the judges afterwards held the conviction good. (1) The same general doctrine was subsequently laid down in the case of R. v. Jones (2) by Lord Ellenborough, who there referred to a case, in which the judges were of opinion, that four prisoners had been properly convicted upon the testimony of an accomplice, whose evidence had been confirmed as to three of the prisoners, but not as to the fourth. And in the report of the York Trials under a special commission, it is laid down by C. B. Thompson, that "confirmation need not be of circumstances which go to prove, that the accomplice speaks truth with respect to all the pri soners, (when several are tried,) and with respect to the share they have each taken in the transaction; for if the jury are satisfied, that he speaks truth in those parts in which they see unimpeachable evidence brought to confirm him, that is a ground for them to believe that he speaks also truly with regard to the other prisoners, as to whom there may be no confirmation." (3) Again, in a later case, where an accomplice was confirmed as to one of several prisoners jointly indicted, but not as to the others, Bayley, J., told the jury, that if they were satisfied from the confirmation, that the accomplice was a credible witness, they might act on his testimony with respect to the prisoners, as to whom he had not been confirmed, and they were convicted. (4) In Birkett's case, (5) on a case reserved, the judges were of opinion, that an accomplice did not require confirmation as to the person charged by him, if he were confirmed in the other particulars of his statement. And in a very recent case at the Old Bailey, before Lord Denman, Mr. Justice Park, and Mr. Baron Alderson, when the counsel for the prosecution stated, that he should not be able to confirm an accomplice, who was to be called as a witness, with regard to the persons of the prisoners, but only as (1) R. v. Durham, Leach, C. C. 538. It was, however, said in this case that the witness (a receiver) was rather an accessary after the fact than an accomplice in the fact. In R. v. Smith and another, reported in a note to the last case, where the only witness affecting the prisoners was an accomplice, the Court admitted the rule of law, that the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice was legal evidence, but thought it too dangerous to suffer a conviction to take place on such testimony, and the prisoners were acquitted. (2) 2 Campb. 132. 31 How. St. Tr. 325. (3) R. v. Swallow, How. St. Tr. 971. (4) R. v. Dawbar, 3 Stark. N. P. C. 34, and see R. v. Barnard, 1 Car. & P. 88. Per Hullock, B. (5) Russell & R., C. C. 252. to the general circumstances of the case, Lord Denman said, he considered, and he believed his learned brothers concurred with him, that it was altogether for the jury, who might, if they pleased, act on the evidence of the accomplice without confirmation; but observed, that a person so situated, would not be likely to receive any great degree of credit. (1) authorities above stated. The authorities, above stated, appear to shew, as it has been Result of before observed, that the rule, which requires some confirmation of an accomplice to be given, is to be considered not as a strict rule of law, but as a practice depending on the discretion of the presiding judge. And these authorities also shew, that judges, in the exercise of their discretion, have generally, if not always, considered that some confirmation ought to be given, but have not considered evidence, affecting the identity of the prisoners charged, to be essential for the purpose of confirmation. sions. On the other hand, there are several recent decisions, in Recent deciwhich judges, in the exercise of their discretion, have thought that confirmatory evidence of identity ought to be given. Thus in the case of R. v. Addis, (2) an accomplice, who was the principal witness, was corroborated as to collateral facts, none of which tended to connect the prisoner with the accomplice, or with the transaction: Mr. Justice Patteson observed, that the corroboration ought to be as to some fact or facts, the truth or falsehood of which would go to prove or disprove the offence charged against the prisoner. And in a subsequent case, (3) where it was proposed on the part of the prosecution, to confirm the accomplice as to the mode, in which the felony was committed, Mr. Justice Williams said, that something ought to be proved (1) R. v. Hastings, 7 Car. & P. 152. In this case, the evidence for the prosecution was gone into, after the statement that confirmation could not be given as to the persons of the prisoners: but the prisoners were acquitted, the subsequent evidence being contradictory, rather than confirmatory of the ac- (2) 6 Car. & P. 388. (3) 6 Car. & P. 595. R. v. Webb. See the observation of C. B. Joy, on this and the preceding case.-Preface, p. III. which would tend to bring the matter home to the prisoners, and that confirming the accomplice as to the mode, in which the felony had been committed, was not enough to entitle his evidence to credit so as to affect other persons; that in fact this would be no confirmation at all, since every one would give credit, to a man avowing himself a principal felon, for at least knowing how the felony was committed. In a later case, on an indictment against two persons, the same doctrine was laid down by Mr. Baron Alderson, (1) who pointed out the distinction between confirmation as to the circumstances of the felony, and confirmation affecting the individuals charged; the former only proves that the accomplice was present at the commission of the offence; the latter shews that the prisoner was connected with it. In summing up, the Judge observed, that confirmation merely as to the circumstances of the felony, was really no confirmation at all; that it was true, the jury might legally convict on the evidence of an accomplice only, if they could safely rely on his testimony, but that he always advised juries not to act on the evidence of the accomplice, unless