devotional feelings, such as prayers, praises, and sacrifices in honour of the Deity, to the proper business for which we were placed in this world."-p. 346.

We learn from this survey of religion, that devotion produces many bad effects. He who either praises the deity, or prays unto him, misapprehends his duty, and acts only under the dominion of passion! It forms no part of the proper busi ness for which we were placed in this world; and of course devotion is nothing more than the result of ignorance! Thns far, however, it must be admitted, that the author has an eye to consistency. He has told us (p. 379)" that God is neither good nor benevolent, and that he does not love his creatures." Consequently prayer is useless, and to grateful praises he is not entitled. Gratitude is the offspring of benevolence. But if the latter exist not in the Deity, the former is not to be expected from the creature, But it is needless to remark further on the pernicious tendency and nature of devotion, prayer, and praise!

"Rational religion, as distinguished from morality, (the author tells us,) consists of four things: First, of a knowledge of the existence and character of the Author of the Universe; Secondly, of an acquaintance with the relation in which we are placed with regard to him; Thirdly, it consists of the practice of those duties of which he is more particularly the object; and lastly, it consists of a correct discernment of the tendency of his works, or of the future destiny of man." p. 357,

In this curious definition of rational religion, as distinguished from morality, revelation, as was natural, has found no place, Repentance, justice, faith, and mercy; iniquity, forgiveness, holiness, rewards, and punishments, are all excluded; and, what may surprise us more, excluded from a definition of that religion which is denominated rational, as it stands distinguish ed from morality!

The author, however, admits the existence of a first cause; and in the commencement of the ensuing chapter, (p, 358) adduces the same proofs, which may be found in a higher state of perfection in Fenelon's Demonstration of the Existence of God, and in Paley's Natural Theology; namely, "that there can be no motion without a mover, no contrivance without a contriver, and no piece of mechanism without a mechanic,' And hence he justly infers, as Paley has done before him, that "if the building be immensely great, the builder must have possessed immense power." But, unfortunately, the author has not adopted either Fenelon's or Paley's wisdom and prudence, and terminated his argument where reason required,

He has proceeded to intimate, and even to assert, the Eternity of the Universe. But we will quote his words.

Perhaps it may be said, that the arguments here adopted, to prove that the mind which contrived this universe had no commencement, may also be employed to prove that the universe itself had no commencement, seeing it continually endures, although the forms which it contains are continually changing. To this remark I do not object; for I cannot conceive that a skilful and powerful mind would suffer its own wisdom and energy to remain unexerted. I have no doubt therefore, that the universe in some shape or other, has existed and will remain as perpetually as its Author.' p. 369.

How God can be the Author of a Universe which has been coeval with his existence, is a paradox at which we have already hinted; and we must add, that it is of such a nature as we have not ingenuity enough to solve. That it is "the Universe" which Mr. Forsyth supposes to have thus existed in some shape or other, are his own words, and the reason which he assigns, is, because "he cannot conceive that a skilful and powerful mind would suffer its energy to remain unexerted." But is this inability to conceive, we would ask, a sufficient reason for admitting the eternity of the Universe? If f so, it will operate with superior force against the fact which is adopted. It is impossible for us to conceive the eternity of any thing; or in fact, as this author has admitted in p. 57,

to conceive or comprehend the essence of any substance in nature." In short, our conceptions are no standard, by which we can either comprehend or admit the eternity or commencement of any given substance in the empire of nature; and those who make them the test of their assent, would do well to inform us upon what principle they admit their own existence.

But waving this consideration, we take the question upon the ground of the author's assumption; namely, that it is unreasonable to suppose that a skilful and powerful mind would suffer its own wisdom and energy to remain unexerted. The only consequence that can be founded on this assumption, is, that such a mind would exert itself to create something; and this very consequence necessarily destroys the notion that what is thus created is eternal. It is evident, that the eternity of the universe cannot be proved from any argument which refers to its efficient cause. Mr. F.'s proposition has often been speciously urged, by Montesquieu among others; but it is selfdestructive, as to the eternity of the world, and only places the difficulty farther back in the waste of eternity. We are at a loss to conceive, also, how he will reconcile this proposition with those arguments which he has adduced to prove the existence of the

Deity. He has told us that "there can be no motion without a mover; no contrivance without a contriver; and no work of ́art without an artist." The force of these arguments we fully admit. But we contend, that the same reasonings which will compel us to admit a contriver, when we behold contrivance, &c. will compel us to admit the previous existence of the contriver; of the mover; and of the artist. For we can no more admit the effect of art to be coeval with the artist, than we can admit an effect to be coeval with its cause; for, in fact, it will involve a palpable contradiction.

Our Author renews this discussion in a subsequent chapter, and transfers his observations from the Universe to simple matter.

It is abundantly evident that a passive mass such as matter is consi dered, could not create mind. Mind must therefore have existed from eternity. But could mind create matter? This is a curious question. Creation out of nothing is obviously an absurdity. But from what materials could mind create matter? Mind is essentially active; matter is supposed to be essentially passive. It seems evident, then, that mind out of its own active essence could not form a substance totally passive, solid, and of a nature so opposite to its own.' p. 418.

