The prerogatives of the Crown were mentioned by two honourable Baronets, as not a little affected by the conduct of the House; and one of them had exprefsly declared, that fo far as it interfered with that of the Crown chufing its own Minifters, he could not go with it. He was forry it had fo happened during this important debate, that the diftinction which the Conftitution had eftablished between a free and an absolute monarchy, had required fo often to be ftated. He declared, that the moft confummate ruin would be the inevitable and immediate confequence of carrying any of thofe prerogatives which diftinguifhed the refpective eftates of the Conftitution to excefs. Were this Houfe on all occafions to be conftantly overawed by prerogative? Were the Royal powers which the Conftitution vested in the Crown intended to have fuch an operation? No man, he trufted, would hold fuch opinions; no man dared to hold fuch language in a free Parliament. Many were the prerogatives of the Commons; but who would affirm that these were intended to act in a manner oppofite to, or inconfiftent with the public welfare? It was precifely the fame cafe in both. His Majefty had undoubtedly the power of chufing his own Minifters, and the House of Commons of affigning the fupplies. But were the one to take into his fervice any men, or fet of men, moft defirable to the Royal inclination, without any regard to how fuch an appointment might operate on the public, might not the House, with the fame propriety, withhold the purse of the people? Both extreines ought to be avoided, because equally injurious to public welfare and that Conftitution which depends on the tendency of all its feperate and combined virtues to this one great and fubftantial object. This he ftated only to fhew how carefully the feveral powers of the Conftitution were guarded against that pronenefs to abuse or proftitution which ftill adhered to all executive governments; and we were undoubtedly taught by it this capital leffon, that the Crown was endowed with no faculty whatever of a private nature; that all its functions were inftituted for public benefit; and that whenever they were otherwise employed, the Conftitution and the country were effentially affected. But why had this House fo much intereft in the choice of Minifters ? And why were all the operations of the Conftitution endowed with this public tendency? The reafon, F 2 which which to his mind was perfectly fatisfactory, was, that as the business of the public were only fo many actions of confidence and truft, the Minifter was confequently under the neceffity of poffeffing their good opinion in a very eminent degree, in order to be qualified for guiding an active and vigorous Government. In voting for the army extraordinaries, in voting efpecially for the navy, and in voting for a variety of other things, he confidered the Houfe as voting literally, and in every fenfe of the word, fo much credit. How then was the Minifter, who oppofed a majority of the Houfe, to poffefs this influence? How could he command these things, which muft, however, be done, and without which there could be no Government, no Conftitution, not even the veftiges of what we had always been, a people not lefs illuftrious for our liberty than for our greatnefs? While, therefore, the duty of a Minifter confifted in coalefcing with a majority in Parliament, and in bowing to their decifion, it was madnefs to think of exifting a moment in fuch a capacity without that neceffary and conftitutional fupport. It was here they were to look for a fanction to all their meafures, where they might expect an affiftance equal to their exigence and principle, and where they would always find an afylum from those who difliked and wifhed to destroy them. This would give them dignity and weight, and fecond all their exertions. But without this, no fort of influence, whether perfonal or relative, would do them any credit, or bring them any folid fanction. His worthy colleague had referred to the people; and another gentleman (Commodore Johnftone) had ftated it as hard, that for the fake of mere punctilio, the Houfe fhould be obliged to addrefs the Throne, or his Majefty, to change his Ministers, or the people to difplace one who poffeffed their confidence. He thought it was but fair that the matter fhould be ftated fairly to the Houfe. It was a good argument to fay the people of England were not reprefented fufficiently, when that was the fubject before the House, as it then had its natural influence, and it anfwered the purpofe for which it was intended. It was an unfair, and not a true mode of reasoning, to say that this House was not a full reprefentation of the people, therefore its authority was of no weight in the Constitution. Did not this give the Crown fuch a manifeft advantage in the Conftitution as put it in immi nent nent danger? Might he not fay, fince by your own confeffion, the people are not reprefented, the House of Commons muft be infignificant and ufelefs? The bufinefs of the country can better, more expeditiously, and with greater unanimity, be carried on without it. In that cafe, where were the people of this country to look for relief or find protection? Not certainly in the House of Lords. For however that part of the Legislature operated, no man would fay it ever could be of any confequence as one of the great barriers of freedom. The only conftitutional afylum of genuine liberty, he knew, even in this land of liberty, was the House of Commons, where the people of England affembled by their delegates and claimed an independence and a weight in the government, which they did in no other kingdom in the world. He wished gentlemen, therefore, would beware of extending their wishes for a reform of their reprefentation any farther than was juft. That the House was, in its prefent conftitution, but an imperfect reprefentation of the Commons of England, no man was more ready to own, and no man would go farther lengths than, he would in accomplishing a reform in that very material particular. But it was improperly applied to the prefent question; for it went to annihilate that fyftem