not dispute his landlord's title. Where a tenancy is created by a lease by deed indented, the tenant may be estopped from saying any thing repugnant to it, according to the strict law of estoppels as applicable to deeds. (1) Where the lease is not by deed, the tenant or any person claiming under him is precluded from objecting to the title of a landlord from whom he has received possession, or to the title of any party claiming under his landlord. (2) But a mere attornment without payment of rent, amounting to a bare assent, does not create an estoppel. (3) And payment of rent to another party than him under whom the tenant came originally into possession, may be shewn to have been done under a misrepresentation, or under other circumstances not entitling the party to receive it. (4) The (1) Co. Litt. 47 b. Strowd v. Willis, Cro. Eliz. 362. Brudenell v. Roberts, 2 Wils. 143. Syivan v. Stradling, ib. 208. Wilkins v. Wingate, 6 T. R. 62. Parker v. Manning, 7 T. R. 537. Blake v. Foster, 8 T. R. 487, that the lessor had an equitable estate. Cook v. Loxley, 5 T. R. 4. Brooksby v. Watts, 6 Taunt. 333. Frogmorton v. Scott, 2 East, 467, illegal possession. Hodson v. Sharpe, 10 East, 350, informal lease. A lease by deed poll is not an estoppel. Co. Litt. 369 b. Bac. Ab. Leases, O. A lease from a feme covert, infant, or from the crown, is not an estoppel, for want of mutuality. Bac. Ab. Leases, O. Co. Litt. 352. Cro. Eliz. 36. Say. 13. Morgan v. Ambrose, Peake, Ev. 242. B. N. P. 139. 2 Ves. Jun. 696. 11 Ves. 344. Palmer v. Ekins, Lord Raym. 1552. Atkinson v. Pierrepoint, Esp. Dig. 30. Phipps v. Sculthorpe, 1 B. & A. 50. Parry v. House, Holt. C. 489. (2) Doe d. Manton v. Austin, 9 Bing. 45. Doe v. Smythe, 4 M. & S. 347. Doe d. Bristow v. Pegge, 1 T. R. 760, n. Parry v. House, where the title was founded on fraud. Holt, 489. Cooke v. Loxley, 5 T. R. 4. Phipps v. Sculhorpe, 1 B. & A. 50. Hull v. Vaughan, 6 Pr. 157. Fleming v. Gooding, 10 Bing. 549. Rennie v. Robinson, 1 Bing. 147. In like manner a copyholder who has been adınitted and done fealty cannot dispute the title of the lord. Doe d. Nepean v. Budden. 3 B. & A. 626. With respect to the estoppel on a mortgagor from disputing the title of the mortgagee, see cases cited in Right v. Bucknell, 3 B. & Ad. 278. In Cornish v. Searall, 8 B. & C. 471, it was held, that the title of a person, to whom the tenant had attorned, but from whom he had not received possession, might be disputed. And Mr. Justice Bayley said, that the distinction was between the case where a person has actually received possession from another, who has no title, and the case where he has merely attorned by mistake to one who has no title; in the former case, the tenant cannot, unless under very special circumstances, dispute the title; in the latter he may, and for this position he cited Rogers v. Pitcher, 6 Taunt. 202. Gravenor v. Woodhouse, 1 Bing. 38. (3) Shep. Touch. 254. Cornish v. Searall, 8 B. & C. 471. Gravenor v. Woodhouse, 1 Bing. 38. By Buller, J., in Williams v. Bartholemew, 1 B. & P. 326. (4) Rogers v. Pitcher, 6 Taunt. 202. Williams v. Bartholomew, 1 B. & P. 326. Gregory v. Doidge, 3 Bing. 474. Gravenor v. Woodhouse, 1 Bing. 38. tenant is not precluded from shewing, that his landlord's title is determined (1) either by act of law, or his own act, or by efflux of time. Upon the same principle, it seems, a party accepting a negociable instrument is precluded from disputing the handwriting of the drawer; and although he may in general dispute the handwriting of the indorser, yet where the drawer is a fictitious person, the acceptor is bound to pay to the signature of the same person that signed for the drawer. (2) When an agent, who is employed to receive money, and who is bound by his duty to his principal from time to time to communicate to him whether the money is received or not, renders (1) England d. Syburn v. Slade, 4 T. R. 682. Doe d. Marriott v. Edwards, 5 B. & Ad. 1065. Doe d. Jackson v. Ramsbottom, 3 M. & S. 516. Doe v. Watson, 2 St. 230. Blake v. Foster, 8 T. R. 487. Brudenell v. Roberts, 2 Wils. 143. Hill v. Saunders, 2 Bing. 112. 4 B. & C. 529. As to the effect of payment of rent subsequently to the expiration of the landlord's title. Fenner v. Duplock, 2 Bing. 10. The tenant may shew payment of rent to a person having paramount title. Sapsford v. Fletcher, 4 T. R. 511. Taylor v. Zamira, 6 Taunt. 