A TRUE OPTIMISM. 495 the things of earth are stamped to satisfy the spirit of man. In face not only of pessimism but also of agnosticism, it has maintained, not alone as regards the race but for individual man, an attitude unweariedly optimistic, and has more distinctly evinced the superiority of its optimism to that of agnostic evolution in the unwavering manner in which its faith in the infinite capacities and possibilities of the soul has kept before man, as the untouched goal of his aspirations, the highest spiritual ends-the ends of spiritual perfection achieved through Immortality. Yes, for it hesitates not to accept the word of M. Secrétan, that "perfection is eternal.” It has taught us to "rest in faith That man's perfection is the crowning flower Is pressing, seen in puny blossoms now, With broadest petal and with deepest glow." Hence we deem ourselves justified in affirming that the immense hopefulness, the intense spring or impulse, and the inspiring thoroughness of the theistic faith, have been so surely known and felt that religion, no less than theology, has become quickened. Recent theistic philosophy of religion has, we are inclined to think, laid more satisfactory hold on the reality of a Philosophy of History, in which the theistic idea is seen to carry with it the Spiritual Presence which is the Spring of spiritual impulse, and the Source of organic growth. Yes, the Spiritual Presence whereby the Kingdom of Heaven is for ever coming amongst us-whereby, too, the harmonisation of the spiritual and industrial functions of society, as it marches on to its most comprehensive development, is more completely secured. We thus pass from the unity of God, as we have seen it, to a resultant unity in History. For in the great historic movement, as the philosophy of history interprets it, or traces out its rationality, it is to such unity we are led amid all the diversities of phenomena. And for the philosophical historian, history is no history at all until there is this rational comprehension of it. The great importance of studying the rise and genetic connection of facts was explicitly pointed out by Trendelenburg ('Logische Untersuchungen,' vol. ii. pp. 388, 395). It is upon such a philosophy of history as we have spoken of that our philosophy of religion must rest, and our justification of the multiform developments of religion proceed. The broad survey of history suggests to theistic philosophy a predestined goal towards which the ofttimes unconscious movements of men and nations end. Just this future of the universe indeed ought more to engage our attention, for the world, as it now is, exists and makes for that future, yes, makes for it with a swiftness which at least ensures the instability of the present. Nor has it been content with such ill-defined and shadowy forecasts of the future of A PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY POSSIBLE. 497 the race as those marked out by Kant, Jouffroy, Herder, Guizot, and others, but has sought the true destination of mankind, as organised, harmonised, and illumined by the Spirit proceeding from the Power that makes for righteousness, truth, and love in the world. We are by no means forgetful, in saying this, what a deep natural sense it has at the same time had of the difficulty of attaining such a Philosophy of History in view of the sophistries and subtleties that only too easily find their way into such speculations, and of the too frequent triumphs disclosed of might and rude violence over virtue and right. Nor do we overlook that, even if the setting up of a heavenly kingdom upon earth were taken to be the end of history, it cannot be so taken without due consideration and disposal of the seemingly different end to which the whole rich development of man's own proud culture is making. We are not even oblivious of the contention-the unreasoned and unwarranted assumption rather, of the late Professor Clifford, in the interests of dogmatic atheism—that the notion of a guiding power or providence in history is immoral, and constitutes a paralysis of human effort, though it is too palpably at variance with fact and human experience to deserve any very serious attention. We remain keenly sensible of the conflicting elements and obstacles in our faith in Providence, as that sweet and puissant Force by which the inexorable rigour of fate or destiny is softened for us. But if the universe is not to be simply meaningless to us, then do we more firmly maintain that only the spiritual world or Kingdom of God, transforming rather than destroying, absorbing rather than extinguishing, will suffice as its adequate goal-adequate to its toil, and pain, and promise. Yes; and though we speak of "promise,” let it not be thought that we mean the philosophy of history to signify any miraculous gift of prophecy, rather than a divining of the plot of the historical drama we see. As Bunsen remarks, in his 'God in History,' only that which is can be satisfactorily reduced to formulas. But, for all that, we see the "history of the world "-the whole present order of things-to be insufficient to prove "the judgment of the world," and we take it to point onwards to a completer vindication of the moral order. This is so even while we admit the sense in which this saying of Schiller is true-that the world's history is its judgment. We certainly do not think theistic philosophy has sympathised with the view of those who would wrench History from all connection with Philosophy, and who would bring its events within the range of mechanical necessity, until History should be virtually reduced to a department of physics. Not even those who would tie history down to narrative, leaving philosophy severely alone-like Thiers-can escape philosophy of history any more than did he. The theistic philosophy of religion DIVERSE PHILOSOPHIES OF HISTORY. 499 must find itself ill content without synthetic efforts in the sphere of History. From the facts as material—sifted, marshalled, classified, set in due relations -there must result a philosophy. How diverse these philosophies of history may be, such names as Bunsen and Buckle, Comte and Kant, Taine and Renan, Hegel and Schelling, Schiller and Schlegel, may suffice to suggest. We are with Guizot in holding that while history may be confined to facts, facts are yet so little of a visible and material character in all possible cases that there are facts, hidden and moral, which are every whit as real as any facts of battle or any acts of government. Certainly in our historic dealings we must see to it that goodness remains for us the sovereign greatness. We see the theistic philosophy of religion reject the defective theory of such a materialistic civilisation as would have satisfied Comte and the deterministic Buckle- to whose constructive synthetic work a value not small may be allowed-and assert the reality and primacy of the spiritual. No doubt, Hegel and Comte are right in viewing the question of a philosophy of history so largely from the view-point of European history, nor can it be doubted that the progress involved would not have been to them the entity it appears to be to some recent thinkers, but would have remained an end calling for some more exact definition. Though we do not forget his striking reduction of the freedom involved, yet we find |