Judgment on paper. Judgment book. The minutes from which a record is afterwards made up, or the copies of such minutes, are not equivalent to an examined or office copy of the record, nor are they proper evidence of the record. Thus, it has been held, that a judgment in paper, signed by the Master, is not evidence; though upon such judgment execution may be taken out: for it is not yet become permanent, and is removable from place to place. And a judgment will not be regularly proved by the judgment book of the Court, though the record of the judgment roll has not been made up, and though the party interested in the proof of the judgment were not a party to the suit in which the judgment was obtained. Records are not complete, until they are delivered into Court in parchment, and there fixed as the rolls of the Court. In a case, where there had been an interlocutory judgment, an inquisition, final judgment and execution, it was held that both judgments must be proved by an examined copy of the roll, which must be carried in; and that it was not Prothonotary's enough to produce entries in the prothonotary's book, and the inquisition, with the prothonotary's allocatur. (2) The daybook, kept at the judgment office, is not evidence to prove the time of signing a judgment. (3) In like manner, a minute book in which entries of proceedings at a Court of Quarter Sessions are made, and from which book the roll containing the record of such proceedings is subsequently made up, is not itself a record, so as to be admissible in evidence. (4) Nor is such a minute-book evidence of the finding of a bill of indictment, though no record in fact be drawn up. (5) But the minutes of a Court may be received, where the matter proved by the minutes occurs before the same Court sitting under the same commission; as upon the trial of Horne Tooke, where the minutes of the Court were received to prove the acquittal of Hardy. (6) book. Minutes. without seeing whence the record (1) B. N. P. 228; Godefroy v. (2) Godefroy v. Jay, 3 C. & P. 192. (3) Lee v. Meecock, 5 Esp. 177. (4) Rex v. Bellamy, R. & M. 171; Rex v. Ward, 6 C. & P. 366, to prove an allegation that an appeal came on to be heard. (5) Rex v. Smith, 8 B. & C. 341; Porter v. Cooper, 6 C. & P. 354. (6) 25 St. Tr. 446. By Lord Tenterden, 6 B. & C. 342. When an ancient record has been lost, an old copy has been allowed to be The existence of an ancient record may sometimes be established by presumptive evidence. The presumption, that a Lost record record has existed and has been lost,' must depend upon the presumed. facts proved, both with respect to it's actual existence, and also with respect to it's custody, which may admit of a greater or less probability of a loss. It does not appear, that the existence and loss of records of the Superior Courts have been presumed ; but it appears, from the instances before cited, in the chapter on Presumptive Evidence, that even acts of parliament may be presumed. An unexamined copy of a recovery of lands in a Court of ancient demesne has been received, where the recovery, if it existed, must have been ancient, and where the possession was proved to have gone a long time according to the recovery. (1) So a license to appropriate has been presumed. (2) And where it appeared that the records of the city of Bristol had been burnt, an exemplification of a recovery of houses in Bristol, under the town seal, has been allowed in evidence. (3) Upon ejectment for the recovery of a rectory, to which a recusant had presented, it was held, that the record of conviction, which was proved to have been burnt, might be proved by estreats in the Exchequer, and an inquisition of the recusant's lands returned there. (4) So, in an action of trover, secondary evidence has been admitted of a fieri facias, and a venditioni exponas proved to have been lost. (5) And similar proof has been allowed of the decree in the time of Henry the Eighth for title in London, that decree having been lost. (6) “In such ' cases," says Chief Baron Gilbert, "the instrument must be, according to the rule of the civil law, vetustate temporis aut judiciaria cognition eroboratum." (7) This subject has been more fully considered in treating of presumptive evidence. Judgment of lords. Judgment, Postea. Judgments in the House of Lords may be proved by examined copies of the minutes of the judgment entered in the journals. The minutes of a judgment are the judgment itself, which it is not the practice to draw up in form. (1) A verdict is frequently given in evidence for the purpose of shewing the opinion of a jury on certain points in issue; as, for example, where a jury, upon some former trial, have found matter of reputation, or have decided a particular right. In such cases, though it is the verdict and not the judgment which is relevant to the inquiry, still it seems to be necessary to produce a copy of the judgment founded upon the verdict. It has been considered that the production of the postea alone is not sufficient; for the judgment may have been arrested, or a new trial may have been granted. (2) It has been held, that a nisi prius record, with the postea, or with a minute of the verdict indorsed by the officer of the Court on the Jury pannel, is good evidence that the cause came on for trial, though no regular postea be indorsed. In London and Westminster it is not the practice for the officer at the trial to indorse the postea, as it is in the country. (3) So the nisi prius record and postea have been held sufficient to support a plea of set off on an action for contribution. (4) The postea (1) Jones v. Randall, Cowp. 17, action on a wager, whether a decree in Chancery would be reversed? An unstamped copy of the minutes of reversal is evidence, without more of the proceedings. (2) Pitton v. Walter, 1 Str. 162. B. N. P. 234. Unless in the case of an issue out of Chancery, when no judgment is entered, B. N. P. 234. (3) Rex v. Browne, 1 M. & M. 315, after consulting the other Judges of K. B. In Rex v. Browne, there was a general verdict entered in the minute against all the defendants. It being necessary to show that a particular defendant had been acquitted, it was held that this might be done by parol evidence, that he was examined as a witness. (4) Garland v. Scoones, 2 Esp. 648. Foster v. Compton, 2 Stark. 