1819. SANDERSON and Another v. SYMONDS. November 20. Policy of in-. ASSUMPSIT on a policy of insurance on the ship surance on of discharge, Venerable, "at and from Liverpool, to her port or ship, "at and from L. to her ports, place or places of discharge and loading in Africa port or ports, and African islands, and during her stay there, and at and place or places from thence back to Liverpool, or her final port or place of discharge in the United Kingdom:" with liberty, on that voyage, "to proceed and sail to, and touch and stay at, any ports or places whatsoever and wheresoever and loading in Africa and African islands, and there, and at and from thence back to L., or her final port or place of discharge in the United Kingdom, with liberty in that voyage to pro during her stay as above; to sell, barter, and exchange goods, and load, unload, and re-load goods at any or all of the ports and places she may call at and proceed to." At the trial before Dallas C. J. at the London sittings after Trinity term, 1819, it appeared, that the vessel, on her return home, was totally lost in Cardigan Bay, and the defence set up to this action, was, that the policy had been materially altered by the Plaintiffs, after the subscription of it by the defendant. The alteration proved, was, the insertion or interlineation of the words, " and trade," after the words "during her stay," and the circumstances attending the alteration, were as follows: The Plaintiff, an insurance broker, fearful that the words "to sell, barter, and exchange goods, and load, unload, and re-load goods," might not be sufficiently extensive ceed and sail to, and touch and stay at, any ports or places whatsoever and wheresoever as above: to sell, barter, and exchange goods, and load, unload, and reload goods, at any or all of the ports and places she may call at, or proceed to."-The insured, subsequently to the execution of the policy, inserted after the words "during her stay," the words "and trade." Some of the underwriters assented to the alteration by subscribing their initials; others refused their assent. In an action against one who refused, held, that the alteration was immaterial, and did not avoid the policy. to to include a trading, after the subscription of the policy by the different underwriters interlined the words, " and trade," and having done so, presented it to the various underwriters for their consent to this alteration. Some of them, in token of such consent, signed their initials to the interlineation, but the Defendant refused to do so, alleging that he never under-wrote trading policies to Africa, and offering to return the premium and cancel the policy. The declaration, containing a count setting forth the words "and trade," as part of the instrument, and another omitting them, the objection of the alteration was not urged so much on the ground of a variance between the contract entered into, and the contract proved, as that it rendered the instrument totally void. The learned Chief Justice having directed the jury, that if independently of the words inserted, the Plaintiffs had, by the policy, liberty to trade on the coast of Africa, they were entitled to recover, the jury found a verdict for the Plaintiff. Lens Serjt. on a former day obtained a rule nisi, to set aside this verdict and enter a nonsuit, on the ground, that the alteration in question had avoided the policy. He cited Langhorn v. Cologan (a), and Fairlie v. Christie (b), to shew that an alteration of the policy after subscription rendered it void. The alteration Vaughan Serjt. now shewed cause. complained of is wholly immaterial. It adds nothing to the insurer's risk, and does not give the insured a power to do any one thing he equally was not entitled to do under the policy as it stood originally. All the expressions of the policy, before the alteration, clearly 1819. SANDERSON v. SYMONDS. (a) 4 Taunt. 330. (b) 7 Taunt. 416. shew, 1819. SANDERSON . SYMONDS. shew, that the vessel was intended to trade on the coast of Africa; if they have not that meaning, they can have none at all, and if they have, how can the insertion of the words "and trade," have altered the legal effect of the instrument? It will never be contended, that an immaterial alteration can avoid the instrument. The Court may be spared the cases collected in Comins' Digest, under title Bond, on the subject of alterations of instruments; these cases do not apply to policies of insurance, which differ from other instruments, inasmuch as they contain so many unconnected parties; but it seems to be implied by the terms of 35 G. 3. (a), that alterations in policies are usual and legal. It is there said, "that nothing in that act contained shall extend to or be construed to extend to prohibit the making of any alteration, which may lawfully be made in the terms or conditions of any policy of insurance duly stamped, after the same shall have been underwritten, or to require any additional stamp duty by reason of such alteration, so that such alteration be made before notice of the determination of the risk originally insured, and the premium or consideration originally paid or contracted for shall exceed the rate of 18s. per cent. on the sum insured, and so that the thing insured shall remain the property of the same person or persons, and so that such alteration shall not prolong the term insured beyond the period allowed by this act, and so that no additional or further sum shall be insured by reason or means of such alteration." And it appears by this act, that, even in cases of stamps, where so much strictness prevails, a greater latitude is frequently allowed, than is contended for by the Plaintiff on the present occasion. In French v. Patton, indeed (b), Lord Ellen (a) G. 636 5. 13. (b) 9 East. 351. borough borough observed, that the alteration was such as to make the policy speak a different language, and lose its original identity, but in the present case nothing is added which the policy did not in substance contain before. The cases of Langhorn v. Cologan, and Fairlie v. Christie, cited by the counsel for the Defendant, are inapplicable. In Langhorn v. Cologan, Lord Mansfield said, "the instrument now is different from what it is stated in the only count, on which the Plaintiff could have recovered at the trial. The alteration is a very material one." But in that case a specific subject of insurance was added afterwards. So in Fairlie v. Christie, a material alteration was made, and the instrument was, therefore, held to be another and different contract, whereas, here the words are merely words of repetition; for by the terms of the policy, a liberty to trade was virtually given before the interlineation complained of as varying the instrument, took place. Lens in support of the rule, contended, that as the Defendant had expressly refused to underwrite a trading policy to Africa, the alteration in question could not be deemed other than material, and as completely varying the identity of the instrument. If the alteration was material, it would follow beyond dispute, that the instrument was rendered void. He insisted, that the statute which had been cited, applied only to cases of alteration made with consent of both parties, and that no answer had been given to the authority of Langhorn v. Cologan. DALLAS C. J. There can be no doubt, that, on the facts of this case, the Defendant is liable on his policy. Even as the Defendant has shaped his own statement, the vessel has done no more than it was agreed she should 1819. SANDERSON v. SYMONDS. 1819. SANDERSON v. SYMONDS. should do. As the policy originally stood, she had liberty to sell, barter, and exchange; load, unload, and re-load goods at any or all of the ports and places she might call at and proceed to. Under this general liberty, the jury had no doubt that the vessel had liberty to trade; indeed, the very acts specified, are descriptive of trading, and of nothing else. It appears that the Plaintiff afterwards introduced the words "and trade;" with what view is immaterial; but he went round to the various underwriters for the purpose of obtaining their consent to the alteration. Some agreed, and some refused; but it is quite clear upon the face of the instrument, that the alteration was immaterial, and that the Defendant would have been liable if no such words had been introduced. The case, therefore, does not come within the reasons of former decisions. If a deed be altered in a material point by a stranger, it is rendered void; if it be altered in an immaterial point by a party, it becomes, in some cases, void. The original rule was not intended so much to guard against fraud, as to insure the identity of the instrument and prevent the substitution of another, without the privity of the party concerned. But the present case stands on its own circumstances. The instrument in question is a policy of insurance, an instrument signed by a number of individuals wholly unconnected in interest, and between whom no privity can exist. Indeed it has never been contended that this was an alteration without the privity of the party, and the old cases turn entirely on alterations without the privity of the party: here, the instrument was shewn to all the parties concerned; those who put their initials to the alteration, thereby expressed their consent to it; those, who refused to do so, expressed their denial by the absence of their initials. But the latter were bound by the policy as it stood at first, the former by |