of reprefentation which it would be dangerous to do before there was a better in its room. The honourable Baronet too had appealed, for the fenfe of the people, to the variety of addreffes which were manufacturing, probably for the purpofe of flattering the present Adminiftration. Thefe at leaft were conjured up in fuch a manner, made their appearance in fuch a questionable shape, and owed their existence to fuch means, that, in his opinion, they might well damn a very strong, but could never prove any very folid fupport to a weak and tottering Adminiftration. He could only speak of thofe places of the country he knew; and many of these were not certainly the leaft refpectable in the kingdom. But in these all was hitherto fullen filence. No one more patriotic than others had yet, in a variety of the moft capital counties in the kingdom, come forward, and urged this moft acceptable measure. In Middlefex his very worthy colleague would own there did not feem any very preffing and active propenfity for a measure thus courtly and defirable. The artifices used so near at hand were no inexpreffive fpecimens of those which, being at a greater diftance from the fcene of ac tion, tion, could be the more perfectly accomplished, without that ridicule and contempt which were the certain concomitants of detection. He had alfo heard of an addrefs in the city of Weftminfter, which undoubtedly was one of the most curious and fingular that ever was carried any where, or by any individuals, of any defcription. This would, to be fure, flourish, as well as another of the fame fort, in a Gazette; but hẻ believed his own colleague, fond as he feemed to be of such a mode of collecting the opinion of the people, would not like to join the party who fhould prefent fuch an addrefs at St. James's. He, for his own part, was aftonifhed that any Ministry or party could be fo blind, fo proud to their popularity, fo eager to retain their fituation, or fo folicitous for a confidence they had forfeited, as to think that the good fenfe of the people of England were to be thus abused. To imagine that practices of this defcription would conciliate the good opinion of the public, was in fact treating them with indignity and infult. A device fo fhallow and barefaced was enough to ruin the best cause; and were it even to be adopted by the best men, would also ruin them; and he trusted the people of this country would not rafhly take the opinion of it from a medium fo groffly and palpably partial. Indeed there was at prefent no other legal way of learning what the general voice was but the fenfe of the Houfe; and by that, till another, a better, and a more decifive one took place, they were bound by the conftitution, ftrictly, firmly, literally, and uniformly to abide. Here then was the great obstacle to that defirable union which so respectable a body of individuals in that house had fo much at heart. The right honourable gentleman, for no reafon he has deigned to give, will confent to refign a fituation, which it were treachery to the Houfe, to the public, to the Conftitution, to admit. The refolutions of the House were opposed to him as the Minister of the Crown. Whether therefore are thefe to be fupported in oppofition to the Minifter, or the Minister in oppofition to these? Would fuch a competition bear a queftion in this House? He does hold his head high enough, but the dignity of the House muft not yield to him, nor to any individual whatever. What reafons has he once condefcended to produce for his ftrange, unprecedented conduct? Can he imagine this Houfe are to credit his bare affertions, in flat oppofition to the most decifive circumftances? Might it not be expec ted ted that any one in fuch a fituation would be glad to afford the House every fatisfaction in their power? Has he in any cafe whatever fignified the leaft inclination of this kind? And what construction lefs than a direct infult to the dignity of Parliament, not to mention the feelings of individuals, can fuch a demeanour bear? But the honourable gentleman, with the most provident attention to thofe affairs which his peculiar obftinacy fo effentially mars and deranges, muft fee the probability of a firm and efficient Adminiftration before he gave way to the wishes of the people. This very odd kind of a reafon was easily accounted for from his official relation to the learned gentleman (Mr. Dundas) who fits with him on the fame bench. He, for one, would not eafily forget the language of that learned gentleman on an occafion fimilar to the prefent in one fenfe, though extremely diffimilar in another. When his noble friend in the blue ribband had been urged to retire from office, the learned gentleman, who will always refift fuch arguments against his own party with all his ability, was anxious to know among the candidates then for office, who were moft qualified to fucceed; and this he urged as a reafon for the former Ministry keep- ́ ing their fituations, that those who had, as he thought, an eye to their places, were not in unifon among themselves. But how did the right honourable gentleman turn that argument? Why, faid he, are thofe on this fide of the. House to be catechifed, because you on that are inadequate to your fituation? An anfwer which, if good then, muft be good ftill. Then, with what pertinence or propriety could this be affigned as the ground on which the Minifter keeps his place, fince it might have been much more appo fitely urged when he uffumed it? Thofe whom he fucceeded made use of no fuch language. They knew their duty was obedience, and they fubmitted. But furely if there can be any force in the reafoning, it was then much ftronger than now. What probability had the right honourable gentleman to erect a folid and permanent Miniftry against thofe who poffeffed a majority of this House, of fo decided and complete a kind as has hardly been exemplified in our times? He would not therefore fay how far the precedent might go. He would not use the indecent language of calling any individual in that House a dictator. He trusted Par liament would ever prove equal to its own protection, efpecially 2 |