check, yet it was evident both from the strength of Wittgenstein's army, and from the talents and activity of the generals, Oudinot had no chance of cutting off the communication with Petersburgh, nor of opening such a communication with Riga as would be of any advantage to Macdonald. At Kobrin, Bonaparte suffered a very severe loss: the Saxon troops, 3,000 in number, were surrounded and entirely captured there by general Tormesow. In the