emphasises, in a striking manner, the close connection which subsists, in our present state of being and knowledge, between the body and mental activities. We take Theism to have been at one with Janet in the deserved stress he has laid on his third form of determinism that rational determinism which consists in "the power of acting in accordance with conceptions or ideas." As it has held to the absolute freedom of God, the condition of His active energy, so it has maintained the true self-determining power of the human will, in virtue of which man not only chooses his ends, but also controls his life. This reality of selfdetermination by a permanent self-identical ego has been ably set forth by Martineau and others, in opposition to Bain, and those whose empirical psychology strips our personal causality of all being save that of a series of sequences in time. The reality of freedom, in fact, has been very clearly seen to stand or fall with the reality of personality in man, these two-personality and freedom-really and truly standing or falling with each other. It has thus grown more evident how far recent philosophy of theism has advanced beyond the phenomenalism of Kant, which vitiated for his philosophy the lofty "realm of ends" to which, in his fine insistence on purity of volition as the goal of will, he did not fail to give an abstract recognition.

We are disposed to claim for recent theistic philosophy that, with greater power as a spiritual

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philosophy, it has declared the real, and not merely formal, freedom of man as a spiritual personality -of every man who has chosen so to live. This actual freedom Professor T. H. Green, with his acknowledged power, has brought into prominence in a way for which theistic philosophy deserves, we think, to be grateful, although it must see very clearly how utterly this service is marred by the way in which Green sacrifices freedom on the shrine of character-that thing of necessary causation in his view. For it certainly refuses to follow Green and others who make of man's moral character what Professor Upton properly calls "an inevitable growth," and who treat "heredity and circumstances" as "the sole arbiters of his destiny." But, tempered by regret as our admiration may be, we cannot but admire Green's characteristic presentation of the way in which the motive lies within the man himself. His is a needed and wholesome presentation in view of recent teachings as to heredity and circumstance in their ethical bearings. It will not do to gloze over the matters we have just been dealing with by saying that selfdetermination combines both the Libertarian and the Determinist views, for the point on which attention must be fixed is that the theistic view— as we apprehend it-postulates a real contingency in our action which is not annulled or effaced by the uniformities or internal necessities of character. To say that I am determined, but only by myself,

is to come short of the full glory of freedom. There must be perfect scope for moral process and free initiative. This we say boldly, undeterred by the fact that, though the "liberty of indifference" is so far left behind that, while it might be passable to have it singled out in Bradley's Ethical Studies,' some recent writers-Professor J. S. Mackenzie, for example-might have been expected to do better than still turn attention to it rather than to the real contingency issue. We can just as little accept this eirenicon as we could the determinism that issued from Schelling's postulation of pretemporal and super-temporal acts of freedom.

We are not disposed to take so lenient a view of determinism in relation to the action of the individual as some recent writers-Professor Caldwell, for example, in his fine work on Schopenhauer's system and we feel bound to maintain a real subjective possibility of choice for man, a freedom whose reality is no whit impaired by the fact that such freedom is limited in its practical issues by certain internal and external circumstances. Theistic philosophy has more forcefully shown that man's volitions, while accordant in a true sense with law, differ from the changes we see in the physical universe - where necessity is the correlate of law-in being entirely initiated and determined from within, and that, too, in another way than the theory of the automatists supposes. It has had a very clear perception of the freedom

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and spontaneity which mark man off from the animal creation, which latter has, of course, a spontaneity of its own as compared with the world of things inanimate. Such consciousness as the animal may be said to possess is a centre of movement for it, but obviously not a centre comparable to that found in man, reflective and free.

Theistic thought cannot be said to have found any satisfactory rational ground for moral freedom and responsibility in the attitude assumed by so able and recent a writer as Professor Royce, of Harvard, who, viewing us in our time-relations as tied in a hopeless manner to our nervous mechanism, sets forth the identity theory, whereby reality is resolved into dissimilar forms or aspects, and our responsibility is resolved into an unreal and timeless participation in the free choice which he postulates for the Eternal Self. Unlike Royce, Höffding, and Romanes, recent theistic philosophy has, we venture to think, tended towards finding free spirit more truly interpretative of matter. With this freedom of man's will it sees that the absolute knowledge or infinite prevision of God no more conflicts than human prescience conflicts with our own free agency. It acknowledges, however, with Mozley, that the truth of man's free will stands so related to the idea of Divine Power that it cannot, of course, become an absolute truth, any more. than in days when Eschylos declared that no one is free save Zeus. Such an absolute liberty it

does not venture to claim because it sees, with Janet, the futility of claiming a liberty which would be unmanageable by us, while we refused such a liberty as we need. It is content with what he calls "the power of emancipating ourselves from the control of our inclinations." In fact, it cannot postulate a strictly absolute freedom for Deity even, if so be it maintains in their integrity our own freedom and personality. It allows not man's free moral self-determination to be swamped by the causative agency of God, but, while holding, as Martineau has well said, to God as Author of all our possibilities, does yet not make Him responsible for our actualities. The door of philosophical escape from the difficulty of the Divine foreknowledge, in respect of human freedom, which Renouvier has opened, is just to admit that the prescience of Deity is not absolute in character.

Theistic philosophy recognises, as it never did before, how truly this human freedom, as something to be won, is subject to development, as all our powers are. This aspect is properly remarked upon by Trendelenburg, who points out that freewill is no ready-made product any more than is thought, but is a fruit of development ('Logische Untersuchungen,' vol. ii. p. 94). Freedom is not to be thought of only in the light of our immediate actualities, but as that whereunto we may come. The theistic philosophy of religion may be claimed as recognising this aspect of things, whereby free