to death there can be little doubt; they acted in conformity to the orders of the governor, of that man whom they were bound and authorised to obey so long as he kept possession of the city; and the French do not pretend that it was set on fire after they obtained possession of it. Perhaps there is not to be found in the annals of mankind any event so awfully grand and impressive as the conflagration of Moscow; it was a heroic deed, but of such a quality and nature as could only have been achieved by the heroism of a semi-barbarous race Nations accustomed to the comforts, the ease and refinements of civilized life, would not have submitted to such a sacrifice, much less would they have been the willing instruments and objects of it. That it was an act perfectly justifiable cannot be doubted. If it is the first duty of a government to provide for the well-being of its subjects, that duty must lead it to protect them from foreign invasion and conquest. Wretchedness undoubtedly followed the burning of Mos cow, but that was trifling in degree, local in extent, and temporary in duration, compared with the dreadful consequences which must have resulted from the unchecked success of the French, To say that the inhabitants of Moscow were unwilling to second the intentions of the Russian government is to libel them, and to betray at the same time the most profound ignorance of the national character; besides, it can hardly be supposed that the city could have been so completely destroyed, unless the inhabitants had at least consented, if not administered, to its destruction; for they must have known from the previous measures adopted by the governor, that it was his intention to set it on fire, if the French advanced to it. But though the right of the Russians to destroy Mos

cow appears to us indisputable, and founded on the most sacred principles of patriotism, yet the policy of the measure admits of some rational difference of opinion. Those who contend that on the score of policy Moscow ought not to have been set on fire, argued in this manner: if Bonaparte had found it entire, he might have been induced to prolong his stay in it, and thus his retreat would either have been absolutely impracticable, or if practicable, being conducted in the very middle of winter, must have proved much more disastrous than it actually did. But it is hardly to be supposed that Bonaparte, even if he had found Moscow entire, would have attempted to winter in it he probably never had such a project in view. Tho' he announced it to his soldiers to encourage them before the battle of Borodino; yet he hoped, by gaining possession of Moscow, to intimidate Alexander, and thus to bring about a peace. The destruction of the city blasted these hopes; but at the same time it may be supposed that it induced him to stay in it longer than if it had not been destroyed in the latter case, as in the former, he must have been convinced, that as there was no chance of moving the emperor Alexander, and no possibility of remaining with his army, surrounded by a Russian winter and Russian forces, it would be proper to prepare for his retreat; but if the city had not been destroyed, his army would have been refreshed, and provisions secured in a much shorter time than could posssibly be the case in the midst of the ruins of Moscow. On the whole, therefore, the destruction of Moscow appears to us to have been a politic, as it was a perfectly justifiable mea

sure.

Of the situation of the French army in Moscow, where they expected to enjoy repose and plenty,

some idea may be formed from the following considerations for the mere purpose of shelter, pro-. bably enough of the city had escaped destruction; but the army must have been collected so closely together as not to have been capable of defence or resistance but the difficulty of subsistence was insurmountable. Moscow itself is situated in a province not remarkable for its fertility; its supplies are drawn principally from the provinces of Tula and Kalouga: here Kutusoff had taken up his position. Bonaparte asserted in one of his bulletins, that every house in Moscow was provided with necessaries of every description for eight months; but this assertion, like those he made respecting the climate of Russia, was totally unfounded, and calculated and intended to deceive the people of France. The inhabitants of Moscow were not accustomed to lay in their stock of provisions till about the middle of October, just before the snow begins to fall; then, but not before, their winter supplies are collected at all other seasons of the year the general stock of provisions was calculated only for a short period of consumption. Bonaparte, in the same bulletin, asserted that large supplies of wine and brandy were found in the cellars; these could not be large, since these liquors are entirely confined to the highest classes in Russia. same causes which prevented him from finding any large stock of provisions in Moscow, threatened to render his retreat difficult and disastrous in the highest degree: about the end of October, immediately after the laying in of the supplies for the winter, there is a cessation of all intercourse between Moscow and the smaller towns, villages, and estates; and this cessation continues during the whole winter. But Moscow was not only in a great measure destitute of provision when Bona

The

parte entered it, but its local situation rendered it extremely unhealthy, especially to an army not accustomed to the climate, and already worn down by fatigue. There are three rivers which surround and flow through the city; and the fogs and exhalations from them, just before the fall of snow commences, are extremely injurious to the health even of the inhabitants, who are seasoned to the climate. As Bonaparte had been disappointed in his hopes of inducing the peasantry to join him, so was he also disappointed in the expectation which he had formed respecting the old Russian nobility who constantly resided at Moscow: they chiefly consisted of those whose ancestors had objected to the removal of the seat of government to Petersburgh: their descendants nourished the same prejudice, and kept aloof, in a sullen and discontented mood, from the new noblesse of the emperor in the new capital, the rapid growth of which they regarded with a jealous eye; but though they disliked the proceedings of the court, they were yet truly Russians in heart and sentiment: indeed, they had about them more nationality than the other classes of the Russian nobility, and consequently hated. the French, and utterly disregarded the promises of Bonaparte. From all this, it is apparent that the situation of the French army in Moscow was most critical, even if they had not been surrounded by numerous armies. Winter was fast approaching; the troops were already exhausted with fatigue; in Moscow they could not remain till spring opened the communication with the southern province; and if they retreated, how were they to obtain provisions, or endure a march of 500 or 600 miles, amidst the severe winter, the deep snows, and the almost hidden and impassable roads of Russia? The Russian generals, in the mean time,

H

were not idle their object was to force Bonaparte from Moscow, by cutting off his supplies there; and when they had compelled him to retreat, to harass him continually for this purpose, a great number of Cossacks, besides those which had been already employed, were collected: now was the season and the opportunity of their utility and triumph. Kutusoff, as has been already mentioned, took up a position to the south of Moscow, defending the fertile provinces from the foraging parties of the enemy. On the other side of the city Winzingerode was posted with a large body of troops, in order to exclude the French from the Petersburgh road and the northern provinces. Wittgenstein defended the line of the Dwina, where he carried on an unremitted and generally a successful contest with Oudinot; but as soon as he learnt that the French were in Moscow, having been reinforced by 18,000 men from Finland, he began a movement upon that city, in the line which it would be necessary for Bonaparte to follow in his retreat. As it was of the utmost consequence to keep open this line, St. Cyr-endeavored to defend the important post of Polotsk against Wittgenstein; but he was completely routed, and driven beyond the Dwina: after this success, the Russian general continued his march on Witepsk, and thus cut off the communication between the main French army and the west of Europe. Bonaparte had hitherto by his intrigues prevented peace from being concluded between Russia and Turkey; but now, as it was of the utmost consequence for the former power to bring up all her forces, she agreed to give Turkey such favorable terms, that peace was agreed upon. In consequence of this event, the army which had been employed on the Turkish frontiers immediately began its march through the south of