without which the admission is not complete, the contents of the paper ought to be shewn, before the statement can be used as evidence against the party. (1) And if part of a conversation is used as evidence by way of admission, the party, against whom it is used, is entitled to have the whole conversation repeated. (2) Where commissioners in bankruptcy send for a party, and compel him to produce documents and answer questions, secondary evidence cannot be given of the documents without proof of the examination which accompanied their production. (3) It is proposed to consider whether any limits have been imposed on the reception of hearsay evidence of a party in his own favor, upon the ground of it's accompanying an admission. In the Queen's case, the Judges appear to have considered, that there was no other limit to the admissibility of the whole of the statements containing an admission, than that of relevancy to the suit. Lord Tenterden, in delivering the opinion of the Judges, says, "if a counsel chooses to ask a witness as to any thing which may have been said by an adverse party, the counsel for that party has a right to lay before the Court (1) See Jacob v. Lindsay, 1 East, 462. Smith v. Young, 1 Campb. 439. Lord Barrymore v. Taylor, 1 Esp. 325. Collet v. Lord Keith, 4 Esp. 212. Randle v. Blackburn, 5 Taunt. 245. Boardman v. Jackson, 2 Ball & Bea. 386. Falconer v. Hanson, 1 Campb. 171, where a log-book was referred to in a deposition. Dagleish v. Dodd, 5 C. & P. 238, where a letter, written by the defendant, was put in, and it was held, that the defendant had a right to have read what was written on the back by the plaintiff. But where a plaintiff put in evidence the copy of a writ, it was held that the defendant had no right to have the sheriff's return read, which formed no part of the document in evidence. Adey v. Bridges, 2 St. 189. Johnson v. Gilson, 4 Esp. 21, where a letter produced refers to other letters; secus, if the letter merely states that others are enclosed under it's cover. Wheeler v. Atkins, 5 Esp. 246, interrogatory referring to a letter. So that, if the interrogating party refuse to produce the letter, he must abandon the whole of the interrogatories. 23. (2) Smith v. Blandy, R. & M. 257. Smith v. Young, 1 Campb. 439. Green v. Dunn, 3 Campb. 215. Anon. 12 Vin. Ab. Ev. A. b. Remmie v. Hall, Mann. Ind. 2d edit. 376. Cray v. Halls, R. & M. 258. Thompson v. Austen, 2 D. & R. 361. Fletcher v. Froggat, 2 C. & P. 569. R. v. Jones, 2 C. & P. 630. 2 Ventr. 171. Com. Dig. Ev. B. 5. Yates v. Carnsew, 3 C. & P. 99, where a bankrupt was entitled to have his examination read in conjunction with extracts from his books. (3) Holland v. Reeves, 7 C. & P. 38. The paper, which was the machine copy of a letter, was not annexed to the examination. the whole which was said by his client in the same conversation, not only so much as may explain or qualify the matter intrcduced upon the previous examination, but even matter not properly connected with the part introduced upon the previous examination, provided only that it relate to the subject matter of the suit: because it would not be just to take part of a conversation as evidence against a party, without giving to the party, at the same time, the benefit of the entire residue of what he said on the same occasion." (1) But it has been held, that although a defendant is entitled to have the whole of a particular entry in a book read, where a part of it is used against him, yet he cannot insist upon reading distinct entries in different parts of the books. (2) And letters written by a party are evidence against him without producing those to which such letters are answers. (3) The examination of a party, signed by him before commissioners of bankrupt, is evidence against him, though part only of his deposition was noted down. (4) And testimony given in Court, admitting a particular fact, may be used as an admission, though the person examined was prevented from entering into an explanation of the circumstances under which the fact took place, because it was irrelevant to the matter in issue upon the former occasion. (5) (1) Justice does not seem to require, that a declaration of a party in his own favor should be received in evidence, merely because it occurred in the course of a conversation, in some part of which he made an admission against himself. But it is, probably, more convenient in practice to allow of the whole conversation being given in evidence. It was held, upon the same occasion, that when the conversation between a witness and a third person is given in evidence with a view to affect the credit of the witness, it would be irrelevant and incompetent to inquire into parts of the conversation not necessary for explaining the meaning of the words and declarations adduced to discredit the witness. 2 Br. & Bing. 298. (2) Catt v. Howard, 3 St. Ca. 6, where it was said to be the constant practice in quo warrantos. See Whareham v. Routledge, 5 Esp. 235. Remmie v. Hall, Mann. Index, 376. If one party gives notice to another to produce his books, and inspects them, it seems to have been considered that this makes them evidence for the other side. By Lord Ellenborough, in Whareham v. Routledge, 5 Esp. 235. Lord Kenyon appears to have held differently. Sayer v. Kitchen, 1 Esp. 209. (3) Lord Barrymore v. Taylor, 1 Esp. 326. (4) Milward v. Forbes, 4 Esp. 172. (5) Collet v. Lord Keith, 4 Esp. 212. It would seem, that the part of a statement which is let in by the party producing it unfavorable to his own case, is not to be con When an answer or depositions in Chancery are offered in evidence, as to the admissions of a party upon oath, or for the purpose of contradicting a witness, it appears not to be necessary to produce any of the other proceedings, as the bill, answer, or decree, for the purpose of elucidating the admission. (1) But, where a bill of discovery had been filed, upon which there had been a decree and order for bringing into Court certain letters, it was held, that these letters could not be read in an action at law between the parties to the Chancery suit, without first putting in the bill and answer; (2) for, it was said, the answer might contain such a contradiction or explanation of parts of the letters, as might wholly neutralize their effect. In the case of Long v. Champion, (3) on a trial of an action at law, a copy of a letter written by the plaintiff's agent, and referred to by the plaintiff in his answer to a bill in Chancery, sidered as an admission for him, so far as to supersede proof by superior evidence. Thus, if the plaintiff, in an action against the sheriff, produce a warrant which recites a writ, it would seem that the sheriff must nevertheless prove the writ, if it be necessary for his own justification. See Grey v. Smith, 1 Campb. 