confirmed as to the particular person charged with the offence. After adverting to the facts of the case, as affecting the two prisoners, the same Judge stated to the jury, that if they thought the accomplice was not sufficiently confirmed as to one, they would acquit that one, and that if they thought he was confirmed as to neither, they would acquit both. In another case, (2) where a thief and receiver were jointly indicted, the same learned judge expressed his opinion, that confirmation as to the thief did not advance the case against the receiver. And in a former case of a similar description, where there was a slight confirmation as to the receiver, but none as to the principal felon, Littledale, J., thought the case failed altogether, and that the accomplice ought to be confirmed as to the principal, before the jury could be asked to believe the witness's testimony. (3) cases. From the class of cases which have been last cited, it will Result of these appear, that the recent practice of several judges, in exercising their discretion as to the evidence that ought to be adduced, in order to entitle an accomplice to credit, has been to require a confirmation upon some point affecting the person of the prisoner charged and that when several prisoners are jointly tried, confirmation is to be required as to all of them, before all can be safely convicted. Indeed, it would be difficult to assign a satisfactory ground for requiring confirmation as to the person of a prisoner indicted alone, and dispensing with confirmation as to prisoners jointly indicted: the same reasons, which render confirmation necessary in the former case, appear to require it in the latter; if a distinction between the two cases were to be allowed, a prisoner's acquittal or conviction, upon an accomplice's testimony, might depend upon the mere accident, of his being indicted alone, or jointly with others. It will be observed, that it is still laid down by judges, even when calling for this personal confirmation, that the jury, if they think proper, may legally convict upon an accomplice's testimony unsupported; and that, in the absence of such evidence, they do not withdraw the case from the jury, but only advise them not to give credit to the accomplice. Whether the rule of practice, which, as we have seen, has been recently followed, will be adopted as a general rule, by which all judges will consider themselves bound, may perhaps not be wholly free from doubt, but the weight of the later authorities appears to be in favour of such a rule. The distinction between confirmation as to the manner, in which an offence was committed, and as to the parties, by whom it was committed, is of obvious importance: and although cases may sometimes arise, in which, from the confirmation of an accomplice as to the circumstances attending the commission of the crime, a jury may be led to conclude, that the accomplice speaks truth with regard to the person charged, still, as the two points are, in general, essentially different, great caution is to be used in drawing such a conclusion. If the witness has really been an accomplice, as he states himself to Distinction between conthe circum stances, and as to the person. Confirmation by whom. Several accomplices. be, he must be acquainted with the manner in which the offence was committed; and, in describing the manner, it would not in general be the interest or the desire of an accomplice to swear falsely. But, with respect to persons concerned, there may be strong reason to infer the existence of motives, which would induce an accomplice to fabricate or pervert some facts against a party charged, notwithstanding that other facts, related by him, may be indisputably true, or even notwithstanding the general consistency of his story may be clearly established. (1) It appears that the practice of requiring confirmation, when the case for the prosecution is supported by an accomplice, applies equally, when two or more accomplices are brought forward against a prisoner. In a case in which two accomplices spoke distinctly to the prisoner's guilt, Mr. Justice Littledale told the jury, that, if their statement were the only evidence against him, he could not advise them to convict; observing, that it was not usual to convict on the evidence of one accomplice without confirmation, and that, in his opinion, it made no difference, whether there were more accomplices than one. (2) (1) This subject, which has been treated at considerable length in the text, on account of its interest and importance, has created much difference of opinion at the Irish bar. See an anonymous pamphlet by an Irish barrister, Dublin, 1824; the object of which is to prove, that some evidence of personal identity ought to be given in all cases. And see the tract of C. B. Joy, before referred to, which, though only recently published, was written some years ago, in answer to the former pamphlet. The Lord Chief Baron considers, that the rule of practice, requiring confirmation, may be satisfied by corroborating parts of the accomplices' evidence, not affecting the persons of the prisoners. In the preface, the learned writer states, that he was induced to publish his treatise in consequence of the cases of R. v. to Addis, and R. v. Webb, cited ante, p. 35. But the subsequent cases, the same effect, were probably not published, when the tract of the Chief Baron appeared; they are not referred to by him, neither does he allude to the previous case of R. v. Wells, Mo. & Ma. 326, ante, p. 36. (2) R. v. Noakes, 5 Car. & P. 326. O. B. cor. Littledale, J., Bolland, J., and Alderson, J. In the work of C. B. Joy, p. 100, et seq. the learned writer expresses a strong opinion, adverse to the course pursued in the above case. He does not, however, refer to the case, but on the contrary states, that the question had not undergone consideration. R. v. Noakes was decided in 1832, after the learned C. Baron's work was writ ten, but some years before its publication. The C. Baron refers to |