This, certainly, is entering into the essence of the question; but human conception, as before, is made the standard by which omnipotence is measured. It does not, however, appear to us altogether so evident, as it seems to this author, that "mind out of its own active essence could not make or form a substance totally passive, and of a nature so opposite to its own,"

Every change which any substance undergoes, necessarily pre-supposes the existence of that substance which undergoes the change, and consequently division supposes the pre-existence of what is divided. On this ground, the present distinct existence of the elements into which matter is now divided, supposes a previous chaotic state, when these elements had no distinct existence, And perhaps no one will doubt, who admits God to be omnipotent, that he can again deprive our elements of their peculiar properties, and melt them down into one common mass, Let us suppose this to have been the primitive state of matter before the elements were formed, or worlds were made. In this case, had any given element, e. g. carbon, a distinct existence? It is denied er hypothesi. Since, then, a contradiction cannot be admitted, we are compelled to conclude, that the elementary principles out of which carbon is formed could not be carbon, because this would be to suppose its existence prior to its existence, which is a contradiction.

Let us now transfer the above reasoning from Carbon and

Chaos, to Matter and the Deity; and suppose Matter to stand in the same relation to God, that Carbon did to the primitive and elementary substance, from which it was afterwards called into formal existence. It follows, that the elementary princi ples, out of which matter was created, could not have been material, because this will make matter to exist, prior to its own existence. And as these elementary principles of matter must have had an existence prior to that of matter;- -as they could not be material in themselves, because it will involve the above contradiction;-it follows, that the elementary principles out of which matter was formed, must all be resolved into the divine efficiency. And we may thus attribute the origin of matter to him, and behold the elementary principles of Matter residing in him, while his Spirituality remains unshaken and entire. And we may thus behold God, who is a Spirit, as the great Creator of every thing, without involving ourselves either in absurdity or contradiction.

Of the character of the Deity, our author tells us, (p. 370.) that, "Our rule ought to be to ascribe no quality or charac teristic to him, that does not appear in his works; and at the same time to ascribe to him every quality, that he has actually displayed in these." But the question still returns- What are those qualities which he has actually displayed.' To this he answers, (p. 372)

"The hungry lion has always been fierce, the fox has been cunning, and the hare has been timid. The waters have always run towards the sea, and a stone cast upward has fallen to the earth. Wormwood has been bitter; motion has followed impulse, and sound has been produced by the agitation of elastic bodies. The human character has never altered, It has alternately been timid, superstitious, and feeble; or bold, rational, and vigorous, according to the circumstances in which it has been placed.

Such we are told is the character of God. The character of man is too well known to require any comment. Degeneracy, it appears, he has none; he is as good and perfect as the Author of his being intended him; and we are now assured, that the

*Whenever we speak of the elementary principles out of which any substance is made, we are fully assured that the substance itself never can be the same in nature with those principles out of which it was made, because this would be to suppose the existence of the substance prior to its existence; and because it is nothing but a combination of these principles which can give substance being. And therefore the elementary principles of any substance must not only have a distinct pature from, but a priority of existence to, that substance, of which they are the primordials. As therefore the elementary principles must have had a priority of existence, they might have continued in being, if God had been so pleased, though no ma terial substance had ever been created.

human character has never altered. The reader will pardon us if we ask-What then are we to think of God? and if we exclaim-From such philosophy may he in mercy preserve the world!

We come now to the third and fourth chapters, in which we are directed to survey the Deity in connexion with the uni

verse.

"There are two ways (says Mr. F. p. 380) in which the Deity may be the cause of whatever exists. He may have formed at first the plan of the universe, and so perfectly adjusted all its parts, that it proceeds of itself in its destined career, without requiring any farther interposition on his part. Or, he may not only have originally contrived and put in motion the universe, but he may still be the preserver of it, and the energetic pr immediate cause and producer of all its movements. It appears to me that the first of these ideas affords a very defective conception of the operations of Deity, and implies that they are to be regarded in no higher point of view, than the efforts of a human artist.”

From these observations, it is concluded, (p 382.)

"that the Deity is the author of all action and exertion; (p. 384) that he is the active, operating, and immediate producer or cause of all the objects. and events that exist or occur around us; that we ourselves are animated or filled by the power and inspiration of the eternal; (p. 385) that our actions are the exertions of that great energy which produces our feelings and our thoughts, and is the source of all the power and of all the action which the universe exhibits."

That the author, from what we have already seen, should be an advocate for destiny in its most unlimited extent, it was natural to conceive. It was therefore with singular prudence, that he has denied the existence of moral and physical evil; and told us, that we have no reason whatever to believe that God hath appointed a day, in which he will judge the world in righteousness. This doctrine is accordingly presented before us, in a dress that it has long been accustomed to wear, with some additional patches, which may serve to conceal deformity from vulgar eyes, where it was already becoming visible.

Adopting this sentiment with a "vigorous character," Mr. Forsyth, it must be acknowledged, proceeds with unexampled rapidity. He begins in p. 337; in p. 391, he makes man infallible; and in p. 401, he raises him to a God! "It is not true, (he observes, p. 401,) that this opinion represents man as an unintelligent machine; on the contrary, it rather represents him as a God." Yet this man, who is thus represented as a God, we are told in the very next paragraph, can, and actually does, fall into vice, while, nevertheless, we are confidently assured in p. 410, that there is no such thing as moral evil in the creation!