387. Stanley v. Fielden, 5 B. & A. 425. (1) Lady Dartmouth v. Roberts, 16 East, 334. Salter v. Turner, 2 Campb. 87. 3 Campb. 401. Ewer v. Ambrose, 4 B. & C. 25. But in general, an answer to a question cannot be read without shewing the question to which it relates. Rex v. Picton, Howell's St. Tr. vol. 30, p. 466. (2) Hewitt v. Piggot, 5 C. & P. 77. The letters in question were not written by the plaintiff, but were used against him, as having been in his possession for a long time, by which a presumption was afforded of his having acted upon them. It was held, that the order was admissible of itself, being an act of Court, not affecting the rights of either of the parties. See Temperley v. Scott, 5 C. & P. 341. as to reading cross-interrogatories which are part of a case. A party giving a correspondence in evidence was allowed to put in his letter in reply to the last letter on the other side. Roe v. Day, 7 C. & P. 705. (3) 2 B. & Ad. 284. A case was cited by counsel as having been decided at nisi prius by Lord Tenterden, in which the defendant, (having given the plaintiff notice to produce his books) offered in evidence a copy of one of them, and it turned out on cross-examination, that the witness had obtained an inspection of the book in the Master's office, where it was deposited by an order of the Court of Chancery, as being referred to by a plaintiff in his answer to a bill, and that on that occasion the copy was made: and Lord Tenterden ruled, that this was the same, as if the whole book were appended to the answer, or the answer expanded to the extent of the book; and that advantage could not be taken of an inspection, obtained through a conventional and economical proceeding between the parties in the Chancery suit, to give in evidence a part of the answer, without reading the whole. and the original of which letter, instead of being filed in the it is necessary in every instance to read an answer in Chancery, Where the whole of admissions are received, it often happens that they contain statements favorable to the persons whose admissions they are, and against whom they are used, and in many instances they are found to contain hearsay evidence of facts. The principal ground for receiving the whole admission appears to be, that by comparing the several parts with each other, the true meaning and extent of the admission may be more clearly understood. On this ground, there does not appear to be sufficient reason why the parts of the admission, which may be favorable to the person against whom it is used, should be applied to any other purpose, in the minds of the jury, than that of explaining the parts which appear unfa vorable. Effect of receiving whole admission. parts of admis sion. But although it would seem, that the principal ground upon Favorable which admissions are received in evidence, is, because it may be presumed, that a person would not speak against his own interest; and that the reason for receiving the whole admission, is only to ascertain, whether the person has in fact spoken against his own interest, and, if so, to what extent, and with what qualifica tions: yet, it may be collected from authorities, that the effect of receiving the whole admission amounts to something more. It would seem to have been sometimes considered, that it operated as a waiver of any objection to the testimony of the party making the admission, as to all matters contained in it. (1) By this reasoning, the use of the admission, as to those parts in which the probability of it's truth is supported by the presumption before mentioned, is deemed a legitimate ground for using it to prove matters, where the presumption in question fails, and a contrary presumption is found to prevail. It is, however, understood, that the several parts of an admission are not necessarily entitled to equal credit; the jury may believe one, and reject the other. (2) Thus, in Smith v. Blandy, (3) in an action for goods sold and delivered, one of the plaintiff's witnesses stated, upon cross-examination, he had heard the plaintiff say, that the goods were sold under a written contract, which the plaintiff at the time shewed the witness. A broker's note was then produced by the plaintiff's counsel, which the witness said was the paper spoken of. It was objected, that the broker's note ought not to be received as evidence of the contract, unless the broker was called to prove it. But the objection was overruled, and it was held by Best, C. J., that the whole of what a party says at the same time, must be given in evidence, though what he says in his favor must not be taken as true, but must be left, under all the circumstances, for the jury to consider whether they believe it or not. And in Randle v. Blackburn, (4) it was (1) Answer of the Judges in the Queen's case, 2 Br. & B. 298. Randle v. Blackburn, 5 Taunt. 245. Smith v. Blandy, R. & M. 257. See per Chambre, J., in Roe v. Ferrars, 2 B. & P. 542, infra, and see infra, tit. Confessions. (2) R. v. Clewes, 4 C. & P. 225. (3) Ry. & Mo. 257. Cray v. Halls, cited ib., where Lord Tenterden left the whole of a conversation to a jury, to consider whether the facts asserted by a party in his own favor, were not true as well as those against him. And see Remmie v. Hall, Manning's Index, 2d ed. 376. In Eq. Ca. Ab. 10, it is said that, "where a man is charged only by an oath, or a book, the same should be his discharge." See also Thompson v. Lambe, 7 Ves. 588. Ridgway v. Darwin, 7 Ves. 404. (4) Randle v. Blackburn, 5 Taunt. 245. The plaintiff was only allowed to recover the balance be |