Poland; and as it advanced, it united with the corps which had been stationed iu Volhynia, forming altogether nearly 80,000 men. Their first object, after they were rendered so powerful by this union, was to attack the Austrian auxiliary army, under the prince of Schwartzenberg: the Austrian government, though obliged by the treaty which it concluded with Bonaparte, to furnish 30,000 men, had not employed them in very active warfare; their sole object was to keep up the communication between the main French army and this part of Poland: this they effected till they were attacked by the Volhynian army, when they were compelled to cross the Niemen and separate themselves from the main body. As soon as the Volhynian army had driven the Austrians across this river, it formed a junction with the force under Wittgenstein, on the high road leading to Moscow. Bonaparte was now sensible of the dreadful error he had committed: unless he actually expected to dictate terms of peace at Moscow, it was the extreme of madness to have proceeded thither at the beginning of a Russian winter: and if he did expect either to dictate terms of peace, or to have his own offers accepted, he must have been ignorant of the determined hatred which all ranks in Russia bore towards him. The apology he offers in his bulletins, for his military career in Russia, is a paltry one: according to him, the Russian winter this year commenced earlier than usual; as if the circumstance of the frost setting in a very few days sooner or later, could have saved or destroyed his army! What must be the military prudence of that man, who calculates for the safety of his army, and the success of his measures on so uncertain a thing as climate! The fact is, Bonaparte in all his former campaigns had been indebted for

his success to the boldness of his advances into the very heart of the enemy's country: that this boldness did not assume the character, deserve the name, and produce the consequences of rashness, was less owing to his own foresight and circumspection, than to the pusillanimity, treachery, and want of talents of his opponents: without adverting to the different circumstances in which he was placed in Russia, from a difference of climate, and national character, he followed his usual plan, thus proving that he was defective in one great feature of a man of abilities, the adaptation of general principles and plans to particular circumstances. Perceiving that tho' he was in the heart of the Russian empire, and amidst the ruins of its ancient capital, no terms of peace were proposed, and that the Russians were gathering round him on all sides, he sent Lauriston to Kutusoff, to propose an accommodation, or at least an armistice. Kutusoff received the French negociator in the midst of his generals, and replied to him with the utmost firmness he told him that he was not authorised to receive any proposals either for peace or an armistice; that he would not send to Alexander, nor even receive the letter which Bonaparte had sent by Lauriston; and that with respect to an armistice, in particular, the Russian army had no occasion for it, and they were in possession of too many advantages to throw them away by accepting it. Lauriston perceiving that Kutusoff was absolutely determined to listen to no terms of accommodation, began to complain of the barbarous manner in which the war was conducted: to this Kutusoff, in language which ought to be addressed to all invaders that the French had introduced the barbarities of which they complained; they had commenced hostilities without reason; had invaded

Russia, which by nature was placed beyond the power of injuring them, and it might have been thought beyond the reach of their ambition; they had inflicted as much misery on its inhabitants as they could, and now, when vengeance and retaliation were at hand, they wished for peace: peace could not be talked of till the French were beyond the Vistula Bonaparte had nothing to do but get out of Moscow how he could, since he came thither without being invited: the Russians, he might depend upon it, would do their duty; and their duty to their sovereign, their country, their murdered or banished and wandering wives and children, demanded that they should make their invaders as much misery as possible; Bonaparte had proclaimed the campaign terminated at Moscow, but with the Russians it was only commencing."

About the same time Murat complained to general Miloradiovitch of the excesses committed by the Cossacks: it is evident, though the conference was begun on his part, that Murat, if he had found encouragement, would have changed the subject to peace; but he met with no encouragement: the Russian general told him that the Cossacks acted according to orders, when they fired on the French foraging parties; and when Murat complained that the flags of truce were also fired upon, the Russian replied, "We want not to hear of parlies; we want to fight, not to negociate; take your measures accordingly." Perceiving that there was no chance of peace, and that the Russians were fully sensible of the reduced strength and miserable state of the French army, and had formed their plans in such a manner as to take the utmost advantage of their own good fortune, Bonaparte, after remaining upwards of a month in Moscow, prepared for his retreat.