524. Dyer v. Bowley, 2 Bing. 94. Moss . Gallimore, Doug. 279. Alchorne v. Gomme, 2 Bing. 54. With respect to payments of rent to mortgagees by tenants of mortgagors. Alchorne v. Gomme, 2 Bing. 54. Pope v. Biggs, 9 B. & C. 245. Keech v. Hall, Doug. 21. It would seem, that the expiration of the landlord's title, had been considered in some cases as not being a defence against the person by whom the tenant had been originally let into possession, unless the title had been formally renounced and a fresh holding commenced under another person. Balls v. Westwood, 2 Camp. 11. And see by Gibbs, C. J., in Rogers v. Pitcher, 6 Taunt. 209. But see Fenner v. Duplock, 2 Bing. 10, and Neave v. Moss, 1 Bing. 360. (2) Cooper v. Meyer, 10 B. & C. 468. Robinson v. Yarrow, 7 Taunt. 455. Wilkinson v. Lutwidge, 1 Str. 648. Smith v. Chester, 1 T. R. 654. Jenys v. Fawler, 2 Str. 946. Leach . Buchanan, 4 Esp. 226. Price v. Neale, 3 Burr. 1354. Smith v. Mercer, 6 Taunt. 76, though the bill be forged. That the acceptance admits authority of agent purporting to draw as such. Porthouse v. Parker, 1 Camp. 82. Robinson v. Yarrow, 7 Taunt. 455. That it admits style of firm, Bass v. Clive, 4 M. & S. 13. And drawer's ability, Taylor v. Croker, 4 Esp. 187, cited 2 B. & C. 299, admits competency of drawer to indorse, Drayton v. Dale, 2 B. & C. 299. Concerning the admission of indorsements by acceptor or indorser, see further Hankey v. Wilson, Sayer, 223. Bosanquet v. Anderson, 6 Esp. 43. Sedford v. Chambers, 1 St. 326. Hemmings v. Robinson, Barnes, 436. Macpherson v. Thoytes, Peake, 20. Jones v. Radford, 1 Camp. 83. Carrick v. Vicary, Doug. 630. Duncan v. Scott, 1 Camp. 101. Lambert v. Oakes, 1 Lord Raym. 433. Critchlow v. Parry, 2 Camp. 182. Chaters v. Bell, 4 Esp. 210. Lambert v. Pack, 1 Salk. 127. Wharfingers. Not conclusive. an account from time to time, which contains a statement that the money is received, he is bound by that account, unless he can shew that the statement was made unintentionally, or by mistake. (1) It is an established rule, that where wharfingers acknowledge the title of a person for whom they hold property, it is considered as an attornment, and they are conclusively estopped from dis. puting such title, whatever may be the claim of a third person, at least, if they were fully acquainted with the nature of such claim, when they made the admissions. (2) But in general, a person's conduct and language have not the effect of operating against him by way of estoppel. (3) (1) Shaw v. Picton, 4 B. & C. 729. The cases respecting the effect of the receipt of premium, by the underwriter from the assured seem referrible to the principles under consideration, Dalzel v. Mair, 1 Camp. 532. A parish certificate is evidence for all the rest of the world, against the parish which granted it, and conclusive as to the parish to which it is directed, 4 T. R. 256. Rex v. Headcome, Burr. S. C. 253. A man is estopped by the recognizance of bail entered into for him by the name in which he is sued, from pleading a misnomer, although he is not a party to the recognizance, Meredeth v. Hodges, 2 N. R. 453. A tenant is concluded by the statement he makes to his landlord as to the time of entry, Doe d. Eyre v. Lambley, 2 Esp. 635. A person giving a wrong name previous to suing out of process, cannot, in an action against the sheriff, avail himself of the error in the name, Price v. Harwood, 3 Camp. 108. And see Bass v. Clive, 4 M. & S. 13. An owner of a ship giving a bill of lading by which freight appears to have been paid before a ship's departure from her landing port, is estopped against the assignee of such bill from claiming freight on the arrival of the vessel at her port of destination, Howard v. Tucker, 1 B. & Ad. 712. (2) Gosling v. Birnie, 7 Bing. 345. The rule is laid down with the limitation in the text by Alderson, J. But the other Judges lay it down in a more unqualified way, See Stonard v. Dunkin, 2 Camp. 344. Hawes v. Watson, 2 B. & Č. 541. Dixon v. Hammond, 5 B. & A. 310. Ogle v. Atkinson, 5 Taunt. 750. Barton v. Boddington, 1 C. & P. 207. (3) Per Chambre, J., in Smith v. Taylor, 1 N. R. 210. It has frequently happened, with regard to the evidence in some of the cases about to be examined, that the Judges have spoken of it as conclusive. But it would seem that in many instances, at least, they had reference to the effect of the evidence under the circumstances of some particular case, and it's probable weight with the jury. See Alner v. George, 1 Camp, 392. Bristow v. Eastman, 1 Esp. 172. The Courts are unwilling to extend the doctrine of estoppels, because it tends to prevent the investigation of truth, see by Lord Kenyon, in Rex v. Labbenham, 4 T. R. 254. Wightw. 67. 6 Esp. 20. 5 M. & S. 76. 10 East, 105. 3 T. R. 632. Peake, 91. 1 B. & P. 210. 