365. It was doubted, whether the indorsement of the costs, with the Master's allocatur on the poste was sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover half of the costs, without producing the judgment. These decisions appear liable to the objection, that the judgment may have been arrested, or a new trial granted; but this possibility would not be likely to be attended with any practical or general inconvenience. See Harrop r. Bradshaw, 9 Price, 359, where, in consequence of an arrangement, no judgment was entered up. That the day of trial, and the fact that the cause was carried down to is sufficient evidence to introduce the testimony of a witness who is dead, (1) or that of a person indicted for perjury. (2) Chancery. A decree in the Court of Chancery may be proved by an exem- Decree in plification under the seal of the Court, or by an examined copy, or by a decretal order in paper, with proof of the bill and answer. (3) But it has been held, that the bill and answer need not be proved, if they are recited in the decretal order. (4) And it is said in a book of authority, (5) that if a party wants to avail himself of the decree only, and not of the answer, the decree, under the seal of the Court and enrolled, may be given in evidence without producing the bill and answer, and the opposite party will be at liberty to show, that the point in issue was not the same as the present issue. However, the rule, generally laid down, seems to be, that, where a party intends to avail himself of the contents of a decree, and not merely to prove an extrinsic collateral fact, (as, that a decree was made by the Court,) he ought regularly to give in evidence the proceedings upon which the decree is founded. "The whole record," says Chief Baron Comyns, "which concerns the matter in question, ought to be produced." (6) So, a sentence in the Admiralty Court may be evidence, upon the libel and answer produced: and a judgment in a Court-baron, or other inferior Court, with proof of the proceedings in which the judgment was given." (7) trial, must be proved by the record, Thomas v. London (sheriffs), 6 Esp. 80. Parry v. Collis, Peake, add. A. 47. (1) B. N. P. 243; 1 Str. 162. 2 Russ. on Crimes, 549. See also Barnard, 243; Hardr. 118; 2 Hawk. c. 46, s. 56. (2) Iles's case, ca. temp. Hardr. 1818; Browne's case, M. & M. 314. See Coppard's case, M. & M. 118, where the postea stated the trial to have been before the Chief Justice, it being, in fact, before a Judge sitting for the Chief Justice; the objection was overruled. See Alford's case, 1 Leach, 150, per jury at assizes, the captain stating (3) Trowell v. Castle, 1 Keb. 21. (4) By Trevor, Ch. J., in Wheeler v. Lowth, cited Com. Dig. Ev. (C. 1), 1 Keb. 21, contra. (5) Bull. N. P. 235, citing Lord Thanet v. Paterson, K. B. East; 12 G. 2. (6) Com. Dig. tit. Ev. (A. 4), (7) Com. Dig. tit. Ev. (C. 1), p. 85. P. 94. If the fact to be shown were merely, that a decree has been made in the Court of Chancery, or that a decree made there has been reversed on appeal, proof of the previous proceedings Ancient decree. will not be necessary. (1) And in the case of an ancient decree, if the bill and answer cannot be found after proper search, the decree alone may be admitted. Answer in An answer in Chancery may be proved by an examined copy. (2) It cannot regularly be given in evidence without proof of the bill; for the bill may materially tend to explain the answer. But if there be proof, by the proper officer, that the bill has been searched for in the office, and cannot be found, the answer has been allowed to be read without sight of the bill. (3) When an answer is offered in evidence as an admission of the party on oath, or when it is used for the purpose of contradicting a witness, or upon an indictment for perjury in the answer, it will not be necessary to shew that there has been any decree in the suit. (4) In civil suits, an answer in Chancery may be proved by an examined copy; (5) but it is said, that, upon an indictment for perjury, the original must be produced, and such is the practice, though there does not appear to be any sufficient reason for the distinction. (6) In civil suits it will be presumed that an answer was made upon oath; (7) but, in criminal prosecutions, some evidence of the administration of an oath is required; as, that an individual (1) See Jones v. Randall, Cowp. 17. See per Bayley, B., in Blower v. Hollis, 1 Cr. & M. 396. Lord Thanet v. Patterson, B. N. P. 235. (2) Hennel v. Lyon, 1 B. & A. 182. Ewer v. Ambrose, 4 B. & C. 25. See Rees v. Bowen, M'CI. & Y. 383. Highfield v. Peake, M. & M. 110. See Salter v. Turner, 2 Camp. 87. Burnard v. Nerot, 1 C. & P. 578, as to office copies of answers. (3) Gilb. Ev. 55. (4) Lady Dartmouth v. Roberts, |