2 N. R. 453. In Combe v. Pitt, Burr. 1590, it was held, that a man who had given money to another for his vote, should not be admitted to say that he had no vote. But it Accordingly we have seen, that in the instances in which the party has assumed a particular character, or has recognised at particular character as belonging to another person, his conduct and language have, in general, not been deemed conclusive against him. (1) It has been held, that a person is not concluded, as to the amount of his property, by an oath taken before commissioners under the property tax acts. (2) An insolvent's omission of a particular debt in his schedule, to which he was sworn, will not preclude him from afterwards recovering the debt. (3) An entry at the Custom House in the names of a firm is not conclusive, against the person making the entry, except as between him and the crown. (4) A person who had given notice to his landlord that he had become bankrupt, in consequence of which his landlord accepted possession of the demised premises, is not estopped from disputing the fact of his bankruptcy, in an action brought by him against his assignees, the assignees not having been parties or persons to the transaction between himself and his landlord. (5) Nor would such a person be precluded from disputing his commission by surrendering, or by petitioning the Chancellor to enlarge the time for surrendering. (6) oath. With respect to the relative credit and weight of admissions Admission on which are not conclusive, it may be observed, that the admissions, which may be considered as having the greatest force, are those which are delivered on the oath of the party. Thus answers in Chancery are very strong evidence, by way is difficult to account for the principle of this ruling, as the moral delinquency of the briber is obviously irrelevant to the question of the effect of the evidence. A return under 1 & 2 Geo. 4, c. 87, of corn in the possession of a party as sold and delivered to B., does not preclude him from shewing that it was delivered to D. on account of сс B., but that B. was not to have (1) Vide supra. (2) Rex v. Clark, 8 T. R. 220. (6) Mercer v. Wise, 3 Esp. 219. Admissions in deeds. of admission, in Courts of Law. (1) Where a bill was filed by the plaintiff as lessee of the dean and chapter of Carlisle, and the defendant offered in evidence an answer of the dean and chapter in a former suit, in which they admitted the existence of a modus, it was held to be not only admissible, but strong evidence to prove the modus; and an issue having been directed, Mr. Justice Bayley, at the trial, laid great stress upon the answer, as being cogent evidence against the defendant in the issue; observing that it was much stronger, than if it had been the answer of an individual. (2) A person's answer in Chancery is evidence against him by way of admission, in favour of a person who was no party to the Chancery suit; (3) for the statement being upon oath cannot be considered as conventional merely. A mere voluntary affidavit is evidence as an admission against the party who makes use of it. (4) Admissions, by the deed of a party under seal, are entitled to great weight, on account of the deliberation implied by the nature of the instrument, if they do not even exclude any contrary statement. Between the parties to the deed, at least, they may be pleaded by way of estoppel, and though not so pleaded, would generally, as between such parties, have the effect of an estoppel. (5) (1) B. N. P. 237. Earl of Sussex v. Temple, Lord Raym. 310. Doe d. Digby v. Steel, 3 Camp. 115, where the statement in the answer was as to belief. Salter v. Turner, 2 Camp. 87. 3 Camp. 401. Lady Dartmouth v. Roberts, 16 East, 334. Rumney v. Beale, Gwil. 1861. Gully v. Bishop of Exeter, 5 Bing. 171. Grant v. Jackson, Peake, 203, where an answer of a partner who had been joined as a defendant in a suit, but as to whom a nolle prosequi had been entered to a bill in Chancery filed by persons not parties to the record, was received, not as a judicial proceeding, but as a naked admission. See 5 Pr. 485. 12 Vin. Ab. 93. Studdy v. Sanders, 2 D. & R. 347, answer by two defendants to a bill of a third defendant, charging them as partners. (2) De Whelpdale v. Milburn, 5 Pr. 485. (3) Ashmore v. Hardy, 7 C. & P. 505, and see Grant v. Jackson, Peake 203, supra, n. 1. (4) Style, 446. Sacheverell v. Sacheverell, Bac. Ab. Ev. 628. Vicary's case, Bac. Ab. Ev. 623. Voluntary affidavit of joint covenantee, B. N. P. 238. Cameron v. Lightfoot, 2 Bl. Rep. 1191, that the making use of an affidavit, is an admission, which supersedes the necessity of proving that it has been sworn or signed, B. N. P. 238. Rex v. James, 1 Show. 97. Johnson v. Ward, 6 Esp. 47, affidavit of agent used by defendant for purpose of putting off a trial. (5) See Doe d. Pritchard v. Dodd. 2 Nev. & M.45. Com. Dig. Ev. B. 5, |